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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined the legal issues of public employee labor relations in the 
United States.  Included in this study is a review of relevant case law as it pertains to 
collective bargaining in the public sector.  In addition to reviewing the case law, this 
study researched the statutory language of each state for public sector collective 
bargaining.  The study includes a review, analysis, and summary of the state and federal 
laws for public sector collective bargaining.   
The collective bargaining process in the United States is designed to resolve 
disputes between two parties, the employer and the employee.  The resolution of these 
disputes often depends on the relative bargaining power of each party.  The private sector 
has a collective bargaining process that has been well established since the passage of the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.  
The federal laws that have been implemented in the last fifty years, to include the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the American with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, among others, cover the scope of almost all of the private sector 
collective bargaining (Oberer, 1994).   
The public sector contains 50 different state laws and several federal laws 
defining the scope of collective bargaining for public employees.  The bargaining process 
in the public sector takes place in the context of the political arena.  This political 
influence, which is unique in each state and at each level of government, provides 
additional steps to the bargaining process that further differentiate public sector 
bargaining from private (Valletta, 1985).  
This study provides conclusions on certain aspects of public sector collective 
 ii
bargaining that lead to dispute resolution and contract negotiation to include fact-finding 
procedures, mediation, arbitration, and strike policies, in the current state of the law.  
Recommendations are made to public officials, policy makers, and other stakeholders for 
the future of public employee labor relations in the United States.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Labor relations in the United States have undergone extensive change in the past 
half-century.  Public employee labor relations have seen a tremendous transformation in 
the last ten years.  Following the Second World War, the country went through one of the 
largest strike waves in history, with many employees unsatisfied with working conditions 
and wages.  People were looking for an improvement in the conditions of the workplace 
and for fair practices in employment.  In the coming years, the government would pass a 
series of laws that directly affected the employee (Imundo, 1975).   
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which restricted union activities 
and permitted states to pass “right-to-work” laws.  In 1963, the Equal Pay Act prohibited 
wage differences for workers based on sex.  In 1964, the Civil Rights Act prohibited 
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  In 
1968, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act made it illegal to discriminate in the 
hiring or firing of persons between the ages of 40 – 65 on the basis of age (Coleman, 
1980).  
As labor relations in the private sector progressed, public employees looked for 
relief in working conditions as well.  In 1970, postal workers staged a massive strike that 
affected the entire U.S. Postal Service.  Later that year, Hawaii became the first state to 
allow its state and local officials the right to strike.  In response to the growing interest in 
public employee unionism, the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) created a public employees department in 1974.  In 1975, more 
than eighty thousand members of the American Federation of State, County and 
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Municipal Employees (AFSCME) participated in the first legal large scale strike of public 
employees (Clark, 1996).  
In the last 25 years, labor relations for public employees have been affected by 
legislation and by political and economic change.  In the United States, the principle 
method for determining overall working conditions in the organized sector of the U.S. 
economy is collective bargaining, rather than legislation.  There are, however, two main 
pieces of legislation that determine labor relations practice (Oberer, 1994): 
(1) The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA).  The NLRA defines the 
rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively with their employers 
through representatives of their own choosing.  To protect the rights of 
employees and employers and to prevent labor disputes.  Congress defined 
which practices were considered unfair labor practices. 
(2) The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).  
The LMRDA provides basic standards of democracy and fiscal responsibility 
in trade unions.  The LMRDA establishes: a Bill of Rights for union members; 
guidelines for the regular election of union officers; requirements for the 
reporting of administrative practices and annual financial activities by unions.  
The provisions of the LMRDA were extended to cover all federal employees 
through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
In the United States, there are more than sixteen million trade union members.  In 
the public sector, although unionization is a relatively recent occurrence, the unionization 
rate (38%) is significantly higher than in the private sector (9%) (Clark, 1996).   
The researcher began with a thorough examination of the historical, political, 
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economic, and legislative events in public sector labor relations since the early 1970s that 
led to the current state of affairs in public sector labor relations and collective bargaining 
in the United States.  The researcher proceeded to define and provide a historical and 
political perspective on the importance of the following terms:  binding arbitration, right-
to-work laws, no-strike clause, grievance procedures, impasse, organization 
representatives, public employees, bargaining unit, bargaining agent, and collective 
bargaining.  The researcher detailed public employee labor laws as defined, and in 
relation to the terms above, in each of the 50 states of the United States.  Through this 
process, the researcher sought to find trends in legislation and policy among the states of 
the union.  How many states have written and tested public employee labor laws?  What 
case law is available from the courts to support these trends?  The researcher examined 
the recent changes in public sector labor relations as they have been affected by the 
events in private sector labor relations.  Whereas the private sector works with a situation 
of supply and demand in which profits drive the market and the organization’s ability to 
survive, in the public sector, budgets are decided legislatively.  What changes have we 
seen in the past ten years in public sector labor relations and what path will public sector 
labor take in the future? 
This study provided a qualitative analysis of legal decisions and examined the 
laws written at the local, state, and federal level in the United States.  The researcher 
scrutinized case law from the United States Supreme Court, United States Circuit Courts, 
State Supreme Courts and Appellate Courts.  Research sources included the United States 
Constitution, all state constitutions and statutes, and case law as related to public sector 
labor relations.  Based upon the qualitative analysis, the researcher made 
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recommendations for public school districts and state legislatures to follow in their future 
legal and management efforts with public employee labor law and employee working 
conditions.  
The study provided a historical and supportive background to the state laws by 
describing federal laws as they apply to public sector labor relations.  The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) and The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
are two of the main federal agencies responsible for promoting equal and fair labor 
practice in the United States.  The following federal laws provide additional guidance for 
fair labor practice:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; The Equal Pay Act of 1963; 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, §§ 
501 and 505; Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990; and The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (Gould, 1993).
This study examined in detail the changing political and economic processes that 
affect the public employee labor laws.  Collective bargaining and the political process are 
very well connected in the public sector.  There is, within this sector, a specific 
responsibility to protect the public interest with the recognized sovereign status of the 
state, and there exists a financial constraint on management which differs greatly from 
the private sector.  Federal employees cannot bargain over the important issues of 
compensation, with the exception of a few select agencies.  Federal workers are further 
prohibited from striking and other forms of political activity considered illegal (under the 
Hatch Act) (Imundo, 1975). 
Additionally, collective bargaining has been discouraged in the public sector on 
the basis of the “privilege doctrine.”  This doctrine states that the benefits the government 
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confers on its employees are privileges as opposed to rights.  The courts have recently 
addressed these doctrines of sovereignty and privilege and the barriers to collective 
bargaining are subsiding in the public sector (Martin, 1977).  Although the issues of 
bargaining in the public sector continue to evolve, and more so in favor of unions, there 
remains the description of government services as “essential.”  Thus, bargaining has been 
denied when this essentiality of services can be hindered.  In recent years, as citizens 
have adapted to postal strikes, teachers strikes, and other disruptions of service on the 
public service level, public sector labor bargaining has become more generally accepted 
by the general public (Martin). 
The focus of this study was limited to the laws in place in the 50 states, detailing 
the rights to collectively bargain and to strike.  There is no comprehensive common legal 
framework within which to work for state and local government employees.  State and 
local labor relations exist through a complex map of common-law doctrines, judicial 
decrees, executive orders, statutes, and ordinances (Clark, 1996).  The labor relations 
situation for public employees is extremely diverse in each city, county, and state in the 
United States.  Many state and local government employees have resorted to strikes as a 
way to ensure their respective employers meet their demands.  The large majority of 
governmental jurisdictions prohibit public employees from striking; however, hundreds 
of public employee strikes have taken place in the last twenty years (Olson, 1986).   
Employers continue to resist the idea of legalizing strikes by employees because 
of the sovereign nature of government and the fundamental necessity of government 
services.  State and local governments have resorted to three basic procedures to press the 
process of finality:  mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.  There continues to be a 
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strong opposition to compulsory arbitration as it displaces the political responsibility by 
delegating governmental authority to a third party who is not responsible to the electorate 
(Ichniowski, 1982).   
In 1970, Hawaii and Pennsylvania authorized certain types of public employees to 
strike.  Ten other states joined in to allow public employees to strike, seven by statute:  
Alaska, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and three by 
common law:  California, Idaho, and Montana (Valletta, 1985).  The trend in public 
sector bargaining has been toward mutual responsibility for wages, hours, and working 
conditions, however the conflict of sovereignty/accountability and bilateral authority is 
strongly ideological and imbedded in discussion and disagreement among the parties of 
interest (Imundo, 1975).     
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study was to develop a base of information from which 
government agencies; state legislatures, public officials, and other stakeholders can create 
practical and legal rules, procedures, and policies concerning collective bargaining in the 
public sector, for teachers, police and fire officers, and other government employees.  
This study examined the laws, statutes, and court decisions that provide a framework for 
the development of future constitutionally sound policy and procedure in collective 
bargaining in the public sector.  This study provided the varying methods of collective 
bargaining, in the United States public sector, for analysis and review, in an effort to find 
common ground and successful methods for labor dispute resolution.   
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Research Questions 
 
1. What conclusions and recommendations can be made from the supporting legal 
research and jurisprudence on the subject of public sector collective bargaining? 
2. What significant issues are found in the historical development and litigation of 
public sector collective bargaining that would lend them to assist in the future 
advancement of state and federal public labor laws?  
3. What are the legal ramifications and limitations, with the state and federal 
laws as currently written, for public sector collective bargaining? 
Background 
 
In the private sector, collective bargaining is maintained by the employer and the 
employee who is normally represented by a labor organization.  The framework of the 
negotiations for pay and working conditions is preserved by specific federal legislation 
and further supported by state laws.  In the United States, employees in the private sector 
are well aware of their rights to bargain and to strike if necessary.  In the public sector, 
employers have very often restricted employees from bargaining for wages and benefits.  
In some areas, for example at the federal level, bargaining for pay has not been allowed.  
Government employees have been expected by the public to serve in their duties without 
question and without work slowdown or strike.  The significance of the “obligation to 
serve” in government employment has its roots in the importance of maintaining safety 
and security for all citizens (Imundo, 1975).  Police and fire are considered essential 
services that should not be interrupted for labor negotiations.  From these primary and 
critical government services continues the discussion to all other government, municipal, 
state, and federal employees.  Water and electricity are regarded by many to be critical 
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services for the public.  Garbage disposal, parks and recreation, schools, and many other 
services, all provided by different levels of government and paid for by citizen’s taxes, 
have been considered crucial to the public’s health and welfare.   
Public employees and their labor organizations have made successful inroads in 
the collective bargaining process with their respective employers.  Many aspects of the 
negotiations process in the public sector are similar to the negotiations strategies and 
methods applied in the private sector (Lee, 1987).  Grievance procedures and rights 
disputes are negotiated in almost identical formats as found in the private sector.  Fact-
finding procedures and mediation are also often utilized in the public sector to find 
resolution to disputes.  The important difference occurs in the public sector when 
resolving interest disputes (Gould, 1993).  The collective bargaining process in the public 
sector does not contain the same economic pressure points as in the private sector.  
Government employers and employees are often mired in political maneuvering when 
trying to resolve labor disputes.  The general public, most often the part with persons 
affected by a possible disruption of services, is often involved when it comes to public 
employee labor negotiations.  The political influence of stakeholders can vary from the 
prominent local businessman or councilman to the common taxpaying citizen who is 
afraid of losing trash pickup services for the next several weeks or the single mother with 
children in school worried about a possible teacher strike.   
The economic strategies used by opposing parties in private sector labor disputes 
can be brutally difficult, causing severe profit loss for a plant operation, locking out 
striking employees and hiring replacements, and even causing permanent business 
shutdown, where both the employer and employee lose everything (Ichniowski, 1982).  
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These very fears and potential dangers to the economic well being of both parties is what 
often keep negotiations underway.  Neither party is in the situation to see the demise of 
the other, for they both need to be healthy for each other to survive.   The employer needs 
the working bodies to keep his plant operating, and the employees need a place of work, 
to provide for their families.  However, the very negotiations for pay and wages, 
especially in difficult economic times, are often gut-wrenching and require committed 
patience and ability to find resolution. 
In the public sector, employees and employers are most often without this final 
step of economic decision.  In the absence of this common fear of economic mortality, 
parties in the public sector have a much more complicated route to dispute resolution 
(Oberer, 1994).  Some state governments rely on fact-finding and mediation efforts with 
the additional threat of arbitration to decide labor disputes.  In general, parties prefer to 
resolve their own issues with each other rather than seeking final and binding arbitration 
with a third and neutral party.  The common feeling is that one can usually negotiate at 
least a better agreement than one that is forced through binding arbitration.  
Unfortunately for some public employees, without the strike as a strategic tool, and 
absent any kind of binding or legal arbitration, they are often forced to accept final offers 
by the employer, the local government agency (Olson, 1986).   
An improved information base of the issues surrounding public employee 
collective bargaining at all government levels, municipal, state, and federal, is necessary 
to better the economic and political working conditions of government employees in the 
United States (Valletta, 1985).  While some states have now allowed public employees to 
strike, others do not even have statutes written to enforce public employee collective 
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bargaining.  Although a federally mandated set of procedures or laws may not be the 
solution, it would be most helpful in order to better grasp the complexities of public 
sector collective bargaining and the needs of both the employers and the employees to 
have some common ground and common understanding in this very uncommon arena, 
collective bargaining in the public sector. 
Definitions 
 
 Closed Shop – A location of employment where workers must be members of the 
union as a condition of their employment.  This practice was made unlawful by the Taft-
Hartley Act. 
 Collective Bargaining – As supported by the National Labor Relations Act, is a 
procedure looking toward the making of collective agreements between employer and the 
accredited representative of union employees concerning wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment, and requires that parties deal with each other with open and 
fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles existing between them to the 
end that employment relations are stabilized and any obstruction to the free flow of 
commerce is prevented.    
 Collective Bargaining Agreement – An agreement between the employer and a 
labor union which regulates terms and conditions of employment.   
 Collective Bargaining Unit – All of the employees of a single employer unless the 
employees of a particular department or division have voted otherwise.  
 Exclusive Bargaining Agent – The union that has been recognized and certified as 
such by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the exclusive representative of 
employees in a bargaining unit.   
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 Fair Representation – The duty of a union to represent fairly all of its members, 
both in the conduct of collective bargaining and in the enforcement of the resulting 
agreement, and to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination 
toward any and to exercise discretion with complete good faith and honesty and to avoid 
arbitrary conduct.   
 Good Faith Bargaining – The requirement upon the employer and employee 
organization and obligation to come to the bargaining table with an open mind and 
sincere desire to reach an agreement.    
 Interests Dispute – A dispute that arises over the terms of the new collective 
bargaining agreement.   
 Labor – This term is synonymous with “employment” and “job” and refers to 
work for wages as opposed to work for profits.  In the Clayton Act, this term is not 
limited to manual laborers or mechanics but also includes intellectual labor.   
 Labor Dispute – Any controversy between employer and employee concerning 
the terms, tenure, hours, wages, fringe benefits, or conditions of employment, or 
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, 
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment.   
 Negotiate – The transaction of business or the act of bargaining with another party 
respecting a transaction of business.  To conduct communications or conferences with a 
view to reaching a settlement or agreement.  A conversation in arranging the terms of a 
contract.  To conclude by bargain, treaty, or agreement.  
 No Strike Clause – Provision commonly found in public service labor-
management agreements to the effect that the employees will not strike for any reason; 
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with labor disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration. 
 Public Employee – A worker or employee whose efforts are compensated by a 
public agency, as in a department or agency of government, which has an official or 
quasi-official status.   
 Public Employer – A department or agency of government, which has an official 
or quasi-official status.  Levels of government can be local, state, and federal.   
 Private Employee – A worker or employee whose efforts are compensated by an 
individual or partnership of individuals that is not official or associated with government 
or public office.   
Private Employer – An individual or partnership of individuals that is not official 
or associated with government or public office.   
 Protected Activity – An action that will not cause an employee to be disciplined or 
discharged. 
 Rights Dispute – A dispute that involves the interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 Shop Steward – A union official elected to represent members in a plant or 
particular department.  Duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members 
and initial negotiations for settlement of grievances. 
 Unfair Labor Practice – As defined by the National Labor Relations Act, a 
practice for the employer: (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
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protection; (2) to dominate or interfere with the formulation or administration of any 
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; (3) to discriminate in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment and to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; (4) to discharge or 
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given 
testimony under the Act; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of 
his employees. 
 Union Shop – A place of where all workers, once employed, must become union 
members within a specific period of time as a condition of employment.  See Closed 
Shop.   
Unprotected Activity – An action that is prohibited and may cause a cease-and-
desist order from the NLRB through an administrative process or through an order from 
the circuit court of appeals.   
 Zipper Clause – An agreement by both parties to preclude further bargaining 
during the term of the contract.  
Legal Definitions 
 
 Action – A lawsuit brought in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction 
of a court of law.  The legal and formal demand of one’s right from another person or 
party made and insisted on in a court of justice.     
 Administrative Procedure – Methods and processes before administrative 
agencies as distinguished from judicial procedure, which applies to courts.  
 Administrative Process – A procedure used before administrative agencies to 
summon witnesses and determine information. 
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 Affirm – To ratify, uphold, approve, confirm, establish, reassert.  In the practice of 
appellate courts, to declare a judgment, decree, or order that it is valid and right and must 
stand as rendered.   
 Appeal – To resort to a superior (appellate) court to review the decision of an 
inferior (trial) court or administrative agency.   
 Appellant – The party who takes an appeal from one court or jurisdiction to 
another. 
 Appellate Court – A court having jurisdiction of appeal and review; a court to 
which causes are removable by appeal, certiorari, error or report.  
 Appellee – The party in a cause against whom an appeal is taken.  The party who 
has an interest adverse to setting aside or reversing the judgment.   
 Arbitration – A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party 
(arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to 
be heard.  The arrangement is attended to avoid the formalities, the delay, and the 
expense of ordinary litigation.   
 Binding Arbitration – Arbitration, which is enforceable by the court of law upon 
its decision.   
 Case Law – The aggregate of reported cases as forming a body of jurisprudence, 
or the law of a particular subject as evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, in 
distinction to statutes and other sources of law.    
 Cease-and-Desist Order – An order of an administrative agency or court 
prohibiting a person or business firm from continuing a particular course of conduct.  
Ruling issued in an unfair labor practice case requiring the charged party (respondent) to 
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stop the conduct found illegal and take specified affirmative action designed to remedy 
the unfair labor practice.   
 Certiorari (Writ of) – A writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an 
inferior court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried 
therein.  The writ is issued in order that the court issuing the writ may inspect the 
proceedings and determine whether there have been any irregularities.  Most commonly 
used to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States, which uses this term as a 
discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear.   
 Clause – A single paragraph or subdivision of a pleading or legal document, such 
as a contract, constitution, or statute.   
 Common Law – As distinguished from statutory law created by the enactment of 
legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, 
relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their 
authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the 
judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages 
and customs, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England.  All the statutory and 
case law background of England and the American colonies before the American 
Revolution.   
 Complaint – The original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced.  A 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.   
 Condition – A clause in a contract or agreement, which has for its object to 
suspend, rescind, or modify the principal obligation.   
 Declaratory Judgment – Statutory (Declaratory Act) remedy for the determination 
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of a justifiable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights.  A binding 
adjudication of the rights and status of litigants even though no consequential relief is 
awarded.   
 Defendant – The party against whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or 
suit.   
 Dismissal – An order or judgment finally disposing of an action, suit, or motion 
without trial of the issues involved.   
 Employee – A person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and 
direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed.   
 Enjoin – To require a person, by writ of injunction, to perform, or to abstain or 
desist from, an act.    
 Fact-finding – An investigation and report to determine the facts concerning a 
particular event, situation, or dispute. 
 Final Offer Arbitration – Arbitration where the arbitrator must choose the final 
offer of either one party or the other and is therefore not permitted to compromise.   
 Grievance – A complaint filed by an employee, or by his union representative, 
regarding working conditions and for resolution of which there is procedural machinery 
provided in the union contract.   
 Holding – The legal principle to be drawn from the opinion (decision) of the 
court.   
 Impasse – A situation allowing for no further progress; stalemate in contract 
negotiations. 
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 Injunction – A court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or 
commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury.    
 Jurisdiction – The power of the court to decide a matter in controversy and 
presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court with control over the subject matter 
and the parties.  The power of the courts to inquire into facts, apply the law, make 
decisions, and declare judgment.         
 Labor contract – A contract between employer and employees (union), which 
governs working conditions, wages, fringe benefits, and grievances.   
 Labor-management relations – Activities, which concern the relationship of 
employee to employers both union and non-union.   
 Labor Organization – An organization or agency or employee representation 
committee, group, association, or plan that is engaged, with employee participation, for 
the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, 
rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment. 
 Labor Picketing – The act of patrolling in motion at or near an employer location, 
carrying placards with a short communication about the union’s claims.   
 Labor Union – A combination or association of workers organized for the purpose 
of securing favorable wages, improved labor conditions, better hours of labor, and 
righting grievances against employers.   
 Mediation – A method of dispute resolution in which a neutral third person, the 
mediator, helps disputing parties to reach an agreement.  The mediator does not have the 
power to impose a decision on the parties. 
 Opinion – The statement by a judge or court of the decision reached in regard to a 
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cause tried or argued before them, expounding the law as applied to the case, and 
detailing the reasons upon which the judgment is based. 
 Plaintiff – a person, who brings an action to court, complains or sues, or seeks 
remedial relief for an injury to rights.   
 Primary boycott – An action by a union by which it tries to induce people not to 
use, handle, transport or purchase goods of an employer with which the union has a 
grievance. 
 Remand – The act of an appellate court when it sends a case back to the trial court 
and orders the trial court to conduct limited new hearings or an entirely new trial, or to 
take some further action.   
 Respondent – In appellate practice, the party who contends against an appeal, 
against whom the appeal is taken, or the appellee.   
 Reverse – To overthrow, vacate, set aside, annul.  To reverse a judgment, sentence 
or decree of a lower court by an appellate court. 
 Secondary boycott – The refusal to work for, purchase from or handle products of 
secondary employer with whom the union has no dispute, with object of forcing such 
employer to stop doing business with primary employer with whom union has a dispute.   
Secondary Strike – A strike against firms which supply goods and materials to the 
firm with which there is a primary dispute.   
 Strike – The act of quitting work by a body of workers for the purpose of coercing 
their employer to accede to some demand they have made upon him, and which he has 
refused.   
 Strikebreaker – An individual who takes the place of workman who has left his 
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work in an effort to force the striking employee to agree to demands of employer. 
 Ultra vires – An act performed without any authority to act on subject.      
 Wages – A compensation given to a hired person for his services based on the 
time worked or output of production.   
Limitations of the Study 
 
1. The importance and pertinence of the court cases utilized in this study were 
limited by their accessibility and availability as a resource through the legal 
research database Lexis-Nexis.    
2. The accuracy of information as presented in the court cases was dependent on the 
legal research database Lexis-Nexis. 
3. The ability to access the most up-to-date state and federal statutes was dependent 
on state and federal statute publications. 
4. The applicability of state statutes and Federal District Court cases was limited by 
the borders of their representative states.  Federal laws, Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and Supreme Court decisions provided legal precedence throughout the United 
States. 
Assumptions of the Study 
 
1. It was assumed that collective bargaining and dispute resolution procedures are 
relevant and current legal issues for public sector employees in the United States, 
from teachers and school board members to police, fire, and utilities officers and 
their respective government agencies.   
2. It was assumed that teachers, school district and site administrators, school board 
members, university staff and professors, state legislatures, government agencies, 
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and the general public would benefit from current and up-to-date knowledge of 
the legal status of public sector collective bargaining in the United States. 
3. It was assumed that the individual parties named above would be better equipped, 
with a broad and detailed information base on public sector collective bargaining, 
to manage new government policy, legal changes in state and federal statutes, and 
new court decisions and better able to plan for the future success of public sector 
employment.     
Significance of the Study 
 
Collective bargaining in the public sector is in a state of change throughout the 
United States.  There is no single policy, federal statute, or executive order that dictates 
the complete negotiations process for public employees.  Policy varies from state to state 
with some states bereft of any collective bargaining law at all.  Some states utilize 
mediation and fact-finding methods with or without arbitration.  In some instances, 
arbitration is mandatory while in others it is voluntary.  Strikes are prohibited by almost 
all states, but have been recently allowed in several.  The discussion on the state of public 
sector collective bargaining continues throughout the United States, from school board 
meetings to city council meetings to government agency policy meetings.   
The collective bargaining process, although not supported by state statute in all 
fifty states, is sanctioned by court decisions, attorney general opinions, local ordinances 
and executive orders.  There continues to be much debate about the best course of action 
for future legislation for the public sector.  The dialogue has become a political one as 
different sides of the political spectrum become involved in the future of government 
employee rights.  Conservative party influence and support of elected officials tends to 
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lead in the direction of refusal of many of the rights long ago granted to private 
employees.  The right to bargain collectively for wages and benefits has been a right of 
private employees for most of the past century.  The right to strike is also a well-
established right of private employees that is often successfully used to drive labor 
disputes to final resolution.   
These rights that have been a part of private sector labor negotiations for many 
years find resistance in the public sector.  There are those parties who feel that 
government sovereignty is inviolable and that to strike against the very government that 
protects you is an unacceptable and reprehensible option.  In addition, to allow 
government to be saddled by the arm-twisting techniques of strikes, lockouts, and 
shutdowns would be contrary to the foundations of our system of government.  The 
political process cannot be influenced by the economic needs of its employees.  These are 
the feelings of a substantial number of individuals directly involved in the public 
employment process, while others have argued simply that times have changed.  The 
economic well being of our government is interconnected with private industry in a 
multitude of areas of business, manufacturing, production, technology, and research.  The 
financial fluctuations of the private sector have great influence on what occurs with the 
government.  A simple course in macroeconomics can justify and demonstrate the 
connectedness of private and public sector economic activity.   
For most employees working in government jobs, a merit based system of 
recognition and promotion existed rather than the seniority and experience based system 
supported by most collective bargaining agreements.  In addition, government employees 
were simply not permitted to debate their wages and benefits.  As the situation in public 
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sector employment changed and employees gained greater leverage in determining their 
own working conditions, some agreements went to the more traditional seniority based 
system of recognition found in the private sector.  However, the merit-based approach 
has made a comeback in recent years in the private sector and will continue to play a role 
in determining worker pay.  The matter is more complicated in the public sector than in 
the private sector where production and profit provide more measurable events to 
determine pay in a merit based system.  The work done in many parts of the public sector 
are service-based jobs such as police, fire, and education where there is no product to 
measure.  Recent efforts in qualitative research, measurement, and assessment have 
provided more options for these employees in a merit-based system of employment.   
Employees need to be aware of the changes occurring in their areas of work.  The 
notion of collective bargaining has evolved from a simple model of employer versus 
employee for the greatest wage hike possible or strike.  Working conditions have 
improved dramatically across the country in all areas of expertise, from technology to 
agriculture to service-related jobs to education.  Employees, employers, legislatures, 
political advocates, contract negotiators and community members must gain a broader 
and deeper knowledge of the historical and constitutional background of the issues 
surrounding public sector collective bargaining.  These issues affect a large portion of the 
working population and in addition since they involve government services they have 
great importance to a majority of the population at large.  The knowledge gained and 
implemented will serve as a starting point for the development of new policies and 
procedures that are prepared to serve the rights of employees and employers.   
There exists a general lack of knowledge and misinformation throughout the 
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ranks of public sector employees.  This situation is worsened by the inconsistency of 
policy from state to state.  The federal laws do not ameliorate this set of circumstances in 
the different municipalities, cities, and local governments, as they address the rules for 
federal employees.  The complexity and variation of public sector collective bargaining 
rules is often reduced to rumor and rhetoric as different political parties provide their 
input.   
This study will examine and provide the legal information base that is drawn from 
the principles and interpretation of the constitutional law as developed by our judicial 
review system.  This study will further clarify and decipher the legal issues as they relate 
to public sector collective bargaining.   
Government agencies, school boards, and other city and municipal services must 
have an awareness of the current law regarding public sector collective bargaining.  The 
jurisprudence and the historical review of public sector collective bargaining will be 
provided in his study and its importance accentuated for all stakeholders.  The future of 
public employment and its success depends on an acceptance to understand and analyze 
the process and history through which public sector collective bargaining has traveled 
and to prepare and predict the road ahead.   
The significance of this study is to provide a clear understanding of the current 
state of the law, to review the path already taken, and to determine which course to map 
for the future of public sector employment.  In addition, it would be most prudent to find 
a way to create a standard of consistency among states, at all levels of government.  The 
analysis of the state and federal statutes and court decisions will provide a knowledge 
base from which to plan for future legislative decision-making and judicial action.  This 
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study is significant in its review and analysis of state and federal laws and court 
precedent for public sector collective bargaining to better prepare the formulation of 
policy and procedure that will affect a large percentage of the working population.  This 
study is further significant in its recommendations and conclusions, based upon the 
current and historical jurisprudence of public sector collective bargaining, to assist in the 
improvement of working conditions for public sector employees in the United States.   
Research Methodology 
 
 The initial research in this study involved the investigation of the legal issues 
surrounding the topic of collective bargaining in the United States.  In the course of this 
research, it was determined that further study of the historical background of collective 
bargaining was necessary for a thorough understanding of the subject.  Primary and 
secondary legal sources were researched. 
 In this study, the methodology consisted of legal research of related case law, 
state and federal statutory language, administrative rules, and executive orders.  Federal 
statutory provisions provided the information base for collective bargaining in the United 
States, but once the study proceeded to the area of specific research of collective 
bargaining in the public sector, it was necessary to research state statutes and case law.  
Primary sources included state and federal constitutional language, state and federal 
statutory language, and state and federal court decisions.  These primary sources of 
information were identified through the research of secondary sources such as law 
journals, public labor law journals, legal encyclopedias, and annotated statutes.   
 In addition to the law and labor law journals that were researched, the legal 
resource service Lexis-Nexis was the source of state and federal court decisions.  The 
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legal dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary was utilized for legal definitions.  The legal 
encyclopedias, Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence 2d, assisted in 
finding and investigating the law for public sector collective bargaining.  Further legal 
research was conducted and cases investigated in American Law Reports, West’s Federal 
Practice Digest, and the United States Code Service Lawyer’s Edition.   
 The review and analysis of the law as provided by these legal research sources 
supported this study and its efforts to assess the significance of current and historical 
changes in public sector collective bargaining.  The methodology of this study also 
reported on the examination of all state statutory language as it applies to public sector 
collective bargaining.  This research reviewed the state and federal court decisions as 
they relate to these statutes at the state level.  Federal statutes were included in the study 
and their application in the law was reviewed.  In order to provide the most current and 
pertinent legal research, this study included communication with state attorneys general 
and state department of education officials.      
Organization of the Study 
 
This study was divided into four separate and distinct sections.  Chapter I 
identified the topic of public sector collective bargaining as relevant for study and review.  
This chapter discussed the importance of public sector collective bargaining and 
identified the key participants in any future changes of the law.  In addition this part of 
the study presented the need for a historical review of the case law and federal and state 
laws as they developed in the United States.  
A formal literature review of the historical and legal basis for the current public 
sector labor law as written was presented in Chapter II.  The study investigated state and 
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federal court decisions and state and federal laws as they developed through the twentieth 
century and currently stand and apply to public labor relations.  This section further 
provided analysis and examination of the court decisions from a historical and legal 
perspective as they applied to public sector labor relations during the economic, political, 
and demographic changes of the United States in the last one hundred years.   
Chapter III presented the information on all state statutes that addresses public 
sector collective bargaining, dispute resolution, and rules regarding strikes.  This section 
of the study examined all legally applicable state statutes and related court cases for 
public sector collective bargaining and labor relations.  Analysis of court decisions and 
statutes is included where appropriate and supportive of the study.   
Chapter IV summarized the study and provided recommendations and conclusions for 
review by all interested parties:  school board officials, government agency leaders, local 
and state government officials, and other community members.  This chapter 
recapitulated the historical and legal review from Chapter II and provided additional 
analysis and consideration of the law as it applied to public sector collective bargaining.  
In addition, this chapter provided information to be considered by policy makers and 
stakeholders on the current public sector labor law and to utilize this data as a resource 
when formulating future rules and procedures in the arena of public sector labor relations 
at all levels of government. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The Common Law and Early Cases  
 
 
The beginnings of what is now termed “labor relations” in the United States can 
be traced back almost two hundred years to a case known as the Philadelphia 
Cordwainers’ Case (Commonwealth v. Pullis, 1806).   
This case is an excellent point of departure for any study of the political, 
economic, and social factors involved in the development of labor law into its current 
form (Oberer, 1994).  In order to complete an up to date study of public employee labor 
law in the United States, a detailed review of the history of labor law in general must first 
be accomplished.  The importance of public sector labor relations has only recently 
developed in the last thirty years as a separate political arena and its previous history is 
more dependent on the legal and political course of private sector labor relations. 
In this early labor case, the issues of striking and conspiracy were already in play.  
Philadelphia shoe manufacturers were challenged with providing a local shoe product at 
an agreed upon rate and one for export at a reduced rate to compete with British 
production.  As the export market grew unexpectedly, the shoe manufacturers found 
themselves at a loss for profit and demanded all shoes be sold at the original agreed upon 
rate.  The “masters” who bought and sold the shoes from the “journeymen” refused to 
honor the request.  A strike ensued and the leaders were arrested on conspiracy charges.  
The strike ended in failure and the prices returned to the old rates.     
The larger issue here arises from the strain between the American Federalists and 
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their support for the English common law which stated that for workmen to attempt to 
raise wages was “criminal” and the Jeffersonian Republicans who supported a system of 
“individual freedom and a minimum of law and government” (Commons, 1910).  In the 
Mayor’s Court of Philadelphia, the prosecution and defense argued the tenets of freedom 
of collective action and the realities of the journeymen societies’ compulsion of 
membership for all shoemakers, otherwise known as closed shop.  According to court 
testimony, anyone who attempted to “scab” as a journeyman or master would be either 
beaten or threatened.  The court considered whether the journeymen’s combined actions 
were harmful to the general public and stated that it would be “impossible to do business 
if journeymen could arbitrarily jump their wages” (Commons, 1910).  With a jury, the 
court found the defendants “guilty of a combination to raise wages” and each journeyman 
was fined eight dollars.   
The English common law viewed the journeymen’s behavior as conspiracy and 
criminal.  The Republicans’ arguments of freedom and equality of right for the individual 
made the case not only more interesting but also more important for the time and was the 
beginning of the history of American labor law, after common law.  For the first time in a 
court of law in the United States, the needs of the individual were being compared with 
the needs of the public.  At the time, the court clearly stated that any action that is solely 
for the benefit of one and to injure another is considered unlawful.  From this one 
decision, based on principle, unions of the time were legally condemned.   
Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842) 
 
Almost forty years later, in Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842), a similar group of 
shoemakers combined to form a society of workers and attempted to control prices.  They 
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further agreed not to work for any person who employed any journeyman that was not a 
member of their society, essentially maintaining a closed shop as in Pullis (1806).  The 
defendants were charged with conspiracy and the court considered the merits of such a 
society.  The court stated that such a society could be used for “honorable and useful 
purposes” to assist workers in times of need, sickness, and distress or for purposes of 
“oppression and injustice.”  Contrary to the results of Pullis, in Hunt, the court stated that 
societies and associations were perfectly legal as long as there were no secret or 
pernicious goals planned by the organized groups of individuals.  The court further stated 
that if the associations acted to cause hardship to another by reducing profits through 
work stoppages and strikes, these actions were not necessarily unlawful as long as the 
specific actions were not directly criminal in nature.  Justice Shaw’s focus on the 
“purpose” and the “means” in determining the lawfulness of the concerted union activity 
set a precedent in labor law for years to come and was evident in later court cases, 
statutes, and administrative decisions.  The questions:   (1) What did they do? and  (2) 
Why did they do it? were measured against the social acceptability of the action 
committed (Oberer, 1994).   
In the time of Pullis to Hunt, workers were viewed by employers as conspirators 
to raise wages and as a detriment to free trade between companies.  According to the 
individuals who ran the companies, workers deterred good business practice and cut into 
profit by their union activities.  With the decision in Hunt, the closed shop was permitted 
and the court changed course from the Pullis doctrine of union activity equals criminal 
conspiracy.  A labor union was free to take certain action in order to pressure economic 
benefit for its workers but any intentional infliction of harm upon the employer was now 
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considered a tort and unlawful unless proved to be justified by a legitimate purpose.  This 
meant that a union on strike could be held liable for damages for losses by the employer 
unless the self-interest of the union (workers) justified the action.  The question for the 
courts after Pullis and Hunt was to determine a judicial balance among the competing 
economic interests of workers, employers, and the public.  
The period following the Hunt case and after the Civil War allowed judges a 
considerable amount of freedom to decide cases as appropriate for each situation.  Courts 
attempted to find the balance of interest among all parties and to determine what actions 
can be considered justifiable and lawful.  However, businesses still held the upper hand 
and had considerable political influence.  Unions were still viewed by companies as a 
nuisance and an impediment to profit making practices.  English common law, which 
dictated that workers who organized to raise their own wages were guilty of criminal 
conspiracy, was not far from the minds of the politicians and influential corporate bosses 
who ran the country.  The United States was growing as a young country, trying to 
compete with the economic powerhouses of Europe.  The rights of workers were yet to 
become a real factor in American labor law.   
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, further complicated 
matters for the unions, providing statutory language that “unlawful conspiracies” would 
be brought to the courts.   
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony… (The 
Sherman Act of 1890, § 1) 
 
Union activity and pressure was sometimes considered to violate the Sherman 
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Act.  Although the government’s intention was to prevent large trusts from dominating 
American business and to break up large monopolies, to promote competition and 
effective price control, unions did not benefit from this government action.   
In 1896, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided against union actions and 
granted an injunction to prevent picketing and patrolling of company property.  These 
activities were determined to interfere with the freedom of contract and the right to 
employ individuals at a price agreeable to all parties.   
Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896) 
 
In Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), the defendants were found to have been “willfully 
and maliciously” patrolling the streets in front of the employer’s premises and blocking 
the entrance and threatening persons attempting to enter to work in their places.  
Although the defendants claimed that they were simply trying to secure better wages, the 
court stated that their actions had been unlawful. 
A combination to do injurious acts expressly directed to another, by way of 
intimidation or constraint, is outside of allowable competition, and is unlawful 
(Vegelahn, 1896). 
 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented from this decision.  Holmes did not feel  
that the courts should decide this matter and were not designed to devise policy without 
instruction from the legislature.  Holmes further suggested that union activity was 
competition and should be considered lawful if not criminal by threat of force or by act of 
force.  Although the injunction was imposed and the patrolling stopped, Justice Holmes’ 
words about future union activity and the realities of an industrialized nation were 
poignant. 
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most 
superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, 
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and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever 
increasing might and scope of combination.  It seems to me futile to set our faces 
against this tendency (Vegelahn, 1896). 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court dealt directly with the application of the Sherman Act 
in two important cases.    
Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 
 
In Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), The Danbury Hatters’ case, a combination of workers, 
members of a labor organization, took action to prevent the free trade and commerce of 
their employer through the use of a boycott.  The employer Dietrich Loewe, a hat 
manufacturer, refused to recognize the union.  The employees went on strike.  Loewe 
resumed work with a scab crew and the employees organized an interstate boycott.  The 
case was originally brought to the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut under § 7 
of the Sherman Act.  The plaintiff claimed damages for economic injuries inflicted by the 
defendant by a “combination and conspiracy” of action that was unlawful under the 
Sherman Act.  The case then proceeded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit on a writ of error.  The question was whether the plaintiffs could maintain action 
against the defendants under § 7 of the Sherman Act.  The case went to the Supreme 
Court to have the “whole record and cause sent up for its consideration” and ended with a 
decision by the Court to grant an injunction against the union activity for preventing free 
trade and commerce as delineated in the Sherman Act.   
Congress made no distinction between classes.  It provided that every contract, 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal.  Labor unions are not 
exempt from the comprehensive provisions of the Sherman Act against 
combinations in restraint of trade (Loewe, 1908). 
 
Lawlor v. Loewe (1915) 
 
Seven years later in Lawlor v. Loewe (1915), the Court again decided in favor of 
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Loewe by upholding a lower federal court allowing him to collect damages.  
Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company (1911) 
 
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company (1911), the Court upheld an 
injunction order against the American Federation of Labor (AFL), an organization 
composed of voluntary associations of labor unions.  The AFL approached the company 
as to the hours of labor of its workers.  The controversy ended up in a boycott of the 
company.  The AFL publication The American Federationist printed the company as an 
“unfair” employer.  The Court forced the AFL to remove the Bucks Stove Company from 
its “unfair list” and to cease the boycott.  The Danbury Hatters’ case and the Bucks Stove 
and Range Company decision took away the unions’ strategy of using the secondary 
boycott to pressure employers to recognize unions for collective bargaining and to 
operate closed shops.   
Yellow-Dog Contracts and The Erdman Act of 1898 
 
During this time period, many employers engaged in yellow-dog contracts, an 
agreement where an employee promises, as a condition of employment, not to be a union 
member or to become one during the course of employment.  The Erdman Act of 1898, 
ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424, attempted to prevent this practice and provided that it is unlawful to 
require an employee to enter in an agreement not to become or remain a union member, 
or to discriminate against an employee because of union membership.   
Adair v. United States (1908) 
 
However in Adair v. United States (1908), the Court declared § 10 of the Erdman 
Act, which specifically dealt with the employment of union workers, to be 
unconstitutional. 
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It is not within the power of Congress to make it a criminal offense against the 
United States to discharge an employee simply because of his membership in a 
labor organization; and the provision to that effect in § 10 of the act of June 1, 
1898, 30 Stat. 424, concerning interstate carriers is an invasion of personal liberty, 
as well as of the right of property, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and is therefore unenforceable as repugnant to 
the declaration of that amendment that no person shall be deprived of liberty or 
property without due process of law.  It is not within the functions of government 
to compel any person in the course of his business, and against his will, either to 
employ, or be employed by another. An employer has the same right to prescribe 
terms on which he will employ one to labor as an employee has to prescribe those 
on which he will sell his labor, and any legislation which disturbs this equality is 
an arbitrary and unjustifiable interference with liberty of contract. 
 
Coppage v. State of Kansas (1915) 
 
Furthermore, in Coppage v. State of Kansas (1915), the “yellow dog contract,” at 
issue again, was determined to be a lawful option for the voluntary employee and 
employer.  A Kansas law had banned the practice of these agreements, which barred 
employees from joining labor unions.  Coppage, an employer, had terminated an 
employee for refusing to sign a “yellow dog contract.”  Coppage was charged and 
convicted of violating the Kansas law.  Coppage appealed to the Supreme Court.  The 
question was whether the Kansas statute violated freedom of contract as protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court determined that although 
the employer and employee do not have the constitutional right to insert any stipulation 
into a labor contract, they do have the right to accept or refuse any given employment.  
The Kansas law was found to be arbitrary and to interfere with the normal exercise of 
personal liberty and property rights.   
To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while 
retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask him to give up any part of 
his constitutional freedom.  He is free to decline the employment on those terms, 
just as the employer may decline to offer employment (Coppage, 1915). 
 
The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 
 34
 
The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, was passed and 
designed to give relief to labor unions and to strengthen the antitrust provisions of the 
Sherman Act of 1890.  Labor unions were excluded from the language forbidding 
combinations in the restraint of trade.  Previous to the Clayton Act, unions had been 
labeled as a nuisance to business, often found guilty of preventing free trade and 
commerce, and even held liable for civil damages as a result of loss of profit for their 
respective companies.  Strikes, picketing, and boycotts were not permitted.  The Clayton 
Act provided the labor unions some breathing room and allowed them to exercise their 
economic influence through more direct action.  The following two sections of the Act 
addressed union behavior specifically: 
§ 6:  The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  
Labor organizations cannot be held to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
 
§ 20: Restraining orders will not be granted by any court in cases between 
employer and employee, involving a dispute concerning terms or conditions of 
employment. 
 
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering (1921) 
 
In Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering (1921), the Supreme Court 
 stated that the distinction between a primary and secondary boycott was material to the 
question of whether union conduct was protected under the Clayton Act.  The Duplex 
Company refused to operate a closed shop.  The company also continued to operate a ten-
hour workday at reduced wages.  The union called a primary strike, which was 
unsuccessful.  After the primary strike failed, the union organized a secondary national 
strike with the national labor organization with which it was affiliated.  The company 
manufacturer’s clients were warned by the union with threats of loss and of sympathetic 
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strikes in other unrelated trades.  These other businesses were further threatened not to 
purchase, sell, or transport the Duplex Companies presses for any purpose.  All of these 
actions interfered with interstate trade of the manufacturer and caused great loss to its 
business.  The Court interpreted the Clayton Act of 1914: 
§ 6 of the Clayton Act assumes that the normal objects of such organizations 
(labor unions) are legitimate, but contains nothing to exempt them or their 
members from accountability when they depart from objects that are normal and 
legitimate and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.  
 
§ 20 of the Clayton Act which provides that injunctions shall not be granted in any 
case between an employer and employee growing out of a dispute concerning the 
terms and conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable 
injury does not use the words “employers and employee” in a general class sense 
or treat all members of a labor organization as parties to a dispute which 
proximately affects but a few of them (Duplex Printing, 1921).   
 
The Court held that the union’s activities constituted a secondary boycott aimed at  
compelling third parties and strangers not to do business with the struck employer and 
were not protected under the Clayton Act.  The Court further stated that union attempts to 
exert pressure on companies other than their own violated antitrust law. 
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 
 
The Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch 347, 44 Stat. 577, was passed to apply 
for interstate railroads and their related businesses, requiring employers to bargain 
collectively and prohibiting discrimination against unions.  The Act provided for 
mediation, voluntary arbitration, and fact-finding boards and was intended to promote 
stability in labor-management relations in the railroad industry.   
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 
 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70, was set up to  
free unions from the Sherman Act and also to nullify the basis of decision in the Duplex 
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case.  The government intended to preserve the traditional boundaries of injunctions and 
to prevent restraining orders from being given without a proper hearing and finding of 
fact.  The Act made it quite clear that the tide had turn in favor of labor unions and their 
rights to impact the decisions regarding the employment conditions of their members.   
§ 101.  No court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to 
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case 
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the 
provisions of this Act [29 USCS §§ 101 et seq.] 
 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 
 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat.  
449, created a national administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), to conduct representation elections to determine whether a union could represent 
employees as the exclusive bargaining representative and to determine whether certain 
unfair labor practice violations had been engaged in by the employer.    
The constitutional basis for the NLRA is the commerce clause of the United 
States Constitution, Article I, § 8.  The basis for the law as written is that statutory 
regulation of labor and management is necessary to prevent industrial conflict that would 
disrupt interstate commerce.  In 1935 the NLRA was called the Wagner Act.  The 
language has now changed from “preventing any action” by the labor unions to disrupt 
commerce and trade to “managing” labor and management relations.  The right of the 
labor unions to represent their members had developed into a priority for the 
industrialized United States.   
 § 1 [§ 151].  Protection by law of the right of employees to organize and  
 bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or  
 interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain  
 recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices 
 fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of  
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 differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by  
 restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees. 
 
 
§ 7 [§ 157].  Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining.   
 
The NLRB became the “expert agency” in dealing with the regulation of labor 
disputes.  The Wagner Act allowed employees to be protected in their free choice to 
protest working conditions they found unfair.  They were now permitted to organize into 
unions and to select their own representatives.  In addition, management was required to 
bargain in “good faith” with the bargaining unit that represented a majority of the 
workers.  The main focus of the NLRB was on the development of a body of case law that 
would govern the majority of the factors in the relationship between labor and 
management.  The enforcement of the NLRB’s orders was obtained through the circuit 
courts of appeals.  The cases appeared and were decided soon after the enactment of the 
NLRA.   
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) 
 
In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937), the Court accepted the 
constitutional theory that Congress was to regulate labor relations in order to avoid any 
interference with the shipment of goods across state lines.   
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or 
unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce, is within the regulatory 
power of Congress, under the commerce clause…therefore Congress has 
constitutional authority, for the protection of interstate commerce, to safeguard 
the right of the employees to self-organization and free choice of their 
representatives for collective bargaining (Jones, 1937).   
 
In Jones, the NLRB found that the respondent had violated the Act by engaging in 
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unfair labor practices affecting commerce.  The employer was taking discriminatory and 
coercive action by discharging specific employees who were members of the union.  The 
employer further interfered with the employees’ self-organization through coercion and 
intimidation.  The NLRB ordered the corporation to cease and desist the behavior and to 
reinstate the fired employees.  The corporation failed to comply, and the NLRB was 
forced to petition to the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order.  The court denied 
the petition but certiorari was granted.  The Supreme Court reversed the order and 
remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the NLRB was within its 
competency and that the Act was valid as applied.   
The NLRA defined an appropriate bargaining unit as a grouping of employees 
recognized by the employer, agreed upon by the parties in the case, or designated by the 
NLRB for the purpose of representation and collective bargaining.  The purpose of this 
bargaining unit is to ensure that employees have the fullest freedom in the exercise of the 
rights as guaranteed by the NLRA.  The determination of the bargaining unit is of intense 
interest to both management and the labor organization as it is the building block of the 
structure of labor relations.   
§ 2 [§ 152]. The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or 
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.   
 
After an appropriate bargaining unit has been determined, the NLRB holds  
representative elections.  If the union wins a majority, and no objections exist concerning 
the procedures and processes as connected with the election, the union is certified by the 
NLRB as the exclusive representative of the employees bargaining unit.   
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§ 9 [§ 159]. Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective 
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such 
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit 
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, or other conditions of employment.  
 
The Board and the courts used the following to determine what constituted an  
appropriate unit:  (a) whether the employees were under common supervision; (b) 
whether the employer’s bookkeeping relating to the employee concerns, wages, and other 
benefits was organized on a plant, multi-plant, or multi-company basis; (c) whether the 
employees had contact with one another, do they clock in/out at the same location; (d) the 
similarity in type of work performed; (e) similarities in wages, hours, and working 
conditions; (f) the desires of the employees.   
 The Taft-Hartley amendments would later make it clear that the NLRB cannot 
declare an appropriate unit by considering the worker’s wishes alone, (Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.  § 149 (b) (5) et seq. 1976).   
The subject of collective bargaining is divided into three categories: (a) 
mandatory subjects: rates of pay and wages, pensions, health benefits and insurance 
plans, and fringe and supplementary benefits; (b) hours of employment; length of 
workday and work shifts; (c) other terms and conditions of employment: discharge and 
discipline, grievance procedures, work assignments, work rules, duration of collective 
bargaining agreement, and safety rules.   
§ 8(d) [§ 158].  Obligation to bargain collectively.  To bargain collectively is the 
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of 
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to: wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.    
 
The NLRB held that disparagement of labor unions by the employee was 
considered an unfair labor practice.   
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NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Company (1941) 
 
In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court tried to protect free speech for the employer in 
the case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Company (1941).  The courts intended 
to support the NLRB and its findings and not to undermine the agency by changing its 
decisions at will.   
A court is precluded by the command of § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations 
Act that “the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall 
be conclusive,” from substituting its own views as to the facts for those of the 
National Labor Relations Board, but it is not bound to accept findings which are 
not free from ambiguity and doubt (Virginia, 1941).     
 
Although the NLRB in its early stages of existence was challenged in the  
 courts, the very nature of the NLRA protected the Board’s authority and allowed it to 
become a useful and respected organization in labor relations.  The NLRB continued to be 
challenged in the courts, but as its body of legal precedence grew, the likelihood of it 
being wrongly undermined diminished.  In Virginia, we see one of the first indications of 
the Court’s willingness to provide protection to the employer.  In this case, the employer 
has been accused of coercion and unfair labor practices, attempting to prevent company 
employees from openly planning and discussing union activity.  The employer in this 
case had published a company bulletin stating its relatively anti-union stance and 
encouraging its employees to seek resolution to any issues of wages and benefits without 
the assistance of an “outside” union.  In this case, the NLRB had determined that the 
company had committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8 (1), (2) and (3) 
of the Act and had ordered the company to cease and desist from its unfair labor 
practices.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded this decision.  The Court 
stated that the bulletin printed by the company and other additional spoken utterances by 
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company representatives had not amounted to “coercion”.   
The bulletin and the speeches set forth the right of the employees to do as they 
please without fear of retaliation of the company.  Whether there are sufficient 
findings and evidence of interference, restraint, coercion, and domination, without 
reference to the bulletin and the speeches, or whether the whole course of 
conduct, evidenced in part by the utterances, was aimed at achieving objectives 
forbidden by the Act, are questions for the Board to decide upon the evidence 
(Virginia, 1941). 
 
The pattern had been set with this one of many cases during the early days  
of the NLRA.  The courts were not willing to take away the authority of this new and very 
important agency.  In addition, by reversing and remanding this decision with specific 
instructions for the Board, the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated the importance of the 
process of fact-finding and review of the evidence without fear of “ambiguity and doubt”.  
In Virginia, the employer has demonstrated his right to speak out on the issues related to 
labor relations.  The employer had to be wary of coercion, but this case helped to define 
the right to speak on the issues as they related to collective bargaining.   
As the NLRB continued to build a base case law and decisions, with the support 
of the courts, the unions also became more successful in promoting their efforts.  The 
unions pressed for the unwilling employers to be subject to arbitration when a dispute 
over the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement was at issue.   
Textile Workers’ Union v. Lincoln Mills, (1957) 
 
In Textile Workers’ Union v. Lincoln Mills, (1957), an action was brought by a 
labor union in the United States District Court of Alabama over the arbitration provisions 
of a collective bargaining contract.  The District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction 
and ordered the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions.  The case was 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and reversed on the 
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grounds that although the District Court had jurisdiction to review the lawsuit it lacked 
the authority in federal and state law to grant relief.   
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Appeals Court 
decision, holding that § 301 of The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides 
that:  
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce may be brought in any 
District Court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 
parties and authorizes the federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements (Textile Workers, 1957). 
 
United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., (1960) 
 
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., (1960), a union which 
had entered into a collective bargaining contract with an agreement for arbitration of all 
grievances attempted to force arbitration on an issue involving an employee who had left 
his job because of injury and later sought compensation benefits and was entitled to 
return to his job by virtue of seniority described in the collective bargaining agreement.  
The United States District Court of Tennessee refused to compel arbitration, holding that 
the employee having accepted the settlement when he left his job was prevented from 
claiming seniority or other employment rights.  The United State Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision on the grounds that the grievance of which arbitration 
was sought was frivolous and not subject to arbitration.  On certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the lower courts had erred in 
weighing the merits of the grievance and the equities of the employee’s claim, in view of 
the fact that the arbitration clause called for the submission of all grievances to arbitration 
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not only those a court would deem meritorious.   
Under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the function of the 
court is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a 
claim which on its face is governed by the contract, and the court has no business 
weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a 
particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written 
instrument which will support the claim (United Steelworkers, 1960). 
 
NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, (1987) 
 
In NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, (1987), a 
union, which sought to represent the employees of a grocery store, filed charges with the 
NLRB alleging that the storeowners and another union had committed unfair labor 
practices.  The union provided evidence that the second union did not represent an 
uncoerced majority of the employees.  The Regional Director of the NLRB investigated 
the situation.  An attempt was made to negotiate a settlement but failed.  The Regional 
Director filed a formal complaint against the second union, however before hearings 
began, the Regional Director reached an informal settlement with the owners and the 
second union, which barred any further collaborations but did not require them to admit 
any unlawful practices.  The first union refused to accept this decision and filed a 
complaint with the General Counsel of the NLRB, as allowed by agency regulations.  The 
General Counsel found no need for an evidentiary hearing and sustained the Regional 
Director’s decision.  The first union petitioned for review of the case by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The court held that it had jurisdiction and that the 
complaint should not have been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing and granted a 
petition for review, vacated the informal settlement, and remanded the matter to the 
NLRB with instructions to reinstate the complaints.  On certiorari, the United States 
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Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.  In a 
unanimous view of the court, it was held that a decision of the NLRB’s General Counsel 
to dismiss an unfair labor practice complaint before hearings begin, pursuant to an 
informal settlement in which the charging party refused to join, 
(1) is not subject to judicial review under the NLRA since it is a reasonable 
construction of the NLRA to find that settlement and dismissal decisions are 
prosecutorial functions, so that regulations allowing the General Counsel to make 
such decisions without review by the NLRB are consistent with the NLRA’s policy 
of separating prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions (United Food & 
Commercial Workers, 1987). 
 
The NLRB is the “expert agency” and the courts are not to step in without 
the Board’s interpretation of the case at hand.  The courts upheld this general view of the 
Board’s authority to ensure a “uniform federal” interpretation of the law.  In certain 
instances the States assumed some limited jurisdiction where actions involved a clear 
breach of collective bargaining agreement, libel or harm suffered under statutes designed 
to protect an individual’s emotional injury, violence, or threat to peaceful order.   
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, (1958) 
 
In International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, (1958), the issue was whether a state court 
had jurisdiction to entertain an action by an employee, who had worked in an industry 
affecting interstate commerce, against a union and its agent, for interference with the 
employee’s lawful occupation.  The complaint by the employee alleged that he was 
forced to lose time from his work and to lose earnings which he and others would have 
received had they not been prevented from going to and from the plant.  Russell claimed 
compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and for mental anguish and punitive 
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damages in the amount of $50,000.  The union filed a plea to the jurisdiction.  They 
claimed that the NLRB had jurisdiction of the controversy to the exclusion of the state 
court.  The principal issue of law is whether the state court had jurisdiction to entertain 
Russell’s complaint or whether that jurisdiction had been pre-empted by Congress and 
vested exclusively in the NLRB. On certiorari, the Supreme Court found that the 
employee’s right to recover, in the state courts, all damages caused to him could not 
fairly be said to be pre-empted without clearer declaration of congressional policy.  
Russell could not collect duplicate compensation for lost pay from the state courts and the 
Board.  Notwithstanding that under 10 (c ) of the NLRA, 29 USC 160 (c ), the NLRB may 
award back pay to an employee who has suffered a wage loss as a consequence of union 
conduct which is an unfair labor practice, and that, under 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act (29 USC 
158 (b) (1) (A), it is an unfair labor practice for a union to deny a worker access to a plant 
during an economic strike, the Act does not pre-empt the jurisdiction of a state court to 
award all damages, including punitive damages to the employee.   
Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck, (1985) 
 
In Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck, (1985), an employee brought in a state 
court a tort action against his employer and its insurer, alleging bad faith in the handling 
of his claim under a disability plan included in the collective bargaining agreement and 
seeking damages.  The employee did not exhaust the grievance procedure established in 
the collective bargaining agreement prior to bringing action in the court.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that the claim did not arise under 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (29 USCS 185) but that the claim here was a tort claim of bad-faith and not 
a bad-faith breach-of-contract claim.  On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.  The 
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Court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon 
analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim must either be 
treated as a 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.  In the 
present case, the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to make use of the 
grievance procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement or dismissed as 
pre-empted by 301.    The Supreme Court determined that the state courts are not 
deprived of jurisdiction where arbitration clauses in labor contracts are at issue, however, 
the federal labor law of contract pre-empts tort law based upon a violation of the 
collective agreement if resolution of the claim is dependent upon the meaning of the 
collective bargaining agreement.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Manufacturing Company, (1956) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Manufacturing Company, (1956), an 
employer who was bargaining with a union representing its employees with respect to a 
wage increase, claimed that it was financially unable to support the pay increase.  The 
employer refused to provide documentation detailing the financial status of the company.  
The NLRB found the employer’s refusal to furnish such information as in violation of the 
NLRA’s requirement to bargain in good faith and ordered the employer to supply the 
union with information to substantiate the employer’s position as to its economic inability 
to pay the recognized wage increase.  The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the 
Board’s order.   
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court, stating that in agreement 
with the NLRB, an employer’s refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of inability to pay 
increased wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith.  Good-faith 
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bargaining, for purposes of the amended NLRA requires that claims made by either 
bargainer should be honest claims and supported by the ability to provide necessary 
records or documentation. 
It is sufficient if the information is made available in a manner not as burdensome 
or time-consuming as to impede the process of bargaining (Truitt Manufacturing 
Company, 1956).       
 
In the NLRB’s view, the factor determining whether a management decision is  
subject to mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself.  If the change is in 
the nature or direction of the business, then it is outside the constraints of mandatory 
bargaining.  If the essence of the decision is simply labor costs, then management is to 
follow the criterion of mandatory bargaining.  It is a duty of the employer to provide to 
the union financial and accounting information to substantiate its claim that the company 
is incapable of paying a wage increase requested by the union.   
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Company, (1948) 
 
In Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Company, 
(1948), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a North Carolina statute and a Nebraska 
constitutional amendment that provided that no one be denied an opportunity to obtain or 
retain employment because he is or is not a member of a labor organization, and 
prohibited employers from entering into contracts or agreements obligating themselves to 
exclude person from employment because they are or are not labor union members.   
 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the state laws described did not violate the 
guaranties of free speech, peaceable assembly and petition, or the contract clause, or 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution.  The Court held that 
the constitutional right of workers to assemble and to discuss and formulate plans for 
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furthering their own self-interest in jobs cannot be construed as a constitutional guaranty 
that none shall get and hold these jobs except those who will join in the assembly or will 
agree to abide by the assembly’s plans.   
 The laws in North Carolina and Nebraska were found not to violate rights 
guaranteed to employers, unions, or members of unions by the Constitution of the United 
States.   
These state laws do not abridge the freedom of speech and the right of unions and 
their members to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances, which are guaranteed by the 1st Amendment and made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
  
Nor do they conflict with Article I, § 10, of the Constitution, insofar as they 
impair the obligation of contracts made prior to their enactment (Northwestern 
Iron and Metal Company, 1948).     
 
The Social Security Act of 1935 
 
During the early days of the NLRA, Congress passed other laws in an attempt to 
better working conditions in the United States.  The first of these laws was the Social 
Security Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449.  The law was written in support of labor 
unions’ efforts to organize and bargain collectively. 
§ 151.  Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, 
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain 
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest. 
 
Franklin Roosevelt was president during this time and immediately following the 
Great Depression.  The general public in the United States was skeptical of social 
insurance.  The American people were known for their independent and pioneer spirit and 
were wary of programs that appeared to bear the signs of socialism and communism.  
Roosevelt was determined to pass legislation that provided insurance programs for 
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unemployment and old age.  The law was passed in 1935 and amended and expanded in 
1939.  Roosevelt, in his presidency, although distracted from domestic affairs by the 
seriousness of World War II, continued to support the expansion of social security 
benefits to include disability benefits and medical benefits for the elderly.  The United 
States still does not have a national health insurance program for the general population. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
 
A few years later, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3, 52 Stat. 
1060, was passed into law.  The Act was written to provide for the establishment of fair 
labor standards in employments in and affecting interstate commerce.  Three main 
clauses are included in the law: (a) minimum wages; (b) maximum hours; and (c) child 
labor provisions.   
§ 6.  Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek are 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the 
following rates.   
 
§ 7.  No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce for a 
workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation 
for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than 
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.   
 
§ 12.  No producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in 
commerce any goods produced in an establishment situated in the United States in 
or about which within thirty days prior to the removal of such goods there from 
any oppressive child labor has been employed.   
 
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
 
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136, was passed by 
The U.S. Congress otherwise called the Labor-Management Relations Act, as an 
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.  The Act prohibited secondary 
boycotts, outlawed the closed shop, and permitted union shops only after a vote of a 
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majority of the employees.   
§ 1. It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of 
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in 
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for 
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to 
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor 
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices 
on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to 
the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor 
disputes affecting commerce. 
 
The Taft-Hartley Act was written in an effort to equalize the ground rules which 
until then had been believed to have worked against employers.  This Act declared it an 
unfair labor practice for a union to accomplish the following: 
(a) restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to organization and  
collective bargaining; (b) restrain or coerce employees in their selection of its 
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or adjustment of 
grievances; (c) cause an employer to discriminate against an employee; (d) refuse 
to bargain in good faith; (e) participate, induce, or encourage employees to strike; 
(f) force an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization; (g) force 
employers to assign specific work to employees belonging to a particular labor 
organization; (h) cause an employer to pay for services that are not performed, 
prohibiting “featherbedding”; (i) engage in secondary boycott.   
 
In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed all strikes by government employees. 
Strikers working in government jobs were to be immediately discharged and made 
ineligible for reemployment by the federal government for three years.  The Act also 
enlarged the NLRB from three members to five.    
 The right to organize and bargain collectively was not extended to managerial 
employees.  The Taft-Hartley Act did not allow managers to be included in a bargaining 
unit.  In two cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld and supported this decision and 
legislation.   
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company, Division of Textron, Inc. (1974) 
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In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company, Division of Textron, Inc. (1974), a labor 
union petitioned for a representation election to determine whether the union would be 
certified as the bargaining representative of buyers in a purchasing and procurement 
department of an employer’s plant.  The NLRB held that the buyers constituted an 
appropriate unit and directed the election, which resulted in the Board’s certification of 
the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the buyers.  The employer 
requested that the Board reconsider this decision but the Board denied the motion on the 
grounds that the employer had not shown that union organization of its buyers would 
create a conflict of interest in labor relations.  The employer however refused to bargain.  
The Board found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice and issued an order 
compelling the employer to bargain with the union.  The U.S. Court of Appeals of the 
Second Circuit denied the Board’s enforcement of this order on the grounds that  
(1) it was not certain that the Board’s decision rested on a factual determination 
that the buyers were not true “managerial employees” but on an erroneous holding 
that the Board was free to regard all managerial employees as covered by the Act 
unless duties met the conflict of interest touchstone; and (2) the Board was 
required to proceed by rulemaking rather than by adjudication in determining the 
status of buyers as “managerial employees” (Bell Aerospace Company, 1974). 
 
On certiorari the United State Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in part and reversed in part, and the cause was remanded to the Court of 
Appeals with directions to remand to the Board to permit it to apply the proper legal 
standard in determining the status of the buyers.  It was held that  
(1) all “managerial employees” are exempt from the amended National Labor 
Relations Act; and (2) the Board properly exercised its discretion in proceeding by 
adjudication rather than by rulemaking in determining the status of the buyers as 
“managerial employees” (Bell Aerospace Company, 1974). 
 
NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980) 
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In NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980), a union filed a representation petition with 
the NLRB seeking certification as the bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members 
of certain schools in a private university.  The university opposed the petition on the 
grounds that all faculty members were managerial or supervisory personnel and thus not 
“employees” within coverage of the NLRA.  At hearings before a Board appointed 
hearing officer, it was determined that the faculty were professional employees entitled to 
the protection of the NLRA and the Board granted the union’s petition and ordered an 
election.  The university refused to bargain.  In a subsequent unfair labor practice 
proceeding, the Board ordered the university to bargain with the union representing the 
university faculty.  The university continued to refuse and the Board sought enforcement 
of its order in the United States Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit.  The Court of 
Appeals denied the Board’s petition, finding that the faculty were in fact “managerial 
employees” and not covered under the NLRA.  On certiorari the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed and held that the university faculty members were “managerial 
employees” and excluded from coverage of the NLRA and were not entitled to the 
benefits of collective bargaining under the Act.    
The university faculty members (1) determined what courses would be offered, 
when they would be scheduled, and to whom they would be taught; (2) debated 
and determined teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards; 
(3) effectively decided which students would be admitted, retained, and 
graduated; and (4) decided the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, 
and the location of the university schools (Yeshiva, 1979). 
  
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 
 
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), also known as 
the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 525, 542, 545, was passed by Congress and 
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provided for the regulation of labor union internal affairs, including the control of union 
funds.  The LMRDA provided for union democracy and fiduciary responsibility.  The 
LMRDA was originally designed to eliminate corruption and racketeering in unions and 
was later enlarged to include a “bill of rights” for union members, safeguards for union 
finances, and mandated reports on union administration.  The emphasis on this legislation 
was to eradicate corrupt union activity and other misconduct found in some labor 
organizations and to encourage democratic processes among all union members.  The 
LMRDA provided for the following provisions to prevent unfair labor practices by 
employers:   
§ 158 (a).  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer: (a) to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees; (b) to dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or 
other support to it; (c) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership 
in any labor organization; (d) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act; (e) to 
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. 
 
The LMRDA further stipulated the following provisions for labor organizations: 
 
§ 158 (b).  It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:  
(a) to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed; (b) to 
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee; (c) to 
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer; (d) to engage in or to induce or 
encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his 
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or handle or work on any 
goods, articles, materials or commodities or to perform any services; (e) to picket 
or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any 
employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize 
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees. 
 
Unions and employers continued to monitor unfair labor practices.  A common  
problem for employers was controlling the practice of “union security clauses” that 
required workers to pay dues and initiation fees as a condition of employment.  This form 
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of union security agreement was referred to as a “union shop” which was different than a 
“closed shop” which required that workers become union members before being hired 
and which was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley amendments.   
Local 357 Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Board (1961) 
 
In Local 357 Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Board (1961), an association 
of motor truck operators entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and several local unions which required the operators to 
employ casual or temporary employees “on a seniority basis” through a hiring hall 
operated by one of the unions, “irrespective of whether such employee is or is not a 
member of the Union.”  A union member obtained casual employment with an operator 
independently of the union and the hiring hall and was later discharged when the union 
complained.  Upon charges made by him against the union and the employer, the 
National Labor Relations Board found the hiring-hall provision to be unlawful per se and 
that the employee’s discharge at the union’s request constituted a violation by the 
employer of § 8 (a) (1) and § 8 (a) (3) and a violation by the union of § 8 (b) (2) and § 8 
(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act.  The board ordered the employer and the 
union to cease giving effect to the hiring-hall agreement and directed them to reimburse 
all casual employees for fees and dues paid by them o the union.  Upon review, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the order requiring a general 
reimbursement of dues and fees, but upheld the board in ruling that the hiring-hall 
agreement was illegal.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.  
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts did not find hiring halls as such 
illegal, but merely certain practices under them.  The Board and the court found that the 
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manner in which the hiring halls operated created in effect a closed shop in violation of 
the law.   
 The courts continued to struggle with the responsibility to balance between the 
collective interest of the workers over the individual employee’s advantages once the 
majority of employees in an appropriate unit have designated the union as their 
bargaining representative.   
J.I. Case Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1944) 
 
In J.I. Case Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1944), the petitioner, 
J.I. Case Company, had offered each employee an individual contract of employment for 
one year at a time.  The contracts were uniform and fair.  The Company agreed to pay a 
specified rate and the employees agreed to accept the working provisions.  This system of 
employment continued for several years.  During this time, a union petitioned the Board  
for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of the production and 
maintenance employees.  The Company urged the individual contracts as a bar to 
representation proceedings.  The Board directed an election which was won by the union.  
The union then asked the Company to bargain.  The Company refused stating that it 
could not deal with the union in any matter which would affect the individual contracts 
while they were in effect.  The Board held that the Company had refused to bargain 
collectively, in violation of § 8 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act and that the 
contracts had been used to impede employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by § 7 
of the Act.  The Company had engaged in unfair labor practices, as defined by § 8 (1) of 
the Act.  The Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from giving the individual 
contracts.  The Circuit Court of Appeals granted an order of enforcement.  On certiorari, 
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the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision and specified the following changes to the 
Board’s cease and desist order: 
(a)  Give separate written notice to each employee who signed an individual 
contract of employment or any modification, continuation, extension, or renewal 
thereof, or any similar form of contract for any period subsequent to the date of 
the Decree, that such contract will not in any manner be enforced or attempted to 
be enforced to forestall collective bargaining or deter self-organization, that the 
employee is not required or expected by virtue of such contract to deal with 
respondent individually in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment (J.I. Case Company, 1944). 
 
Individual contracts of employment cannot be utilized by an employer as a basis for 
precluding negotiations with the union on the same subject matter.  These contracts may 
not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor 
Relations Act looking to collective bargaining.   
 Organizational picketing became an important issue that was dealt with by both 
unions and employers.  Amendments passed by Congress in 1959 attempted to regulate 
organizational picketing in certain key respects.   
§ 158 (b) (7). to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be 
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an 
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative 
of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept 
or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, 
unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such 
employees [29 USC § 158 (b) (7).] 
 
Picketing and strikes were thought by many fearful employers to cause irreparable 
harm to business.  The National Labor Relations Board and the courts took the position 
that area wage standard picketing was not prohibited by the National Labor Relations 
Act.  There have been numerous cases in regards to the legality of picketing and different 
kinds of picketing.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America (1960) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union 
No. 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America (1960),  a union, which no longer represented a majority of the 
employees, took part in peaceful picketing, called by the employer “recognitional 
picketing” and was accused of attempting to restrain and coerce the employees in the 
exercise of § 7 and participating in unfair labor practice under § 8 (b)(1)(A) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.  § 7 provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protections, and shall also have the right to 
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may 
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in § 8 (a)(3) (Drivers, Chauffeurs, 
Helpers, Local Union 639, 1960).   
 
The Board entered a cease and desist order which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside, holding that § 8 (b)(1)(A) was 
inapplicable to peaceful picketing, whether it was organizational or recognitional in 
nature.  On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding 
that § 8 (b)(1)(A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed against 
union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof, that is, 
conduct involving more than the general pressures upon employees which are implicit in 
economic strikes against employers. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 103, International Association of 
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (1977) 
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In National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 103, International 
Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (1977), the 
National Labor Relations Board held that the union had committed an unfair labor 
practice in violation of § 8 (b)(7)(C) of the Act (29 USCS 158 (b)(7)(C)), which prohibits 
recognitional picketing by a union that is not the certified representative of the employees 
and that has not filed a petition for a representation election within 30 days from the 
commencement of picketing.  Upon the union’s petition for review of the Board’s order, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.  On certiorari, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that it was an unfair labor practice within the 
meaning of § 8 (b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act for an uncertified union not 
representing a majority of the employees to engage in extended picketing to enforce a 
“pre-hire” agreement which the employer validly executed under § 8(f) of the Act, since 
the object of such picketing was to attain recognition as the employees’ bargaining 
representative.     
§ 8 (b)(7) provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to picket 
or cause to be picketed or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer 
where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or 
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or 
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor 
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor 
organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees [29 
USCS § 158 (b)(7)].   
 
The issue of picketing by individuals was a problem for employers as it caused a 
disruption to the normal flow of daily business.  However, picketing was also considered 
by some a simple action of expression that should be protected by the First Amendment.   
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Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 
 
In Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), the petitioner, Byron Thornhill was convicted in 
the state of Alabama for violation of § 3448 of the State Code of 1923.   
§ 3448.  Loitering or picketing forbidden.  Any person or persons, who, without a 
just cause or legal excuse, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of 
business of any other person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged 
in lawful business, for the purpose, or with the intent of influencing, or inducing 
other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or 
be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the 
works or place of business…for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering 
with or injuring any lawful business…shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
 The petitioner was charged and convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.  Upon 
appeal to the Circuit Court, a trial de novo sentenced the petitioner to further 
imprisonment.  The case was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals.  The State of 
Alabama, by its Solicitor, complained that the petitioner picketed the works or place of 
business of another person, firm, corporation, or association of people, the Brown Wood 
Preserving Company, Inc., a corporation, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or 
interfering with or injuring the lawful business or enterprise of the company.   
 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the range of activities 
proscribed by § 3448, whether characterized by picketing or loitering, embraced nearly 
every practicable, effective means whereby the employees may enlighten the public on 
the nature and causes of a labor dispute.  The safeguarding of these means is essential to 
the securing of an informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is 
of public concern.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the danger of injury to an industrial 
concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of 
freedom of discussion embodied in § 3448.   
The danger of breach of the peace or serious invasion of rights of property or 
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privacy at the scene of a labor dispute is not sufficiently imminent in all cases to 
warrant the legislature in determining that such a place is not appropriate for the 
range of activities outlawed in § 3448 (Thornhill, 1949).  
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision.   
 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt (1957) 
 
The issue and legality of picketing continued to be presented to the courts for 
action.  In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt (1957), U.S. 
Supreme Court considered the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
power of a State to enjoin picketing.  The petitioner unions sought unsuccessfully to 
induce some of the respondent’s employees to join the unions and began to picket the 
entrance to the respondent’s place of business with signs reading, “The men of this job 
are not 100% affiliated with the A.F.L.”  As a result, drivers of several trucking 
companies refused to deliver and haul goods to and from the respondent’s plant, causing 
substantial damage to the respondent.  The company sought an injunction to restrain the 
picketing.  In trial court, it was held that by virtue of Wisconsin Statute § 103.535, 
prohibiting picketing in the absence of a “labor dispute,” the petitioners must be enjoined 
from maintaining any pickets near respondent’s place of business and from inducing 
others to decline to transport goods to and from the respondent’s business.  On appeal, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding § 103.535 unconstitutional, on the 
ground that picketing could not constitutionally be enjoined merely because of the 
absence of a “labor dispute.”  On reargument, the court withdrew its original decision and 
held that the picketing was for an “unlawful purpose,” since Wisconsin Statute § 111.06 
(2)(b) made it an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in a group to  
coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees 
in the enjoyment of their legal rights … or to engage in any practice with regard 
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to his employees which would constitute an unfair labor practice if undertaken by 
him on his own initiative [Wisconsin Statute § 111.06 (2)(b)].   
 
 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, determining that the policy of 
Wisconsin enforced by the prohibition of this picketing was a valid one.  On dissent, 
Justice Douglas wrote,  
here, where there is no rioting, no mass picketing, no violence, no disorder, no 
fisticuffs, no coercion, nothing but speech, the principles announced in Thornhill 
should give the advocacy of one side of a dispute First Amendment protection.  I 
would adhere to the principle announced in Thornhill, and I would return to the 
test that this form of expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent 
that it forms an essential part of a course of conduct which the State can regulate 
or prohibit (International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 1957).   
 
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Allied International, Inc. (1982) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to review cases on picketing.  In International 
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Allied International, Inc. (1982), the president 
of the International Longshoremen’s Association ordered ILA members to stop handling 
cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union.  As a result of the boycott, Allied 
company’s shipments were completely disrupted.  Allied brought action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and claimed that the boycott 
violated the prohibition against secondary boycotts in § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 USC § 158(b)(4).  Allied sued for damages under § 303 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 USC § 187, which created a private damages 
remedy for victims of secondary boycotts.  Allied also filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB under § 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 USC § 160(b).  Allied also alleged 
that the ILA boycott violated the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1, and amounted to interference 
with Allied’s business relationships in violation of admiralty law.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of these specific claims.  The Court of Appeals 
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reversed the dismissal of Allied’s other complaints and remanded for further proceedings.  
The court found that the effects of the ILA boycott were “in commerce” within the 
meaning of the NLRA and that the ILA boycott was within § 8(b)(4)’s prohibition of 
secondary boycotts, despite its political purpose, and that resort to such behavior was not 
protected activity under the First Amendment.  The NLRB reached the conclusion that the 
ILA’s refusal to unload Allied’s shipments was “in commerce” and amounted to a 
secondary boycott.  The Board issued a cease-and-desist order to the union requiring it to 
unload Allied’s shipments.  On certiorari the U.S. Supreme Court determined the 
coverage of the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA.  The terms “commerce” and 
“affecting commerce” are defined in 29 USC § 152(6) and (7), as amended by the LMRA, 
as follows: 
(6) The term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or 
communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or 
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any 
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia… 
 
(7) The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or 
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to 
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce. 
 
 The Court found that the ILA’s activity was “in commerce” and within the scope 
of the NLRA.  The Court further stated that the ILA boycott was a national boycott 
affecting ports throughout the United States.  If the effects of the boycott were not “in 
commerce,” the complaining parties such as Allied could seek relief in state courts.   
The secondary boycott provisions in § 8(b)(4)(B) prohibit a union from inducing 
employees to refuse to handle goods with the object of forcing any person to 
cease doing business with any other person.  The statutory prohibition applies to 
the undisputed facts of this case.  The ILA has no dispute with Allied, Waterman, 
or Clark.  It does not seek any labor objective from these employers.  Its sole 
complaint is with the foreign and military policy of the Soviet Union.  The certain 
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effect of this action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers.  The 
secondary boycott provisions were designed to prevent such burdens ( Allied 
International, Inc., 1982).   
 The Court concluded by stating that it would not create an exception to the statute 
on the basis of the argument that “political” boycotts are exempt form the secondary 
boycott provision.  The distinction between labor and political objectives would be 
difficult to discern.  The Court further stated that 
In the absence of any limiting language in the statute or legislative history, there 
is no reason to conclude that Congress intended such a potentially expansive 
exception to a statutory provision purposefully drafted in broadest terms (Allied 
International, Inc., 1982).   
 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware 
Company (1982) 
 
In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne 
Hardware Company (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court further defined the boycott.   
The term “concerted action” encompasses unlawful conspiracies and 
constitutionally protected assemblies.  Evidence that persuasive rhetoric, 
determination to remedy past injustices, and a host of voluntary decisions by free 
citizens were the critical factors in the boycott’s success presented the Court with 
the question whether the state court’s judgment was consistent with the 
Constitution of the United States (Claiborne, 1982).  
The Mississippi state courts concluded that the boycotts included elements of  
force, violence, and threats and rendered these actions unlawful, regardless of whether 
the actions of boycott were primary, secondary, economical, political, social or other.  
The court rejected the petitioners’ reliance on the First Amendment. 
The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the peace to achieve 
a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy.  There is no instance where it 
has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment 
includes in its protection the right to commit crime (Claiborne, 1982).   
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The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the petitioners had agreed to use force, 
violence and “threats” to effectuate the boycott.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court 
clarified that the First Amendment does not protect violence.   
Violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weapons, 
gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise of 
advocacy.  Although the extent and significance of the violence in this case are 
vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no question that acts of violence 
occurred.  No federal rule of law restricts a State from imposing tort liability for 
business losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence.  When such 
conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity, however, 
precision of regulation is demanded.  The presence of activity protected by the 
First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages 
liability and on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages 
(Claiborne, 1982). 
 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court further elaborated by clarifying its position on  
individuals’ rights to act with others for a common cause.  The Court referred to the 
“purpose” of the boycott and the “ultimate objectives” of the petitioners.  The Court was 
unwilling to protect behavior that was “violent” and thus “illegal.”  The Court did not see 
speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism as a basis for a legal damages award. 
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the petitioners.  They may be 
held responsible for their violent deeds.  However, the burden of demonstrating 
that this behavior colored the entire collective effort is not satisfied by the 
evidence that violence occurred or that violence contributed to the success of the 
boycott.  The findings in this case are constitutionally insufficient to support a 
judgment that all petitioners are liable for all losses in the boycott (Claiborne, 
1982).   
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  
National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel Packing Company (1969) 
 
 In National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel Packing Company (1969), the U.S. 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of an employer’s duty under the National Labor 
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Relations Act to recognize a union that bases its claim to representative status solely on 
the possession of union authorization cards, and the steps an employer is permitted to 
take and the scope and content of statements that an employer may make in legitimately 
resisting card-based union recognition.  The specific question was whether the duty to 
bargain can arise without a Board election under the Act.  In this case, the unions had 
obtained a majority of employees through union authorization cards without 
misrepresentation or coercion.  The employer questioned the reliability of this majority 
obtained through an alternate route to election.  In addition, the union claimed that the 
employer had committed unfair labor practices that undermined the union’s majority and 
made a fair election impossible.  The union also claimed that the employer had made 
specific statements to the employees that fell outside the protection of First Amendment 
rights and § 8 (c) of the Act.  These statements made by the employer included promises 
of better jobs and higher pay if the employees “broke the union” and eventual discharge 
of those employees that did not cooperate with the employer’s demands to stop the union 
activity.  The Board had found that  
(1) the union had obtained valid authorization cards from a majority of the 
employees in the bargaining unit and was thus entitled to represent the employees 
for collective bargaining purposes and (2) the employer’s refusal to bargain with 
the union in violation of § 8 (a)(5) was motivated not by a “good faith” doubt of 
the union’s majority status but by a desire to gain time to dissipate the union’s 
status completely (Gissel, 1969).   
 
 The Board entered a cease-and-desist order and ordered the employer to bargain 
on request.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit found that the cards 
themselves were too inherently unreliable that their use gave an employer virtually an 
automatic, good faith claim that that a secret election was necessary.  The employer 
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would not be ordered to bargain unless 
(1) there was no question about a union’s majority status, either through an 
employer’s recognition of the card validity or an employer’s own poll status or (2) 
the employer’s §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) unfair labor practices were so extensive and 
pervasive that a bargaining order was the only possible remedy irrespective of the 
card status (Gissel, 1969).   
 
       On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed judgment of the decision of the 
Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit where they declined enforcement of the Board’s 
orders to bargain and remanded the case with directions to remand to the Board for 
further proceedings to determine: 
(1) the specifics of the employer’s violations of § 8 (c) (29 U.S.C. § 158 (c)) on 
First Amendment rights that expression of any views, argument, or opinion shall 
not be evidence of an unfair labor practice as long as such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit in violation of § 8 (a)(1).   
  
(2) The Board’s use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by 
less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine 
majority strength and impede election processes (Gissel, 1969).   
 
 The National Labor Relations Act has two purposes.  The statute is concerned 
with protecting trade unions and their members against anti-union actions.  The NLRA 
also attempts to promote collective bargaining where parties should have the widest 
latitude in bargaining tactics, pressure, and economic weaponry.  If the NLRB and the 
courts over-regulate bargaining tactics, they will reduce the substance of the collective 
bargaining process and ultimately reduce the value and meaning of the collective 
bargaining agreement.  There is a need to preserve free trade unions but also a need to 
maintain the openness of collective bargaining tactics and strategy.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, AFL-CIO 
(1960) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 
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AFL-CIO (1960), the employer argued that the “slowdown” was an unfair labor practice, 
specifically an unlawful refusal to bargain and a tactic that precluded discussion.  This 
case presented an important issue of the scope of the NRLB’s authority under § 8 (b)(3) of 
the NLRA which provides that “it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
or its agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the 
representative of his employees.”  The question that was considered here by the Court 
was whether the Board may find that a union, which confers with an employer with the 
desire of reaching agreement on contract terms, has nevertheless refused to bargain 
collectively and in good faith, thus violating the provision, solely and simply because 
during the negotiations it seeks to put economic pressure on the employer to yield to its 
bargaining demands by initiating on-the-job conduct which interferes with the carrying 
on of the employer’s business.  A complaint of violation of § 8 (b)(3) was issued and 
hearings began before the collective bargaining was concluded.  The Board entered a 
cease-and-desist order and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set 
aside the Board’s order.  The union’s tactics involved activities by the member agents 
such as these: 
refusal for a time to solicit new business, and refusal to comply with the 
company’s reporting procedure; refusal to participate in the company’s “May 
Policyholders’ Month Campaign”; reporting late at district offices the days the 
agents were scheduled to attend them, and refusing to perform customary duties at 
the offices, instead engaging in “sit-in-mornings”, and then leaving as a group at  
noon; absenting themselves from special business conferences arranged by the 
company; picketing and distributing leaflets outside various offices of the 
company; distributing leaflets each day to policyholders and others and soliciting 
policyholders’ signatures on petitions directed to the company; and presenting the 
signed policyholders’ petitions to the company at its home office while 
simultaneously engaging in mass demonstrations there (Insurance Agents 
International, 1959).               
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the policy of Congress when it passed the 
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NLRA  had been to impose a mutual duty upon both parties to “confer in good faith” with 
a desire to reach agreement, in order to promote an over-all design of achieving industrial 
peace.  The Court stated that  
the presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on 
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts have recognized.  The present statutory stage of national labor 
relations policy, the two factors – necessity for good faith bargaining between 
parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the 
other party incline to agree on one’s terms – exist side by side (Insurance Agents 
International, 1959). 
 
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the order of the Board and 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.  The Court stated that the Board was not 
the arbiter of what sort of economic weapons were to be used and that the Board was not 
set up to introduce some kind of “balanced” bargaining power between parties.  The 
Court further stated that the Board was not to tread on the substantive aspects of the 
bargaining process in this manner.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Aluminum Company (1962) 
 
The behavior of the unions continued to be reviewed by the courts.  Some actions 
were considered protected; they would not cause employees to be disciplined or 
discharged. Other actions were called unprotected or prohibited and could be cause for 
the NLRB to obtain a cease-and-desist order through an administrative process or through 
an order from the circuit court of appeals.  The Supreme Court held that walkouts were 
generally protected activity.  In National Labor Relations Board v. Washington 
Aluminum Company (1962), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to 
enforce an order of the National Labor Relations Board directing the Washington 
Aluminum Company to reinstate and make whole seven employees whom the company 
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had discharged for leaving their work in the machine shop without permission on claims 
that the shop was too cold to work in.  The Board found that the conduct of the 
employees was a concerted activity to protest the company’s failure to supply adequate 
heat in its machine shop and that such conduct is protected under the provision of  § 7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act which guarantees that “employees shall have the right 
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.”  The discharge of these workers by the company amounted to an unfair 
labor practice under § 8 (a)(1) of the Act, which forbids employers “to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7.”  Acting 
under the authority of § 10 of the Act, which provides that when an employer has been 
guilty of an unfair labor practice the Board can “take such affirmative action including 
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of 
this Act.”  The Board ordered the company to reinstate the discharged workers to their 
previous positions. 
§ 7.  Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to 
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may 
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in § 8 (a)(3) [29 USCS § 157]. 
 
The Court of Appeals took a different position and stated that the workers  
“summarily left their place of employment” without affording the company “an 
opportunity to avoid the work stoppage by granting a concession to a demand” and the 
walkout did not amount to a concerted activity protected by § 7 of the Act.   
The U.S. Supreme Court found the behavior of the seven workers could not be 
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classified as “indefensible.”  Their behavior did not demonstrate a complete show of 
disloyalty to the workers’ employer.  On certiorari, the Court held that the Board had 
correctly interpreted and applied the Act to the circumstances of the case and it was an 
error by the Court of Appeals to refuse to enforce its order.  The judgment was reversed 
and the cause remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to enforce the order in its 
entirety.   
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to examine cases on the dynamics and 
specifics of the strike.  Section 13 of the NLRA stated that nothing in the NLRA was 
intended to interfere with the right to strike.   
§ 13.  [§ 163].  Right to strike preserved.  Nothing in this Act, except as 
specifically provided herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or 
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or 
qualifications on that right [ 29 USCS § 163]. 
 
United Steelworkers of America v. United States (1959) 
 
The right to strike met some limitations.  Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited 
strikes during emergencies affecting national security and health.  In United Steelworkers 
of America v. United States (1959), the Attorney General of the United States obtained in 
the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an injunction, under 29 USC § 
178, against the continuation of an industry-wide strike in the basic steel industry.  The 
injunction was based upon a finding that the continuance of the strike would imperil the 
national health or safety.  The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit affirmed.  On 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. 
American Ship Building Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1965) 
 
The rights of employers were reviewed.  What may the employer do to utilize 
economic weaponry to protect its bargaining position?  In response to the strike, the 
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employers found the lockout to be quite effective.  In American Ship Building Company 
v. National Labor Relations Board (1965), the American Ship Building Company looked 
for review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit enforcing an order of the NLRB which found that the company had 
committed an unfair labor practice under §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA.  The question 
was whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice under the conditions of the 
Act when he temporarily lays off or “locks out” his employees during a labor dispute to 
bring economic pressure in support of his bargaining position.  The trial examiner of the 
NLRB found that the employer was reasonably apprehensive of a strike at some point and 
that the employer’s primary purpose in locking out its employees was to avert peculiarly 
harmful economic consequences which would occur on it and its customers if a strike 
were called either while a ship was in the yard during the shipping season or later when 
the yard was fully occupied.  The examiner concluded that the employer was: 
economically justified and motivated in laying off its employees when it did, and 
that the fact that its judgment was partially colored by its intention to break the 
impasse which existed is immaterial in the peculiar and special circumstances of 
this case.  The employer did not violate § 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the Act (American 
Ship Building, 1965).  
 
A three-to-two majority of the Board rejected the examiner’s conclusion that the  
employer could reasonably anticipate a strike.   
The Board held that absent special circumstances an employer may not during 
bargaining negotiations either threaten to lock out or lock out his employees in aid 
of his bargaining position.  Such conduct infringes upon the collective bargaining 
rights of employees in violation of § 8 (a)(1) and the lockout with its consequent 
layoff amounted to discrimination within the meaning of § 8 (a)(3).  The Board 
also held that such conduct subjects the union and the employees it represents to 
unwarranted and illegal pressure and creates an atmosphere in which free 
opportunity for negotiation stipulated in § 8 (a)(5) does not exist (American Ship 
Building, 1965).    
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On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court did not find any fair construction of the  
provisions relied on by the Board in this case that would support an unfair labor practice 
claim.  The Court held that the employer did not violate § 8 (a)(1) or (a)(3) when, after a 
bargaining impasse was reached, he temporarily shut down the plant and laid off his 
employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his 
legitimate bargaining position.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Brown (1965) 
 
The courts were further challenged to better define the rights of employers and the 
lockout.  The U.S. Supreme Court spoke of the lockout and strike as “correlative” in 
terms of statutory usage.  Employers were utilizing the lockout to avert serious economic 
harm caused by union action, most particularly the union strike.  In the multi-employer 
lockout situation, temporary replacements were utilized to keep production going.  In 
National Labor Relations Board v. Brown (1965), the union caused a strike to occur at 
one of the many stores in a multiemployer retail store group.  The employer continued 
business with temporary replacements and locked out all employees represented by the 
union.  The NLRB held that the non-struck employers were guilty of unfair labor 
practices under § 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered the lockout.  The Court stated the following: 
The continued operations of respondents and their use of temporary replacements 
does not imply hostile motivation any more than the lockout itself.  Nor do we see 
how they are inherently more destructive of employee rights.  The compelling 
inference is that this was all part and parcel of respondent’s defensive measure to 
preserve the multiemployer group in the face of the strike (Brown, 1965).  
 
The Court further commented on the behavior of the employer: 
 73
When the resulting harm to employee rights is comparatively slight, and a 
substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employers’ conduct is prima 
facie lawful. The finding of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a)(3) requires a 
showing of improper subjective intent.  There is no assertion by union or the 
Board that the respondents were motivated by antiunion animus (Brown, 1965).     
 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals.   
 
National Labor Relations Board v.  American National Insurance Company (1952) 
 
In addition to considering the legalities of the strike and lockout, the courts were  
compelled to review the requirements of “good faith bargaining.”  The National Labor 
Relations Board determined in some instances the specific proposals that became 
relevant to decide whether a party had bargained in good faith.  The Board considered in 
most cases whether a demand by either party was designed to frustrate agreement on a 
collective bargaining contract.  The Supreme Court permitted, within limits, for parties in 
collective bargaining to “take their gloves off” and to exert whatever economic pressure 
possible.  The obvious concern was always the possibility that either side would 
completely subvert the collective bargaining process.  In National Labor Relations Board 
v.  American National Insurance Company (1952), the employer rejected the 
representative union’s request for a provision in the collective bargaining agreement for 
unlimited arbitration.  The employer instead proposed a “management functions” clause 
listing matters such as promotions, discipline and work scheduling as the responsibility of 
management and excluding these matters from arbitration.  The National Labor Relations 
Board stepped in and field a complaint against the employer based on the union’s charge 
that the company had refused to bargain as required by the NLRA.  During negotiations 
the Board’s Trial Examiner conducted hearings on the union’s complaint.  The Board and 
the Trial Examiner agreed that the employer had not bargained in good faith.  The Board 
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rejected the Examiner’s views that the employer had a right to bargain for “management 
functions.”  “The respondent’s action in bargaining for inclusion of any such clause of 
management functions constituted a demonstrated bad faith and per se violations of § 8 
(a)(5) and (1)” (American National, 1952).  On respondent’s petition for review, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Act “did not preclude an employer 
from bargaining for inclusion of a management functions clause in a labor agreement” 
(American National, 1952).   On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and held that the duty to bargain collectively “could not be 
enforced by prohibiting all employers in every industry from bargaining for management 
functions clauses” (American National, 1952).  The Court also accepted the finding of the 
lower court that the employer had bargained in good faith for the management functions. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation (1958) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to review the balance of economic and 
strategic bargaining power between unions and employers.  The Court determined that 
there are three categories of subject matter that could be raised by the representatives of 
the union or the employer at the bargaining table: mandatory, non-mandatory, and illegal 
subjects of bargaining.  In National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corporation (1958), the employer insisted that its collective bargaining contract 
include  
(1) a “ballot” clause calling for a pre-strike secret vote of the employees as to the 
employer’s last offer, and (2) a “recognition” clause which excluded, as a party to 
the contract, the International Union which had been certified by the NLRB, as the 
employees’ exclusive bargaining agent and substituted for the agent’s local 
uncertified affiliate (Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 1958).   
 
The NLRB held that the employer’s insistence upon either clause amounted to a  
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refusal to bargain, in violation of § 8 (a)(5) of the NLRA.  The question here posed is 
whether the stipulations of these clauses comes within the scope of mandatory collective 
bargaining as defined in § 8 (d) of the Act.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit set aside the Board’s order relating to the “ballot” cause but upheld the 
Board’s decision as to the “recognition” clause.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment of the lower court and respected the “recognition” clause but 
reversed the court’s judgment with respect to the “ballot” clause.  The Court stated that 
“neither clause related to a matter which, under the NLRA, is a subject of mandatory 
bargaining and that it is unlawful to insist upon the inclusion of clauses relating to 
matters which are not mandatory in collective bargaining” (Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner, 1958).  Until an impasse is reached, the employer may not unilaterally change 
conditions of employment, as this would preclude or limit negotiations about unresolved 
items and would thus be inconsistent with the concept of good faith bargaining.  Both 
sides have an obligation to bargain to impasse.  In order for an issue to be mandatory, it 
must bear a direct, significant relationship to terms and conditions of employment.   
National Labor Relations Board v. International Van Lines (1972) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. International Van Lines (1972), the 
respondent, a moving and storage company, had originally consented to a representation 
election for a local union seeking authorization with the company employees and later 
withdrew its support.  The union organized a campaign to strike the employer and 
picketing commenced at the respondent’s place of business.  When the employees 
refused to cross the picket line, the employer notified them that they would be replaced.  
Some of the employees sought reinstatement and even made unconditional offers to 
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return to work.  The employer refused their reinstatement and claimed it had hired 
permanent replacements.  The Board determined that the labor picketing was activity 
protected under § 7 of the NLRA and concluded that the discharges of the striking 
employees “discriminated against lawful union activity and were unfair labor practices 
under §§ 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a)(3) of the Act” (International Van Lines, 1972).  The Board 
held that the employees to be unfair labor practice strikers and ordered their 
unconditional reinstatement with back pay.  On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, it was held that the labor picketing was a lawful economic strike and 
the discharges were unfair labor practices.  The court upheld the Board’s overall decision 
but reversed the reinstatement of pay part of the ruling.  The court held there to be an 
important distinction between the economic-striker-reinstatement rule and the unfair-
labor-practice-striker-reinstatement rule.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the “unconditional reinstatement of the discharged employees was proper for the simple 
reason that they were victims of a plain unfair labor practice by their employer” 
(International Van Lines, 1972).  The Court further stated that  
to hold that the employee’s rights to reinstatement arising from the discriminatory 
discharges were somehow forfeited merely because they continued for a time to 
engage in their lawful strike after the unfair labor practice had been committed 
would undercut the remedial powers of the NLRB with respect to § 8 violations 
and subvert the protection of § 7 of the Act (International Van Lines, 1972). 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the workers were 
reinstated with back pay.  The significance of unlawful refusal to bargain is not only that 
the Board would probably issue a cease-and-desist order aimed at remedying the 
bargaining behavior, but rather that a strike resulting from illegal bargaining would be an 
unfair-labor-practice strike and would mean that in contrast to economic strikers who 
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may be replaced, these workers would be entitled to reinstatement and back pay. 
 The unions and the employers made great efforts to come to terms with these 
issues of what was legal and what was not legal in terms of labor negotiations.  The 
unions claimed that they needed the strike to hold their ground economically and 
strategically to ensure a fair contract.  The employers complained about loss of business 
revenue and customers and asked the courts to allow the lockout and to hire permanent 
replacements.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer was obliged to bargain 
with a lawfully recognized union that was seeking new affiliation without taking a vote 
among the nonunion employees as well as the union members in the bargaining unit.  The 
courts divided the issues by three main parameters:  mandatory, non-mandatory, and 
illegal.  There were three governing considerations for the courts when determining that a 
subject was mandatory.  The first was whether the subject matter was within the “literal 
definition” of “conditions of employment.”  The second consideration was whether 
industrial peace was likely to be promoted through the negotiation of the issue.  The third 
was whether the Court stated that the practice in the industry was important.  Collective 
bargaining between employer and worker took place on a number of levels in various 
arenas and at different times during the contract period.  In general, the “zipper clause” 
was an agreement by both parties to preclude further bargaining during the term of the 
contract.  If the zipper clause contained clear and unmistakable language to that effect, 
the result would be that neither party could force the other party to bargain, during the 
term of the contract, about matters encompassed by the clause.  In two separate cases, 
Financial Institution Employees and Metropolitan Edison Company, the Court defined 
these issues.   
 78
 
National Labor Relations Board v. Financial Institution Employees of America, Local 
1182 (1986) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Financial Institution Employees of America, 
Local 1182 (1986), the employees authority to determine which union would 
appropriately represent them was challenged by the employer.  The NLRB had certified 
an independent union as the collective bargaining representative of a bargaining unit but 
the union later voted to affiliate with an international union.  The union petitioned the 
Board to amend the certification.  The Board granted the amendment, but the employer 
refused to bargain with the union.  The Board held that the employer was in violation of 
§§ 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a)(5) of the NLRA.  The Board later reconsidered its decision and held 
that because nonunion employees had not been allowed to vote in the affiliation election, 
“the election did not meet minimal due process standards and that, therefore, the 
affiliation with the union was invalid” (Financial Institution Employees of America, 
1986).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Board’s 
ruling was irrational and inconsistent with the NLRA, because  
(1) it intruded upon the union’s internal affairs, (2) it was inconsistent with the 
strong national policy of maintaining stability in bargaining representatives, and 
(3) the interests of nonunion employees were adequately protected under existing 
procedures, and the Board’s reasoning did not support its rule (Financial 
Institution Employees of America, 1986). 
 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case. 
The Court held that the NLRB had exceeded its authority under the NLRA in requiring 
that nonunion employees be allowed to vote for affiliation before it would order the 
employer to bargain with the affiliated union. 
Metropolitan Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1983) 
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In Metropolitan Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1983), the 
union participated in unlawful work stoppages, despite a no-strike clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement.  On each of these strikes, the employer disciplined the union 
officials more severely than the other participants by suspending them for more days.  
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge and an administrative law judge 
concluded that “selective discipline of union officials violated § 8 (a)(1) and § 8 (a)(3) of 
the National Labor Relations Act” (Metropolitan Edison Company, 1983).  The NLRB 
affirmed the administrative law judge’s conclusions and findings, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced the Board’s order.  On certiorari, the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed and held that the imposition of more severe sanctions on union 
officials than on other employees for participating in unlawful work stoppages violated  
§ 8 (a)(3) of the NLRA.   
Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. National Labor 
Relations Board (1961) 
 
The courts continued to review the authority of the Board and U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the NLRA was designed to perform a remedial function and that punitive 
sanctions were not to be imposed for violations.  The employee was often at a severe 
disadvantage as the appeal process could take years to resolve, leaving the employee 
financially and emotionally exhausted.  The remedies determined by the courts were 
compensation for the workers or employers.  In Local 60, United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America v. National Labor Relations Board (1961), the Board 
found that the employer had violated § 8 (b)(1)(A) and § 8 (b)(2) of the NLRA in 
maintaining and enforcing an agreement which established a closed-shop preferential 
hiring condition of employment.  The Board stated that  
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because the dues, non-membership dues, assessments, and work permit fees were 
collected under an illegal contract as the price employees paid in order to obtain 
or retain their jobs, it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to permit 
retention of the payments which have been unlawfully exacted from the 
employees (United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 1961).    
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Board’s decision.  On  
certiorari, the petitioners only challenged the Board’s order on the refund provision.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the union membership, fees, or 
dues were coerced.  The Court further stated that “the Board’s power to command 
affirmative action is remedial, not punitive and as a means of removing or avoiding the 
consequences of violation” (United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 
1961).  The Court reversed the lower court’s decision.   
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provided that in cases where the employer 
had unlawfully refused to bargain for an initial contract, employees would be awarded 
compensation for the delay in bargaining.  The workers would receive an amount based 
on the average wage settlements negotiated by workers at plants where collective 
bargaining had proceeded lawfully, and would receive wages and fringe benefits 
retroactively from the time of the unlawful refusal to bargain until bargaining began.   
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is 
engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, 
within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have 
occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate 
temporary relief or restraining order.  Upon the filing of any such petition the 
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon 
shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining 
order as it deems just and proper (The Civil Service Reform Act, 1978). 
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 Employers and workers looked for the best methods to gain strategic economic 
ground for their own interests.  The employers ran businesses and wanted profits.  The 
workers were in search of the best wages and conditions of employment.  The fact 
remained that the desires of the two parties were often at odds with each other.  The 
methods they used to gain ground often were categorized by the other party as “unfair 
labor practices.”   
 No-strike violations were exactly the kind of practice that employers considered 
“unfair.”  Injunctions were generally permitted for violations of no-strike clauses where 
the underlying grievance was arbitrable.  Damages were obtained against unions for no-
strike-violations, but these actions in courts were normally stayed pending the arbitration 
of the issue.   
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 (1970) 
 
 In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 (1970), an employer 
and a union had made a collective bargaining agreement which contained a no-strike 
clause and a provision for binding arbitration.  The union later called a strike rather than 
submitting the grievance dispute to arbitration.  The United District Court for the Central 
District of California granted injunctive relief against the strike.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Sinclair decision in the U.S. Supreme 
Court provided that injunctive relief from the District Court was precluded by the anti-
injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.   
 On certiorari, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case with directions to affirm the District Court’s order.  The 
Sinclair decision was overruled and it was held that  
 82
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not preclude a 
Federal District Court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation 
under a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions, enforceable under 
§ 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, for binding arbitration of the 
grievance dispute concerning which the strike was called (Boys Market, 1970).   
 
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v.  
Lucas Flour (1962) 
 
In Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v.  
Lucas Flour (1962), an employer brought action against a union for damages for 
businesses losses caused by a strike called by the union over a dispute of the discharge of 
an employee.  The employer and union had a collective bargaining agreement between 
the parties providing that any difference should be submitted to arbitration and that the 
decision of the arbitrators should be final and binding.  The Washington State Supreme 
Court held that the strike was a violation of the contract and entered a judgment in favor 
of the employer.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 
“Washington State Supreme Court was not deprived of jurisdiction over the present 
litigation by § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the strike was a 
violation of the contract, in view of the compulsory arbitration clause” (Local 174, 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 1962).   
Drake Bakeries Incorporated v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers 
International, AFL-CIO (1962) 
 
In a similar case, Drake Bakeries Incorporated v. Local 50, American Bakery & 
Confectionery Workers International, AFL-CIO (1962), a bakery company brought action 
in the United States District Court against a union for instigating a strike in violation of 
the no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining contract between the parties.  
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant a stay 
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of the action pending completion of arbitration, holding that the employer’s claim was an 
arbitrable matter under contract.   
 The courts supported arbitration as a means to resolve conflict and in fact 
preferred it to the strike, lockout, or other methods of “economic warfare.”  The NLRB 
facilitated the arbitration process by carefully using its own jurisdiction and by not 
reversing arbitrators’ awards where the arbitration proceedings were fair, where the 
issues raised before the Board were already raised to the arbitrator, where the award was 
not “repugnant” to the public policy of the Board and the NLRA, and where the unfair 
labor practice issue had been addressed by the arbitrator.   
 The duty of fair representation under which a union as the exclusive bargaining 
agent has an obligation to deal fairly on behalf of all of a bargaining unit’s employees 
(union and nonunion) is indicated in the NLRA’s grant of authority to the union to 
negotiate on behalf of all workers.  The failure of a union to meet its duty of fair 
representation constituted a violation of federal labor law and an unfair labor practice.  A 
union owes employees a duty to represent them adequately as well as honestly and in 
good faith.     
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company (1944) 
 
In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company (1944), the question was 
whether a labor organization had the duty to represent all the employees without 
discrimination and if the courts had jurisdiction to protect the minority of workers from 
the violation of this obligation.  The petitioner, an African-American employee, along 
with his fellow African-American employees, was excluded from union membership by 
constitution.  All protests and appeals of the petitioner, and his fellow African-American 
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workers, addressed to the employer and the union were ignored.  The Supreme Court of 
Alabama took jurisdiction of the cause but held on the merits that petitioner’s complaint 
stated no cause of action.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that  
unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union 
members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating against them as 
such in the contracts which it makes as their representative, the minority would be 
left with no means of protecting their interests or, indeed, their right to earn a 
livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.  While the 
majority of the craft chooses the bargaining representative, when chosen it 
represents, as the Act by its terms makes plain, the craft or class, and not the 
majority.  The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization 
chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as well as 
the minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom it represents (Steele, 
1944). 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the duty which is imposed on a union 
representative of a craft to represent the interests of all its members stands “on no 
different footing and that the Railway Act contemplates resort to the usual judicial 
remedies” (Steele, 1944) of injunction and award of damages when appropriate for 
breach of duty.   
If the collective bargaining agreement does not authorize the individual to take a 
grievance to arbitration, then the union maintains control of the grievance and determines 
whether to initiate arbitration.  The courts held that an individual does not have the 
“absolute right” to initiate arbitration proceedings.  The individual can question the 
union’s failure to process a grievance if its actions toward an employee in the bargaining 
unit were “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”   
Vaca, v. Sipes, Administrator (1967) 
 
In Vaca, v. Sipes, Administrator (1967), an employee sued the defendant union in 
Circuit Court, alleging that he had been discharged from his employment in violation of 
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the collective bargaining contract between his employer and the union, and that the union 
had arbitrarily refused to take his grievance to arbitration.  The jury awarded a verdict for 
compensatory and punitive damages to the employee.  The judge set aside the verdict and 
entered a judgment for the union, stating that the suit involved strictly an unfair labor 
practice which was within the “exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB” (Vaca, 1967).  The 
Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, however, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri reversed, holding that the NLRB did not have exclusive jurisdiction and the 
employee could properly recover damages from the union.  On certiorari, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed.  It was held that  
(1) the state court had jurisdiction in the instant case, (2) the evidence failed to 
establish that the union had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith so as to have breached 
its duty of fair representation, and (3) the union could not properly be held liable 
for damages attributable solely to the employer’s allegedly wrongful discharge 
(Vaca, 1967).   
 
The enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is 
conditioned upon the union’s having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the 
employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings.   
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Incorporated (1976) 
 
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Incorporated (1976), several employees took 
action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, alleging that the employer 
made charges of dishonesty against the employees and discharged them, based on false 
evidence.  The employees claimed that the employer had acted without just cause and in 
breach of the collective bargaining agreement.  A discovery deposition indicated that the 
charges were in fact false but the court upheld the previous judgment on the grounds that  
(1) under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the decision of the 
arbitration committee was final and binding on the parties, and (2) there was no 
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showing of breach of duty by the union (Hines, 1976).   
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision based on the finality 
provision of the bargaining agreement since there was no evidence of misconduct by the 
employer.   
 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to an appropriate remedy against the employer as well as the 
union if the plaintiffs proved erroneous discharges in violation of the bargaining 
agreement and the union’s breach of duty tainting the arbitration decision.   
National Labor Relations Board v. Boeing Company (1973) 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Boeing Company (1973), a union levied 
fines on several of its members for “strikebreaking.”  The union filed suit in state court to 
collect these fines, and the employer then filed charges against the union stating that it 
had violated § 8 (b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.  The NLRB ruled that the union had violated § 8 
(b)(1)(A) by imposing “disciplinary fines” on employees for acts committed after the 
employees had resigned from the union but not for acts committed before they resigned 
from the union.  The United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit 
remanded the case to the NLRB with directions to consider questions relating to the 
reasonableness of the fines.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that, 
“§ 8 (b)(1)(A) of the NLRA has nothing to say about the reasonableness of union 
disciplinary fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship and not otherwise 
prohibited by the Act” (Boeing, 1973).   
Finnegan v. Leu (1982) 
 
In Finnegan v. Leu (1982), appointed business agents were discharged by a new 
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union president.  The business agents brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio alleging that they were terminated in violation of the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § § 101 (a)(1) and 101 (a)(2), guaranteeing 
equal voting rights and rights of speech and assembly to every member of a labor 
organization.  The District granted summary judgment in favor of the union president, 
holding that the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act did not protect union 
employees from discharge as long as their rights as a union member are not affected.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that  
the appointed union business agents had failed to establish a violation of the 
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act arising from their discharge, 
since Title I of the Act does not restrict freedom of an elected union leader to 
choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own and not within § 609 of 
the Act which referred only to retaliatory actions affecting union members’ rights 
and status as a member of the union (Finnegan, 1982).   
 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights 
 
State laws that were clearly designed to evade constitutional responsibility to end 
segregation and racial discrimination were eventually struck down in federal courts but 
these courts suits delayed the progress towards integration and overall fair treatment.   
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade discrimination in employment by 
employers, employment agencies, or labor unions on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin, in any term, condition, or privilege of employment.   
§ 2000 (e)(2).  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
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or national origin. 
 
 Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as 
the administrative agency to implement this Act.  The EEOC was given the power to 
enforce the law in court and covered these areas:  (1) all private employers of fifteen or 
more persons; (2) all educational institutions; (3) private and public employment 
agencies; (4) labor unions with fifteen or more members; and (5) joint labor-management 
committees. 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibited discrimination because of sex in the 
payment of wages, for equal work on jobs that require skill, effort and responsibility and 
are performed under similar conditions.  Employers are specifically prohibited from 
reducing the wage rate of any employee to equalize pay between the sexes.   
§ 206 (d).  No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex 
by paying wages to employees at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages 
to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and performed under similar 
working conditions. 
  
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 
 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 prohibited 
employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from discriminating on the basis of 
age against people between the ages of 40 and 65 in hiring, dismissal, promotion and 
other aspects of employment.    
§ 623.  It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual or otherwise discriminate any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age. 
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied to federal contractors and required them to 
take affirmative action to employ and promote qualified handicapped persons.  
Employers were required to provide employment and make accommodations for 
handicapped workers unless they imposed undue hardship on the employer.  Any person 
claiming discrimination on account of a handicap must demonstrate an impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities.   
§ 793.  If any individual with a disability believes any contractor has failed or 
refused to comply with the provisions of a contract with the United States, 
relating to employment of individuals with disabilities, such individual may file a 
complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department shall promptly 
investigate such complaint and shall take such action thereon as the facts and 
circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws 
and regulations applicable thereto. 
 
The American with Disabilities Act of 1990 
 
The American with Disabilities Act of 1990 extended the rights of disabled 
persons to those with physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or 
more of the major activities of life.  Employers were required to make “reasonable 
accommodations” for the disabled.  
§ 126.  No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and provided 
for jury trials in cases of intentional discrimination, with plaintiffs prevailing receiving 
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possible compensatory and punitive damages.  The courts applied the standard of “strict 
scrutiny” to all government programs of preferences based on racial and ethnic 
classifications for employment, education, governmental contracting, and other 
governmental activities. 
§ 1981.  The purposes of this Act are to provide appropriate remedies for 
intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace and to 
confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication 
of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.    
 
The Public Sector 
 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) 
 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) placed into statutory form already 
existing provisions from various executive orders, thereby removing the possibility of 
changes made by subsequent administrations.  Title VII of the CSRA adopted many of the 
concepts of the Taft-Hartley Act, providing a pattern of labor relations in the federal 
government, which was similar to the private sector.   
§ 7116.  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency (1) to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right 
under this chapter [5 USCS §§ 7101 et seq.]; (2) to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization by discrimination in connection with 
hiring, tenure, promotion, or other conditions of employment.   
 
The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) 
 
The CSRA created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), provided for 
exclusive recognition of labor unions that represented a majority of the bargaining unit, 
guaranteed the rights of federal government employees to join unions of their choice, 
prohibited strikes, slowdowns, and work stoppages, defined negotiable issues, and 
consolidated bargaining units. 
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Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Department of the 
Army (1982) 
 
In Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Department 
of the Army (1982), a union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA over the 
government’s decision to consider a specific day administrative leave rather than forced 
annual leave.  An administrative law judge ruled in favor of the proving ground, stating 
that the union’s proposal was “not negotiable because the FLRA had not determined 
under § 7117 of the CSRA that the regulation at issue was not justified by a compelling 
need” (Aberdeen, 1982).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that § 7117 provided the sole procedure for determining whether here was a compelling 
need and reversed the FLRA decision.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.  
The Court held that § 7117  
provided the exclusive procedure for determining whether there was a compelling 
need for a federal regulation, the FLRA may not make a compelling need 
determination in connection with an unfair labor practice proceeding, and a 
federal agency has no duty to bargain as to matters governed by an agency 
regulation, where there has been no prior determination by the FLRA that no 
compelling need existed for the regulation (Aberdeen, 1982).  
     
 Public employees had the right to join a union as protected by the right of 
freedom of association under the First Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court balanced 
the right of employees against the government’s interest in regulating speech and conduct 
of government employees.  The right of public employees to bargain collectively, let 
alone to strike, is not protected by the Constitution.   
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount (1971) 
 
In United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount (1971), an unincorporated public 
employee labor organization brought suit in an effort to seek declaratory and injunctive 
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relief invalidating portions of the Civil Service Reform Act (5 U.S.C. § 7311) and 
Executive Order 11491.   The Civil Service Reform Act “prohibited any government 
employee from accepting or holding a position in federal government if he participated in 
a strike against the Government of the United States.”   
Executive Order 11491 
 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the 
provisions of the statute and the Executive Order did not violate any constitutional rights 
of the employees and the Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.   
The District Court stated that 
the fact that public employees may not strike did not interfere with their rights 
which are fundamental and constitutionally protected.  The right to organize 
collectively and to select representatives for the purposes of engaging in 
collective bargaining is a fundamental right.  The right to strike because of its 
more serious impact on the public interest is more vulnerable to regulation than 
the right to organize.  Executive Order 11491 clearly and expressly defined 
strikes, work stoppages, and slowdowns as unfair labor practices.  In the private 
sphere, the strike is used to equalize bargaining power, but this has universally 
held not to be appropriate when its object and purpose can only be to influence 
the essentially political decisions of Government in the allocation of resources.  
Congress has an obligation to ensure that the machinery of the Government 
continues to function at all times without interference.  Prohibition of strikes by 
its employees is a reasonable implementation of this obligation (Blount, 1971).   
 
The rights of public employees were considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission 
(1976) 
 
In City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (1976), a school teacher who was not a union member addressed the school 
board at a public meeting and spoke on the subject of the union’s “fair share” clause 
proposal to defray collective bargaining costs.  The Wisconsin Employment Relations 
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Commission, the Circuit Court of Dane County, Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin agreed and held that the  
right to freedom of speech and the right to petition the government could be 
abridged in the face of a clear and present danger that the speech would bring 
about substantive evils that the legislature had a right to prevent and that the 
abridgment of the teacher’s right to speak was justified in order to avoid dangers 
to labor-management relations (Wisconsin Employment, 1976). 
 
On appeal the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  The Court held that  
 
(1) the speech of the nonunion teacher at the open board meeting did not 
constitute negotiations, and thus did not constitute a clear and present danger to 
labor-management relations; (2) the nonunion teacher had not sought to bargain 
or to offer to enter into any bargain with the board and did not appear to be 
authorized by any other teachers to enter into any agreement; and (3) the 
nonunion teacher had spoken as one of the board’s employees and also as a 
concerned citizen on an important decision in government (Wisconsin 
Employment, 1976). 
 
There continued to be controversy about collective bargaining in the public sector.   
A major argument against the applicability of private sector labor law to the public sector 
was that the economics was different.  The private sector was based on a market economy 
that did not apply to the public sector.  The constraints in the public sector were political.  
The employment-benefit relationship or trade-off that exists in the private sector was not 
present in the public sector.  An often cited difference between public and private sector 
employment was that unions in the public sector have the opportunity to bring pressure 
on their employees through the political process.  Unions have used the legislature to 
obtain their goals that were under negotiation at the bargaining table.  The federal 
government and a majority of the states prohibit striking by common law or statute.  The 
courts determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the public interest overrides the basic 
right to strike.  The debate shifted to substitutes for striking.  Fact-finding was foremost 
among the choices.  The Civil Service Reform Act provided a resolution.   
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§ 7119 (c).   The Federal Service Impasses Panel or its designee shall promptly 
investigate any impasse presented to it under subsection (b) of this section. The 
Panel shall consider the impasse and shall either (i) recommend to the parties 
procedures for the resolution of the impasse; or (ii) assist the parties in resolving 
the impasse through whatever methods and procedures, including fact-finding and 
recommendations, it may consider appropriate to accomplish the purpose of this 
section.  
 Fact-finding produced a formal report with recommendations and suggested that 
the “unreasonable” party bend to the weight of “public pressure” over the issues and yield 
or modify its position.  The report also can “harden” the positions of both parties and 
make it even less likely to allow dispute resolution.  Fact-finding did not provide finality.       
§ 7119 (c).   If the parties do not arrive at a settlement after assistance by the 
Panel, the Panel may (i) hold hearings; (ii) administer oaths, take the testimony or 
deposition of any person under oath, and issue subpoenas as provided in § 7132 of 
this title; and (iii) take whatever action is necessary and not inconsistent with this 
chapter to resolve the impasse. (C) Notice of any final action of the Panel under 
this section shall be promptly served upon the parties, and the action shall be 
binding on such parties during the term of the agreement, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.  
 Under the National Labor Relations Act, workers, public and private, had the 
right to engage in walkouts if they were protesting unsafe conditions.  In National Labor 
Relations Board v. Washington Aluminum Company (1962), the National Labor 
Relations Board issued an order directing an employer to reinstate employees whom the 
employer had discharged for leaving work without permission on claims that the shop 
was too cold and thus unsafe to work in.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the order on the ground that the walkout did not amount 
to a concerted activity protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.  The workers 
left the shop without giving the employer an opportunity to avoid the work stoppage by 
granting a concession to the demand.  On certiorari the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
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judgment and remanded the case with directions to enforce the Board’s order in its 
entirety.  The Court stated that  
although the company contended to the contrary, we think that the walkout did 
grow out of a labor dispute within the plain meaning of the definition of that term 
in § 2 (9) of the Act which declared that it included any controversy concerning 
terms, tenure or conditions of employment (Washington Aluminum, 1962). 
 
 
Collective bargaining and the political process are very well connected in the 
public sector, one affecting the other and vice versa.  In the public sector there is a 
specific responsibility to protect public interest.  Traditionally, public employment in the 
United States has been legally classified as a “privilege”, not as a “right”, and as a 
consequence of this distinction, government workers have not been able to exercise the 
same constitutional prerogatives as other citizens (Martin, 1977).   
United States Civil Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers (1973) 
 
In most cases, federal employees cannot bargain over the important issue of 
compensation, except in select agencies.  Federal workers are prohibited from striking 
and other forms of political activity are considered illegal.  In the Hatch Act’s restrictions 
against voluntary participation by the federal civil service, it was stated that Congress had 
the constitutional right to restrain the political activities of classified employees (Martin, 
1977).  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States Civil Service v. National 
Association of Letter Carriers (1973) that  
it is not only important that Government and its employees in fact avoid 
practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be 
avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be 
eroded to a disastrous extent (National Association, 1973).   
 
States were not required to treat employees any differently than the U.S. Supreme  
Court, unless required by state law.  The ultimate control of state personnel relationships 
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is, and will remain with, the States (Martin).  Collective bargaining at all pubic 
employment levels was discouraged on the basis of the privilege doctrine as described by 
Martin.  The doctrine stated that benefits that government confers on its employees are 
privileges and not rights.  Government services were characterized as “essential” and thus 
many bargaining rights were denied to public employees.  However, in recent years 
citizens have adapted to many civil service strikes: postal, air controllers, and other local 
level workers.   
Executive Order 10988 (1962) 
 
President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 (1962) established a pattern for labor 
management relations in the federal government.  The order specified three types of 
unions:  formal, informal, and exclusive.  Union or agency shops were prohibited.  
Advisory arbitration of grievances was permitted but resolution of impasses was left to 
the parties.  Arbitration in interest disputes was prohibited.   
§ 1 (a).  Employees of the Federal Government shall have, and shall be protected 
in the exercise of, the right, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, 
join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from any such activity.   
 
§ 3 (a).  Agencies shall accord informal, formal, or exclusive recognition to 
employee organizations which request such recognition. 
 
§ 5 (b).  When an employee organization has been formally recognized, the 
agency, through appropriate officials, shall consult with such organization from 
time to time in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and 
practices, and matters affecting working conditions that are of concern to its 
members.   
 
Union membership grew tremendously following the implementation of Executive 
Order 10988.  The number of employees in exclusive units increased dramatically and 
the percentage of all employees covered by formal agreement increased to forty-nine 
percent in 1974 (Freeman, 1988). 
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Executive Order 11491 (1969) 
 
President Nixon’s Executive Order 11491 (1969) attempted to remedy numerous 
negotiation problems that developed since 1962.  There were problems with multiple 
labor representatives, the absence of a neutral enforcement system, and the abuse of 
power by agency heads and unfair labor practices.   
§ 1 (a).  Each employee of the executive branch of the Federal Government has 
the right, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a 
labor organization or to refrain from any such activity, and each employee shall 
be protected in the exercise of this right.   
 
§ 10 (a).  An agency shall accord exclusive recognition to a labor organization 
when the organization has been selected, in a secret ballot election, by a majority 
of the employees in an appropriate unit as their representative.   
  
§ 17.  When voluntary arrangements, including the services of the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service or other third-party mediation, fail to resolve 
a negotiation impasse, either party may request the Federal Service Impasses 
Panel (FSIP) to consider the matter.  
  
The Federal Service Impasse Panel (FSIP) 
 
The Federal Service Impasse Panel (FSIP) was created and authorized to resolve 
bargaining stalemates (CSRA, 1978).  The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)  
was also created to manage labor relations in the public sector.  The FLRA was designed 
similar to the NLRB and was set up to decide questions related to the representation of 
rights, negotiability of contract proposals, exceptions to arbitration awards, and unfair 
labor practices.  The investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices was with the 
General Counsel of the FLRA (CSRA, 1978).   
 Title VII of the CSRA defined the scope of negotiations in federal government 
collective bargaining.  Many topics that were commonly bargained for in the private 
sector were excluded from negotiations in the federal government.  The original statute 
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prohibited negotiations for wages in most cases, determination of budget, assignment of 
employees, assignment of work, discipline of workers, and the contract out of agency 
work.   
 The determining factor was whether the agency had the discretion to set wages 
and benefits.  Negotiation was then required with the union.  Executive Orders 10988 and 
11491 excluded many of the topics commonly negotiated in the private sector, such as 
wages, hours, overtime, rates, holidays, annual leave, pensions, insurance, and union 
security.  The CSRA continued with this restrictive approach.  The territory for bargaining 
remained unchanged, and matters of law and matters subject to government-wide 
regulation remained unbargainable (Coleman, 1980).   
 Under Title VII, there were three categories of negotiability:  issues which the 
parties have a duty to bargain in good faith, issues where bargaining was prohibited, as a 
matter of law, and issues over which management had discretion whether to bargain or 
not.   
 Negotiability in the federal government was controlled by a rank order of 
relationships between collective bargaining contracts and federal statutes, agency rules 
and regulations, and interagency rules and regulations.  Contracts were not permitted to 
contradict statute.   
 The FSIP developed broad powers to accept or refuse to take jurisdiction over 
negotiation disputes and to recommend procedures for resolving impasses.  In the 
CSRA’s  § 7119 (c), FSIP decisions were considered “binding” and it was an unfair labor 
practice to refuse cooperation with the FSIP.  The FLRA had the authority to sustain, 
overturn, or modify an arbitrator’s award, based on the conflicts with written laws, rules 
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and regulations.   
The Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) 
 
The FLRA generally refused to further review cases where the appeal consisted of 
disagreement with the arbitrator’s: (1) interpretation of contract; (2) finding of fact; (3) 
evaluation of the evidence and testimony; and (4) reasoning and conclusions in resolving 
the dispute.  Statutory standards of review were used by arbitrators and the Merit System 
Protection Board (MSPB), which had the responsibility to protect federal employee rights 
and interests, and both used substantial evidence for any agency actions taken for 
unacceptable performance.  Employees appealed cases to the MSPD  but sometimes did 
not work through the arbitration process in favor of the negotiated grievance procedure.   
Bowen v. United States Postal Service (1982) 
 
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service (1982), a discharged employee filed a 
grievance through his labor union as provided by the collective bargaining agreement.  
When the union refused to take the grievance to arbitration, the employee sued the 
employer and the union, seeking damages and injunctive relief and charged that the 
employer had violated the collective bargaining agreement by dismissing him without 
just cause and charged that the union had breached its duty of fair representation.  The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia returned a verdict in 
favor of the employee and approved the apportionment of damages of $30,000 against the 
union and $22,954 against the employer.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit accepted the District Court’s findings of fact but overturned the damages 
award, holding that the reimbursement of lost earnings was the obligation of the 
employer only.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  The 
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Court held that “the damages were required to be apportioned between the employer and 
the labor union where the damages sustained by the employee were caused initially by 
the employer’s unlawful discharge and were increased by the union’s breach of its duty 
of fair representation (United States Postal, 1982). 
Executive Order 12871 (1993) 
 
President Clinton established the National Partnership Council, in Executive 
Order 12871 (1993), to advise the President and propose specific reforms in the law for 
employee relations in the government.  The executive order required each agency to 
establish “labor-management partnerships” programs.   
§ 1 (b). The National Partnership Council shall advise the President on matters 
involving labor-management relations in the executive branch.  Its activities shall 
include supporting the creation of labor-management partnerships and promoting 
partnership efforts in the executive branch.   
 
§ 2 (a). The head of each agency shall create labor-management partnerships by 
forming labor-management committees or councils at appropriate levels to help 
reform Government.   
 
§ 2 (c). The head of each agency shall provide systematic training of appropriate 
agency employees (including line managers, first line supervisors, and union 
representatives who are Federal employees) in consensual methods of dispute 
resolution, such as alternative dispute resolution techniques and interest-based 
bargaining approaches.   
 
State and Local Government 
 
There is no comprehensive common legal framework within which to work for 
state and local government employees.  State and local labor relations existed through a 
complex map of common-law doctrines, judicial decrees, executive orders, statutes, and 
ordinances.  In the public sector outside the federal government, the trend has been to 
consider most topics bargainable, including wages, hours, and conditions of employment.  
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Most states have no statutory provisions limiting the scope of bargaining but impose on 
the parties the duty to bargain with respect to “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment” (Horowitz, 1994).   
The labor relations situation for public employees was extremely diverse in each 
city, county and state in the United States.  State and local government employees, unlike 
their federal counterparts, have resorted to strikes as a way to ensure their respective 
employers meet their demands.  The large majority of jurisdictions prohibited public 
employees from striking; however, hundreds of public employees’ strikes have taken 
place in the last 30 years.  The constitutional protection of the First Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment for protection of speech, expression and association and the 
rights of a person of life, liberty, and property as protected by due process of law, were 
important to public sector employees, particularly to employees in states without public 
sector collective bargaining status.   
 First Amendment rights generally allowed a worker to join a union or advocate 
joining a union without fear of being discharged by the employer.  Employees were 
permitted to speak on public issues, but this right was balanced by the interests of the 
state and local governments’ responsibilities to provide public services.   
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle (1977) 
 
In Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle (1977), an 
untenured school teacher, with several past performance issues, spoke out on public radio 
against the school principal’s policies.  The school board did not renew the teacher’s 
contract at the end of the year and cited the teacher’s lack of tact and professionalism.  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the teacher 
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was entitled to reinstatement with back pay, as his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were violated.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  On 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded 
the case.  The Court held that  
(1) the school board was not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit in the federal court, since under state law, the board was more like a 
county or city, not entitled immunity, than it was like an arm of the state, (2) the 
teacher’s constitutional claims were not defeated merely because he did not have 
tenure, (3) even with protection of free speech, the mere fact that the conduct was 
found by the District Court to have played a “substantial part” in the board’s 
decision not to renew the teacher’s contract did not amount to a constitutional 
violation justifying remedial action by the board, (4) the District Court had erred 
in not determining whether the board showed by a preponderance of evidence that 
it would have reached the same decision on re-employment of the teacher, and (5) 
the case would be remanded, since it could not be determined from the lower 
court’s opinions what conclusion those courts would have reached had they 
applied the proper test (Doyle, 1977).  
 
Connick, District Attorney in and for the Parrish of Orleans, Louisiana v.  Myers (1983) 
 
In Connick, District Attorney in and for the Parrish of Orleans, Louisiana v. 
 Myers (1983), an employee in the District Attorney’s office was terminated for refusing 
a transfer and for being insubordinate by distributing a questionnaire to her colleagues on 
office morale, transfer policies and the need for a grievance committee.  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana agreed with the employee that 
her right to constitutionally protected free speech had been violated.  She was granted 
reinstatement, back pay, damages, and attorney’s fees, holding that the questionnaire was 
the reason for her termination and that the issues in the questionnaire were matters of 
public concern and that the employer had not demonstrated that the questionnaire had 
substantially disrupted the work environment.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that  
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the discharge did not offend the First Amendment since (1) the employee spoke 
out not as a citizen but as an employee upon matters of personal interest, and the 
federal court is not the appropriate forum to review the wisdom of personnel 
decisions taken by a public agency, (2) the District Court erred by imposing the 
burden on the state to justify the employee’s discharge by requiring it to clearly 
demonstrate that the speech interfered with the operation of the office and (3) the 
limited First Amendment interest here did not require the employer to tolerate 
action that disrupted the office, undermined the supervisor’s authority and 
destroyed the close working relationships in the office (Myers, 1983). 
 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 (1968) 
 
 
 In Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 (1968), 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in the “absence of proof of false statements knowingly 
or recklessly made by a teacher, his right to speak on issues of pubic importance could 
not furnish the basis for his dismissal” (Pickering, 1968). 
 A balance had to be struck between the interest of pubic employees as citizens 
commenting on issues of public interest and the interest of the state as an employer 
delivering on public services.  State and local employers were prevented from arbitrarily 
disciplining or dismissing employees.  The U.S. Supreme Court used a two-part test to 
decide whether the employee was deprived of a protected interest and what process was 
due.   
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) and Perry v. Sinderman (1972) 
 
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) and Perry v. Sinderman 
(1972), employees’ rights of liberty, property and due process were considered.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Roth that the employee’s right to due process applied only to the 
“deprivation of interests encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
liberty and property, and the range of such interests was not infinite, and procedural due 
process protected only interests that a person had already acquired” (Roth, 1972).  In 
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Perry v. Sinderman, the Court held that “there was no requirement in the Constitution 
that an untenured teacher be afforded a hearing unless it can be shown that the non-
retention deprived the teacher of some interest of liberty or property” (Sinderman, 1972).  
However, the Court recommended that the teacher be given “a hearing by the college 
board, following which the matter could come before the courts for review supported by 
the information developed at the hearing” (Sinderman). 
 A property interest was usually found when an employee had a tenured position 
or when he was protected by civil service rules or a collective bargaining contract.  An 
employee may be protected when he had the expectation of continued employment.  
Liberty interest existed when an employee’s reputation was harmed or his expectation to 
find further employment was affected.   
 Public sector collective bargaining has come into conflict at the state level with 
civil service regulations.  Unions continue to work in this area of disagreement between 
civil service codes and the collective bargaining statutes and agreements to expand the 
scope of bargaining.  State and federal systems of government have sovereign powers.  
The concept of sovereignty is inherent in the supreme power of a political state.  “Any 
state that possesses and maintains supreme power can determine whether or not an 
individual or a group of individuals can initiate a claim against the state” (Imundo, 1975).  
Local governments are not sovereign and must not enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with employee organizations without state passed legislation authorization.  
States established boards or agencies to enforce these laws of public sector collective 
bargaining.  These agencies handled these issues:  unit determination, bargaining agent 
recognition and certification, impasse resolution, and grievance arbitration.   
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 Employers continued to resist the idea of legalizing strikes by public employees 
because of the sovereign nature of government and the fundamental necessity of 
government services.  “The operation of the government is organized around a system of 
checks and balances that delimit the exercising of power by an individual or group” 
(Imundo).  State and local governments have resorted to three basic procedures to press 
the process of finality: mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.  Binding arbitration 
attempted to prevent strikes through legally imposed penalties for failure to reach 
agreement.  State policymakers provided a wide variety of dispute resolution mechanisms 
when legislating bargaining rights; most notable was compulsory arbitration (Ichniowski, 
1982).  Final-offer arbitration was another method to dispute resolution in the public 
sector where the arbitrator may not compromise but accepted entirely one position or the 
other.  Ichniowski (1982) found that municipalities that provided for collective bargaining 
in any form experienced significantly fewer strikes than did municipalities in 
environments where there was no law or where bargaining was outlawed.  In addition, 
municipalities with a duty-to-bargain environment without arbitration experienced more 
strikes than municipalities with arbitration.    
 The variables in state bargaining laws used to measure the differing legal 
environments for collective bargaining include two principal aspects of the law – 
bargaining rights and impasse procedures.  Some state frameworks establish the right of 
employee organizations to merely “meet and confer” with employers or “present 
proposals” (Ichniowski, 1982).  In general there are four classifications of public 
bargaining laws: states with no specific provisions for collective bargaining or where 
bargaining is illegal; states where labor organizations have the right to present their views 
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to employers but which falls short of the “duty-to-bargain” provision; states which have a 
duty-to-bargain provision but no compulsory arbitration mechanism for resolving 
disputes; and states which have duty-to-bargain and provide compulsory arbitration.   
 Opposition to compulsory arbitration continued due to the fact that it displaced 
the political responsibility by delegating governmental authority to a third party who was 
not responsible to the electorate.  However, there was still support for this kind of 
arbitration as it tended to prevent strikes and delegated legal authority, with explicit 
standards and guidelines for arbitrators, and had procedural safeguards with court review 
written statutorily.  This system of arbitration did not have the power to impose a burden 
or charge.   
 Public policies vary among the states and some public policies have had a greater 
impact than others on reducing strike frequency for public employees.  In Pennsylvania, 
policymakers have decided that the exercise of the right to strike in the public sector is, 
within limits, more important than the costs possibly imposed on the public by strikes 
(Olson, 1986).  Olson found that in New York, policymakers have successfully deterred 
strikes by imposing substantial penalties on striking unions and employees.  Olson 
determined that many state public employees considered the benefits of interest 
arbitration over the strike. 
To compare the probability of a strike with and without arbitration, assume that 
unions initially choose between a strike and arbitration by selecting the procedure 
with the higher expected outcome.  Following the use of either procedure, 
however, the union may invoke the procedure that was not initially chosen in an 
attempt to obtain an outcome superior to that already obtained from the first 
procedure.  Under this decision framework, compulsory arbitration will reduce the 
strike probability if unions initially choose arbitration in most negotiations and 
seldom strike because of an unfavorable arbitration award (Olson, 1986).  
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The trend in public sector bargaining has been toward mutual responsibility for wages, 
hours, and working conditions, however the conflict between sovereignty and 
accountability and bilateral authority has been strongly ideologically recognized and 
imbedded in discussion and disagreement.  The movement of work involvement and 
labor-management cooperation continues to grow more prevalent in the work 
environment.   The concern for these “involvement committees” is that they can be 
considered “management dominated” and thus not permitted by the Wagner Act as 
amended under the Taft-Hartley Act.  Worker-management relations continue to be under 
review in the courts, the state and federal legislatures, and the employee and employer 
organizations.   
 Interest in “employee participation programs” has heightened as competition from 
foreign manufacturers has increased.  However, when “non-professional” employees 
participated in joint problem-solving structures with management, it was argued that they 
were performing a managerial function (Lee, 1987).  Unions have often described these 
groups as “company unions” dominated by the employer, in violation of the NLRA.  
When “professional” employees attempted to organize, management frequently 
challenged the lawfulness of such a union, stating that the employees were performing 
“managerial duties.” 
Payne v. The Western & Atlantic Railroad Company (1884) 
 
One of the main issues in public employment was the employer’s rights to 
discharge nonunion employees at will.  Union employees were generally protected under 
their respective collective bargaining agreements, as stipulated by contract.  The at-will 
doctrine can be traced back to the 1884 Payne Case of the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
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which was noted for its interpretation of the common law right of an employer to 
discharge an employee.     
In Payne v. The Western & Atlantic Railroad Company (1884), the Tennessee 
Supreme Court examined the common law and the following question:  Is it unlawful to 
threaten to discharge employees if they trade with a certain merchant?  The court stated 
that  
if the act is unlawful it must be on other grounds than breach of contract, as, that 
it unjustly deprives plaintiff of customers and trade to which his fair dealing 
entitles him, and thus destroys his business.  For any one to do this without cause 
is censurable and unjust (Payne, 1884). 
 
However, in Payne, the court was unwilling to control human behavior, liberty  
and normal commerce.  Employers were expected to trade, buy and sell goods, and hire 
and fire workers to promote healthy profits and good business practices.  The court held 
that employers may dismiss their employee at will, be they many or few, for good cause, 
for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal 
wrong.   
If in the act of discharging them, they break no contract, then no one can sue for 
loss suffered.  Trade is free; so is employment.  The law leaves employer and 
employee to make their own contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce.  
Either the employer or employee may terminate the relation at will, and the law 
will not interfere, except for contract broken (Payne, 1884). 
 
 
The case represented a seminal decision for the at-will doctrine of employment.  
Absent a contract, an employer or employee can end the working relationship at their 
will, at any time, for almost any reason, including no reason at all.  These issues have 
been challenged to provide greater protection for nonunion employees against unjust 
termination of employment.  The courts have developed three broad categories of 
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exceptions to the employer’s right to terminate employees at will:  public policy, breach 
of implied-in-fact contract, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
The public policy exception extended to employees who had a recognized claim 
for wrongful discharge when the discharge was contrary to a clear mandate of public 
policy.  This exemption also extended to cases of professional employees who were 
asked to violate the employee’s professional code of conduct.  The public policy 
exception is the most widely accepted exception and is applied in 43 of 50 states 
(Hackstock, 2002).  Public policy is generally defined as the “well-established public 
policy of the State” existing in the state constitution or state statutes.   
Blair v. Honda of Honda of America (2002) 
 
In Blair v. Honda of Honda of America (2002), an employee was terminated for 
excessive absences from work.  The employee suffered from medical allergies that were 
exacerbated by the materials on the manufacturing line, and she filed a complaint against 
Honda, alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public 
policy.  The court stated that “Ohio employment law was based on the general premise 
that all employment is considered at-will, whereby either party may terminate the 
employment relationship for whatever reason and whenever either so desires” (Blair, 
2002).  The court further said that “when asserting a claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that clear public policy 
existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative 
regulation, or in the common law” (Blair).  In the end the court held that  
to allow the employer to terminate the employee for missing work due to an 
illness caused by the employer’s decision to require the employee to work in an 
unsafe environment would jeopardize the public policy that demands that 
employees be provided with a safe work environment (Blair).     
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The court found that a clear public policy of workplace safety had been violated  
and ordered the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Union County, Ohio reversed  
and remanded for further disposition. 
Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1999) 
 
A more controversial and delicate exception to employment at will is when the 
court finds that an employer has breached an implied contract with the employee.  In 
Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1999), an employee left her previous place 
of employment of eleven years for a promise of new employment at a new clinic.  One 
day before beginning work, the employee received a call from the new clinic stating that 
they had decided not hire her after all.  The employee sued for breach of oral contract.  
The court stated that “the employee had a right to assume he would be given a good faith 
opportunity to perform his duties” (Goff-Hamel, 1999).  The court reversed the judgment 
of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.   
  
 
 
 111
CHAPTER III 
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
 
 
 A review of statutes and case law was conducted for the fifty states to determine 
the current status of public employee and specifically public school teacher labor law, 
collective bargaining, and strike laws.  To assist in the research, state secretaries and 
superintendents of education and state attorneys general from the fifty states were 
contacted by letter to request up to date information regarding their respective state’s 
applicable statutory language and corresponding legal challenges in the courts.  A total of 
forty-five states responded, with thirty states providing information from both the state’s 
department of education and the office of the attorney general and the remainder 
providing information from one of the two sources.   
 The review of state statutes and case law demonstrated an identifiable geographic 
pattern to the status of public employee labor law.  The states were divided into 3 regions.  
Region I was No State Collective Bargaining Laws.  In this region were predominantly 
the Southern states through the Southwestern and into the Western states.  Region II was 
Collective Bargaining Laws with the Northeastern through the Midwestern and parts of 
the Western states.  Florida and Tennessee were the exceptions from the South.  Region 
III was made up the Northeastern, Midwestern, and Western states where ten states 
Permitted Strikes, plus Alaska and Hawaii, to make a total of twelve states to permit 
public employees to strike.   
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Region I – No State Collective Bargaining Laws 
 
Alabama—Statutes 
 
None 
Alabama—Court Cases 
 
In Walker County Board of Education v. Walker County Education Association 
(1983), the plaintiff appealed a decision by the Walker County Circuit Court to the 
Supreme Court of Alabama, where the School Board of Education had adopted certain 
policies that were applicable to all professional staff members in the Walker County 
School System.  These policies included issues of dismissals, reduction in personnel, 
grievance procedures, and other employee concerns.  A dispute arose between the Board 
and the employee organizations, the Walker County Education Association (WCEA) and 
the Walker County Education Support Personnel Organization (WCESPO), over 
decisions by the Board to reduce personnel, stating that these decisions violated the 
policies previously set forth.  The Alabama Supreme Court concluded, “the policies were 
adopted pursuant to statutory authority and were unilaterally adopted by the plaintiff and 
were not the product of collective bargaining” (Walker County, 1983).  The Court further 
stated that  
the concept of “collective bargaining,” as understood and applied in the field of 
private industry, implies bargaining sanctions and weapons not available to public 
employees, such as the right to strike and other incidents of the private 
employment relationship not appropriate in the public employment field.  It also 
implies two bargaining units of co-equal status, each with unlimited power to 
enter into binding commitments.  This concept does not apply in the case of the 
state with relation to its employees (Walker County, 1983).    
 
The court further concluded that  
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the Board has authority under Title 16 § 8 (10) of the Code of Alabama 1975 to 
“consult with” a representative of the employee organization when that 
“consultation” is in the context of meeting, discussion, and recommendation.  
Title 16 § 8 (10) obligates the Board to “directly, or indirectly consult with the 
professional organization representing the majority of the certified employees and 
in addition to also consult with professional assistants, principals, teachers, and 
interested citizens (Walker County, 1983).   
 
Title 16 § 8 (10) of the Code of Alabama 1975 only obligates the Board to meet 
and consult with those persons set out in the statute; it does not obligate the Board 
to reach any agreement, accept any proposals or negotiate any matter if it does not 
with to do so.  The Board is free to reject the proposals submitted for any reason 
or no reason, without committing an unfair labor practice or subjecting itself to 
any sanction.  However, once the Board accepts a policy pursuant to statutory 
mandate the same remains in full force and effect to the extent it does not violate 
Alabama law until modified or amended by the Board in accord with the 
procedure set forth in Title 16 § 8 (10) (Walker County, 1983). 
 
The Court found that the trial court had properly determined that the provision for  
binding arbitration was unenforceable unless voluntarily agreed into by the Board and the 
WCEA and WCESPO.        
Arizona—Statutes 
 
None 
Arizona—Court Cases 
 
 In Board of Education of the Scottsdale High School District v. Scottsdale 
Education Association (SEA) (1972), the Court of Appeals of Arizona reviewed an appeal 
from the Maricopa County Superior Court to determine the legality of an order for the 
Board to follow an “impasse” procedure called for by a “Professional Negotiation Policy” 
executed by the SEA and the Board.   
 The Court stated that 
there is no objection to the organization of the plaintiff as a labor union, but if its 
organization is for the purpose of “demanding” recognition and collective 
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bargaining, the demands must be kept within legal bounds.  The plaintiff does not 
have the right to organize for all of the purposes for which employees in private 
enterprise may unite.  It does not mean that, having organized, it is necessarily 
protected against unfair labor practices or that it shall be the exclusive bargaining 
agent for all employees of the unit.  It means nothing more than that the plaintiff 
may organize and bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions which 
it may be in the power of the board of education to grant (Scottsdale Education 
Association, 1972).  
 
The Board was determined to be authorized to enter into “collective bargaining”  
with a representative of the teacher-employees when that “collective bargaining” was in 
the context of meeting and consulting with.  The Court found that “the decision of 
whether the Board desires to enter into such a “collective bargaining” situation remains 
for the Board, and actions to compel or coerce the Board to so bargain collectively 
against its better judgment are improper” (Scottsdale Education Association, 1972).     
    
Arkansas—Statutes 
 
None 
Arkansas—Court Cases 
 
Without a collective bargaining law for public employees, school districts have 
devised alternate methods to promote a good working environment.  The Little Rock 
School District Board of Education established a working relationship with all employees 
to result in a working environment, which is productive, efficient, and creative.  Staff 
members are permitted to work with their supervisors to determine their working 
conditions, to use the process of “meet and confer” or to select another process of 
negotiation (Little Rock School District Negotiation Practices, 1999).   
In Wilson v. Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers (1997), a group of 
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taxpayers with children in the Pulaski County School District filed a lawsuit against the 
Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers challenging the legality of a teacher strike.  
The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that “it is clear that the ability of public 
employees to withhold their services involves a question of significant public interest, the 
resolution of which would preclude future litigation” (Pulaski, 1997).  The Court further 
stated that based on previous cases, Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830 (1958) and City of Ft. 
Smith v. No. 38, AFL-CIO, 245 Ark. 409, (1968), strikes for public employees were 
illegal in Arkansas.  The Court further explained the jurisdiction of equity with respect to 
public employees. 
There is no doubt but that equity will exercise jurisdiction to restrain acts or 
threatened acts of public corporations or of public officers, boards, or 
commissions which are ultra vires and beyond the scope of their authority 
(Pulaski, 1997). 
 
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that the appellant had  
failed to make a showing of irreparable harm, and did not uphold the order of 
injunction against the teachers’ organization.  On dissent, the minority of the Court stated 
that  
the issue of whether teachers who are public employees may strike against their 
government employers is an issue of significant public interest that must be 
addressed.  The language in City of Fort Smith is unequivocal and is, at the very 
minimum, persuasive authority for the proposition that strikes by public 
employees is illegal.  (Pulaski, 1997).   
 
 
Colorado—Statutes 
 
None 
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Colorado—Court Cases 
 
 Public school employees in Colorado bargain under a voluntary agreement in 
which the local association seeks a collective bargaining agreement with the school 
district and obtains it through a representation election, employee organization, or 
collaboration.   
 In Lori Lazuk v. School District No. 1, City and County of Denver (2000), the 
plaintiff appealed a decision from the District Court of the City and County of Denver to 
the Court of Appeals of Colorado, Division Three, and the case was decided in favor of 
the defendants, School District No. 1.  The plaintiff, a schoolteacher, had openly 
questioned the school’s leadership and was subsequently transferred to another school.  
The plaintiff asserted that the school board  
cannot delegate the power to transfer a teacher and, therefore, the collective 
bargaining agreement entered into by the school district and the teachers’ 
association, which provides for teacher transfers without school board approval, is 
invalid (Lazuk, 2000).     
 
The Court stated that by adopting the collective bargaining agreement as school  
board policy, the school board exercised its authority to delegate the authorization to 
transfer teachers.  The Court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
denying plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction and affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.    
Georgia—Statutes 
 
The only statutory provision recognizing a right of public employees to 
collectively bargain is the Firefighters Mediation Act.  O.C.G.A. § 25-5-1 allows 
firefighters to join labor unions and enter into contracts with local municipalities having 
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over 20,000 citizens.  The state legislature allows municipalities to decide whether they 
will enter into collective bargaining.  The law outlaws strikes, work stoppages, and 
slowdowns.   
Georgia—Court Cases 
 
In Camden County v. Haddock (1999), a county employee was terminated by the 
Camden County Commission as a result of a county budget deficit and related problems.  
The employee alleged violations of procedural due process and a violation of the open 
meetings law.  The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the county had violated its own personnel policy.  However, on appeal to the Georgia 
Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the county had not violated the due process 
clause and reversed the decision.  The court stated that   
the State Constitution provided the same procedural rights in public employment 
cases as the federal due process clause.  Public employees have a property interest 
in continued employment for due process purposes when a personnel manual 
provides that an employee can only be terminated for cause.  The focus of the 
procedural due process analysis is whether the state makes adequate procedures 
available, not whether the plaintiff takes advantage of those procedures and 
achieves a successful outcome (Haddock, 1999).    
 
Kentucky—Statutes 
 
Kentucky law provides for specific exception to the collective bargaining laws for 
firefighters and police.  Kentucky Revised Statutes, Ch. 345 addresses collective 
bargaining for firefighters and Kentucky Revised Statutes, Ch. 78 addresses police. 
§ 345.030.  Employees’ right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining.  
Firefighters of a city of the first class shall have, and shall be protected in the 
exercise of, the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor 
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment free 
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from interference, restraint, or coercion.   
 
§ 78.470.  In any county in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which has a 
population of 300,000 or more, and which has adopted the merit system, the 
county employees in the classified service as police may organize, form, join or 
participate in organizations in order to engage in lawful concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, and to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice.   
 
Kentucky—Court Cases 
 
 While public employees in Kentucky do not have the right to strike, public 
agencies may elect to voluntarily negotiate with a representative of its employees, 
although it has no duty to do so.   
 In Fayette County Education Association (FCEA)  v. Board of Education of 
Fayette County (1980), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reviewed a judgment from the 
Fayette County Circuit Court over a collective bargaining agreement.  The Board of 
Education of Fayette County had decided to bargain collectively with Fayette County 
teachers.  A poll was taken among teachers and the results indicated that the majority of 
teachers favored collective bargaining and that a majority desired the FCEA to represent 
them.  The court held that “the Board of Education of Fayette County could not designate 
any individual or group representing a group of employees as exclusive representative for 
all employees” (Fayette County, 1980).  The Court upheld the lower court’s decision and 
the agreement was void.    
  
Mississippi—Statutes 
 
None 
 119
Mississippi—Court Cases 
 
In Biloxi Firefighters Association v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi (2002), a previous 
city council resolution had directed the city mayor to enter into good faith negotiations 
with the Biloxi Firefighters Association so as to establish an understanding concerning 
wages, hours of work and conditions of employment.  However, a newly elected mayor 
vetoed the resolution.  The state circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
city whereupon the Association appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.  The Court 
concluded that  
one city council cannot legally adopt a resolution binding a successor 
administration on discretionary matters.  A collective bargaining agreement is 
policy-oriented, reflecting the will of a certain administration.  To hold that such 
action as a matter of law binds a subsequent administration would violate well-
settled Mississippi case law (Biloxi, 2002). 
 
The circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city was affirmed in 
all respects.     
North Carolina—Statutes 
 
North Carolina public employees are prohibited from becoming members of trade 
unions or labor unions.  North Carolina General Statute § 95-98 (1959) declared all 
public employee collective bargaining illegal. 
§ 95-98.  Any agreement, or contract, between the governing authority of any 
city, town, county, or other municipality, or between any agency, unit or 
instrumentality thereof and any labor union, trade union, or labor organization, as 
bargaining agent for any public employees of such city, town, county or other 
municipality, or agency or instrumentality of government, is hereby declared to be 
against the public policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, void and of no effect.   
 
North Carolina—Court Cases 
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 In James H. Bailey v. State of North Carolina (1998), the systems of retirement 
benefits for public employees were in question.  The North Carolina General Assembly 
had approved at least thirteen different public employee retirement systems which were 
operating for the purpose of providing public servants with retirement benefits.  The 
retirement systems included three different benefit and contribution schemes:  mandatory 
defined benefit plans, optional plans, and noncontributory plans.  The mandatory plan 
included the Legislative Retirement System, the Consolidated Judicial Retirement 
System, and the Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System, the Local 
Government Employees’ Retirement System, and the Disability Income Plan.  In 
testimony during the trial in the Superior Court of Wake County, it was determined that 
the state government had made innumerable communications that retirement benefits 
would be exempt from state taxation.  The trial court held that state legislation which 
partially taxed state and local government retirement benefits was an unconstitutional 
impairment of contract under the United States Constitution and a material breach of 
contract.   
 On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the central issue was whether 
the plaintiffs had an enforceable contract right which was unconstitutionally impaired by 
the State of North Carolina.   
A public employee has a right to expect that the retirement rights bargained for in 
exchange for his loyalty and continued services, and continually promised him 
over many years, will not be removed or diminished.  Plaintiffs, as members of 
the North Carolina Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement System, had a 
contractual right to rely on the terms of the retirement plan as these terms existed 
at the moment their retirement rights became vested (Bailey, 1998). 
 
 The Court held that the relationship between the Retirement Systems and 
employees vested in the system is contractual in nature, the right to benefits exempt from 
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state taxation is a term of such contract, and such exemption does not constitute an 
unconstitutional contracting away of the State’s sovereign power.  The case was affirmed 
on the lower court’s holding that the legislation was unconstitutional as an improper 
impairment of contract and taking of property without compensation.   
      
Texas—Statutes 
 
 The Texas Government Code, § 617.002 prohibits collective bargaining by public 
employees.   
§ 617.002 (a)  An official of the state or of a political subdivision of the state may 
not enter into a collective bargaining contract with a labor organization regarding 
wages, hours, or conditions of employment of public employees. 
 
§ 617.002 (c )  An official of the state or of a political subdivision of the state may 
not recognize a labor organization as the bargaining agent for a group of public 
employees.   
 
Texas—Court Cases 
 
 In Corpus Christi Independent School District v. Padilla (1986),  employees of 
the school district filed suit complaining that the superintendent had denied them a 
hearing before the Board of Trustees (Board) to hear their grievances.  The employees 
had been reassigned and in effect received reduced work hours.  On appeal to the Court 
of Appeals of Texas of the Thirteenth District, the Court held that the Board was 
“empowered to delegate the authority to the superintendent, pursuant the Texas 
Education Code, § 23.26 (b)” (Padilla, 1986).  The Court determined that the Board’s 
policy on hearing grievances did not infringe upon any of the employees’ constitutionally 
protected rights.  The Court further noted that  
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The presentation of a grievance is in effect a unilateral procedure, whereas a 
contract or agreement resulting from collective bargaining must of necessity be a 
bilateral procedure culminating in a meeting of the minds involved and binding 
the parties to the agreement.  The presentation of a grievance is simply what the 
words imply, an no more.  It is clear that the Texas statute carefully prohibits 
striking and collective bargaining, but does permit the presentation of grievances, 
a unilateral proceeding resulting in no loss of sovereignty by the municipality 
(Padilla, 1986).   
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.  The employees had  
never approached the Board during the open forum portion of the Board’s meeting and 
the superintendent was legally authorized to meet with the employees and deny their 
grievances.    
  
Virginia—Statutes 
 
 Virginia does not recognize collective bargaining by public employees.  These 
laws date back to the Virginia Code of 1950.   
§ 40.1-57.2.  Prohibition against collective bargaining.  No state, county, 
municipal, or like governmental officer, agent or governing body is vested with or 
possesses any authority to recognize any labor union or other employee 
association as a bargaining agent of any public officers or employees, or to 
collectively bargain or enter into any collective bargaining contract with any such 
union or association or its agents with respect to any matter relating to them or 
their employment or service.   
 
Virginia—Court Cases 
 
 In School Board of the City of Richmond v. Parham (1978), a Virginia public 
schoolteacher filed a motion to force the School Board of the  City of Richmond to 
submit a grievance to arbitration.  The Circuit Court granted the teacher’s motion and the 
School Board appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.  At issue is 
whether grievances within local school districts can be given to an arbitration panel or if 
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the School Board has the final decision in disputes.  At the heart of this controversy are 
the provisions of Article VIII of the Virginia Constitution. 
Article VIII, § 4.  Board of Education.  The general supervision of the public 
school system shall be vested in a Board of Education. 
 
Article VIII, § 5 (e).  Subject to the ultimate authority of the General Assembly, 
the Board shall have primary responsibility and authority for effectuating the 
educational policy set forth in this Article, and it shall have such other powers and 
duties as may be prescribed by law.   
 
The Court determined that the School Board policy of binding arbitration had  
denied the School Board the right to decide upon the ultimate application of the policy.  
“The provision effectively divests the School Board of a function indispensable to its 
power of supervision” (Parham, 1978).     
 The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and the schoolteacher’s motion 
was dismissed.  Final judgment was entered declaring the binding arbitration provision 
invalid.   
     
Region II – Collective Bargaining Laws 
 
Connecticut—Statutes 
 
 The State Board of Labor Relations defines and protects the statutory rights of 
public sector employees to form, join or assist labor organizations.  The three key statutes 
for public employees and teachers are the Teachers’ Negotiations Act (TNA), Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §§ 10-153 (a) et seq., the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA), Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §§ 7-467 et seq., and the State Employee Relations Act (SERA), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 
5-270 et seq.    
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 The statutes allow employees to form unions and collectively bargain over wages, 
hours, and conditions of employment.  Connecticut explicitly allows collective 
bargaining for retirement benefits and related issues.  The law includes binding interest 
arbitration for all issues but it also gives the legislature the ability to reject an award by a 
two-thirds vote if the state has insufficient funds to carry out the award.   
§§ 10-153 (a).  Members of the teaching profession shall have and shall be 
protected in the exercise of the right to form, join or assist, or refuse to form, join 
or assist, any organization for professional or economic improvement and to 
negotiate in good faith through representatives of their own choosing with respect 
to salaries, hours, and other conditions of employment free from interference, 
restraint, coercion or discriminatory practices by any employing board of 
education or administrative agents or representatives thereof in derogation of the 
rights guaranteed.   
 
§§ 5-271.  Public employees shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of 
the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist any employee organization, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of 
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment…free from actual interference, 
restraint or coercion.   
 
Both laws prohibit strikes by public employees and provide for impasse resolution  
through binding arbitration of disputes in negotiations, listed in Connecticut General 
Statutes §§ 10-153 (e) and §§ 7-475.    
   
Connecticut—Court Cases 
 
 In Local 391, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Department of Corrections 
(2003), the local union, consisting of state, county, and municipal employees moved to 
vacate an arbitration award that it claimed the arbitrator had exceeded his powers and 
imperfectly executed them on a final award.  The plaintiff moved to appeal the trial 
court’s decision to uphold the arbitration decision by stating that the court improperly 
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held that the arbitration award drew its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining 
agreement.  On appeal to the Appellate Court of Connecticut, the Court held that  
it is not our role to determine whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement was correct.  It is enough to uphold the judgment 
of the court, denying the plaintiff’s application to vacate the award, that such 
interpretation was a good faith effort to interpret the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement (Department of Corrections, 2003).  
   
 The judgment of the lower court was affirmed and the arbitration decision was 
upheld.   
Delaware—Statutes 
 
 The State of Delaware has a Public School Employment Relations Act, which 
confers certain rights on employees to organize a collective bargaining unit and 
establishes procedures for creating and regulating such a unit in Delaware Code §§ 4003 
– 4004.  Second it obligates boards of education and certified bargaining units to 
negotiate with each other in §§ 4004 (a) and 4013 and prohibits strikes in §§ 4006, 
enumerates certain unfair labor practices in § 4007, gives the Public Employment 
Relations Board enforcement powers in §§ 4008, 4009, and 4014, and establishes a two-
step mechanism for facilitating resolution or impasses in fulfilling the mandate to attempt 
to reach a voluntary collective bargaining agreement.      
§ 4003.  (1)  School employees shall have the right to organize, form, join or 
assist any employee organization, provided that membership in, or an obligation 
resulting from collective bargaining negotiations to pay any dues, fees, 
assessments or other charges to an employee organization shall not be required as 
a condition of employment for certified professional school employees.  (2)  
School employees shall have the right to negotiate collectively or grieve through 
representatives of their own choosing.   
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Delaware—Court Cases 
 
 In Colonial Education Association v. Board of Education of Colonial School 
District (1996), a teacher was disciplined in connection with alleged inappropriate 
conduct with students.  Collective bargaining representatives sought names of student 
complainants and witnesses in order to evaluate and process the teacher’s grievance.  The 
School District refused to disclose the names and the bargaining representative filed an 
unfair labor practice complaint with the Public Employment Relations Board.  The Board 
and the Court of Chancery, of New Castle County held that an unfair labor practice had 
occurred but that disclosure of names without prior consultation with parents was not 
appropriate.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, it was held that  
(1) the School District committed an unfair labor practice by unconditionally 
deciding not to disclose the names, but (2) parents had a right to voice objections 
to the release of student names to bargaining representatives (Colonial Education, 
1996).   
 
 The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that an unfair labor 
practice under Delaware Code § 4007 was committed by the School District.   
 
Florida—Statutes 
 
 Public employees in the State of Florida have the constitutional right to 
collectively bargain.  In the Florida Statutes, Chapter 447, Labor Organizations and 
Public Employees, §§ 447.201 and 447.203, public employees include employees of the 
state, counties, school boards, municipalities, and special taxing districts.  This includes 
all fire, police, corrections, schoolteachers, and support personnel, medical personnel, 
state troopers, tool collectors, sanitation employees, and clerical employees.  The Public 
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Employees Relations Commission is the neutral adjudicative body which resolves public 
sector labor disputes, career service appeals, veterans’ preference appeals, and drug 
testing cases, and whistle blower appeals.   
 Public employers must implement ratified collective bargaining agreements with 
respect to wages, hours, and terms of employment, despite the fact that such 
implementation may conflict with applicable civil service board rules.  If an impasse is 
reached, the Commission has an impasse and mediation coordinator to resolve impasses 
in labor negotiations.  Mediation is an option previous to impasse.  However, if an 
agreement is not reached, the Public Employees Relations Act contains no statement that 
either party is compelled to agree or required to make concessions and the agreement is 
not binding.   
§ 447.201.  The public policy of the state is to provide statutory implementation 
of  § 6, Article I of the State Constitution, with respect to public employees, to 
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its 
employees, both collectively and individually, and to protect the public by 
assuring the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government.  
Nothing herein shall be construed either to encourage or discourage organization 
of public employees.  The state’s public policy is best effectuated by:  (1) granting 
to public employees the right of organization and representation; (2) requiring the 
state, local governments, and other political subdivisions to negotiate with 
bargaining agents duly certified to represent public employees; (3) creating a 
Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in resolving disputes between 
public employees and public employers and (4) recognizing the constitutional 
prohibition against strikes by public employees and providing remedies for 
violations of such prohibition.     
    
Florida—Court Cases 
 
 In Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Association v. Hillsborough 
County Aviation Authority (1988), the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a decision of 
the Second District Court of Appeal.  The petitioners, Hillsborough County 
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Governmental Employees Association (GEA) and the Hillsborough County Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA), as certified negotiators for their respective groups of 
public employees, bargained collectively, and reached an agreement with, the 
respondents, the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority.  The agreements were ratified 
by the employees and pursuant to Florida Statute 447.309 (3), the Authority requested the 
Hillsborough County Civil Service Board to amend its rules to follow the new provisions 
of the agreement.  The Board refused and the Authority was forced to notify its 
employees that it would not implement the new contractual provisions.  The PBA and the 
GEA filed unfair labor practice charges with the Public Employees Relations 
Commission (PERC).  PERC determined that the Authority had committed an unfair 
labor practice.  The Board appealed to the Second District Court and the Court reversed 
PERC’s decision on the ground that the Authority could not have violated its duty to 
bargain in good faith if it was simply following statutory and case law.  The Court 
provided the following question in its decision: 
When provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which has been entered 
into by a public employer conflict with civil service rules and regulations and the 
governmental body having amendatory power over the civil service rules refuses 
to amend those rules in such a manner as to eliminate the conflict, does § 447.309 
(3) apply to civil service rules and therefore govern the effectiveness of the 
collective bargaining agreement, (Hillsborough, 1988).   
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, the Court held that a service board did  
not have the authority to strike provisions at will, leaving any collective bargaining 
agreement of no real value.  The Court stated that this was far too great a price to pay for 
“uniform personnel administration.”  
The Florida Constitution guarantees public employees the right of effective 
collective bargaining.  This is not an empty or hollow right subject to unilateral 
denial.  It is one which may not be abridged except upon the showing of a 
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compelling state interest.  No such showing has been made here.  While it is clear 
that § 447.309 (3) does apply to this conflict, it is equally clear that the statute, as 
applied, unconstitutionally abridges the fundamental right of public employees to 
bargain collectively (Hillsborough, 1988).  
 
The Court held that a public employer must implement a ratified collective  
bargaining agreement even if this implementation may conflict with applicable civil 
service board rules.  The Court remanded the case for disposition consistent with 
this opinion.      
 
Indiana—Statutes 
 
 The Indiana Certified Educational Employee Bargaining Statute, Indiana Code §§ 
20-7.5-1-1 to 20-7.5-1-14 provides for the right of collective bargaining for public school 
teachers.   
IC § 20-7.5-1-3.  School employers and school employees shall have the 
obligation and the right to bargain collectively, and shall enter into a contract 
embodying any of the matters on which they have bargained collectively.   
 
IC § 20-7.5-1-13.  The school employer and the exclusive representative may at 
any time submit any issue in dispute to final and binding arbitration.   
 
IC § 20-7.5-1-14.  It shall be unlawful for any school employee, school employee 
organization to take part in or assist in a strike against a school employer or 
school corporation.      
 
Indiana—Court Cases 
 
 In Tippecanoe Education Association v. Tippecanoe School Corporation (1998), 
an elementary school teacher was deemed to be deficient in her teaching skills by her 
supervisor, the school principal.  The teacher filed grievance that the evaluation forms 
were improperly completed, not indicating the specific performance behavior to be 
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addressed.  The principal denied the grievance, and the superintendent thereafter 
informed the teacher that she would not be rehired.  The Tippecanoe Education 
Association demanded arbitration for the teacher’s grievance.  The arbitrator ordered 
reinstatement of the teacher with back pay, that the principal had failed to correctly fill 
out the evaluation forms.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
school, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.  On appeal to 
the Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District, the Court found that (1) the principal 
did not violate applicable procedures in completing the evaluation forms, so the arbitrator 
should have declined to rule in favor of renewing the teacher contract and (2) the 
arbitrator shall “have no power to rule on the termination of services or failure to re-
employ any teacher” (Tippecanoe, 1998).  The lower court’s decision was affirmed.    
 
Iowa—Statutes 
 
§ 20.1.  The general assembly declares that it is the public policy of the state to 
promote harmonious and co-operative relationships between government and its 
employees by permitting public employees to organize and bargain collectively.   
 
§ 20.12.  It shall be unlawful for any public employee or any employee 
organization, directly or indirectly, to induce, instigate, encourage, authorize, 
ratify, or participate in a strike against any public employer.   
 
Iowa—Court Cases 
 
 In O’hara v. State of Iowa (2002), a public employee was terminated for improper 
sexual advances towards an intern.  The case was grieved all the way to the director of 
the Iowa Department of Personnel.  In the final grievance step, the union representative 
withdrew its support based on the allegations against the employee.  The employee filed a 
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prohibited practice complaint against the union with the Public Employees Relation 
Board (PERB).  The employee filed suit in district court against the State of Iowa for 
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, for terminating his employment without 
just cause, and for discrimination for sexual orientation.   
 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, the Court held that the district court was 
correct in its assertion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the employee’s claim 
against the union for breach of its duty to fair representation.  The court further held that 
the district court had erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the employee’s claim against the State for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 
§ 20.11 (5) provides for judicial review of the PERB’s decision and such actions 
are special proceedings; therefore, there is no right to a jury trial (O’hara, 2002). 
 
The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings against the State.     
 
Maine—Statutes 
 
 The State of Maine provides a uniform basis for reorganizing the right of public 
employees to join labor unions, of their own choosing.  Teachers have the right to be 
represented by labor unions in collective bargaining for terms and conditions of 
employment.  The State Employees Labor Relations Act and the Municipal Public 
Employees Labor Relations Law provide for municipal and state employees. 
§ 979-B.  A person may not directly or indirectly interfere with, intimidate, 
restrain, coerce or discriminate against state or legislative employees or a group of 
employees in the free exercise of their rights, herby given, voluntarily to join, 
form and participate in the activities of organizations of their own choosing for 
the purposes of representation and collective bargaining.   
 
§ 963.  No one shall directly or indirectly interfere with … or discriminate against 
public employees or a group of public employees in the free exercise of their 
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rights…for the purposes of representation and collective bargaining.   
 
Maine—Court Cases 
 
 In Union River Valley Teachers Association v. Lamoine School Committee 
(2000), the School Committee appealed a decision by the trial court that confirmed an 
arbitration ruling, contending that the arbitrator had erred by disregarding the labor 
contract.  In arbitration, the issue was whether a teacher’s termination proceedings were 
in compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.  The arbitrator determined that 
the dismissal had been improper and recommended a ten-day unpaid suspension.  The 
School Committee argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority and violated 
public policy.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Maine, the Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision and supported the arbitrator’s decision granting the teacher’s request to 
be reinstated.  The School Committee, not the arbitrator, by voluntarily agreeing to 
arbitration of dismissals, established pursuant to statute the standard of just cause for 
dismissal.  The surrender in collective bargaining agreements of powers granted to boards 
of education by statute to an arbitrator may later prove inconvenient or disruptive.  
However, this should have been considered at the bargaining table.   
The burden of establishing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority lies squarely 
with the Committee, and has failed to meet its burden.  Accordingly we affirm the 
lower court’s confirmation of the arbitration award (Lamoine School, 2000).   
 
Maryland—Statutes 
 
 The State of Maryland provides two separate collective bargaining laws that cover 
school employees.  The first pertains to all certified employees and the second affects 
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non-certified employees.  The collective bargaining process includes fact-finding 
procedures that allow for panels to review both sides of the dispute, report findings, and 
make recommendations for settlement.   
§§ 6-402, 6-503.  Public school employees may form, join, and participate in the 
activities of employee organizations of their own choice for the purpose of being 
represented on all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working 
conditions.   
 
Maryland—Court Cases 
 
 In Board of Education of Prince George’s County v. Prince George’s County 
Educator’s Association (1987), the teachers’ association filed a formal grievance over a 
dispute with the school board involving an education program.  The grievance claimed 
that a board policy had violated a collective bargaining agreement by changing the 
program and thus affecting teacher salary without cause.  An arbitrator from the 
American Arbitration Association denied the grievance.  The teachers’ association filed 
suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, claiming that the arbitrator had 
“exceeded his power.’  The petition was denied and was then further appealed to the 
Maryland Court of Appeals.  On appeal, the Court stated, “the employer did not violate 
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and the new program that was created did 
not violate any provisions of the agreement,” (Prince George, 1987) and the grievance 
was denied.      
 
Massachusetts—Statutes 
 
Chapter 150E. § 2.  Employees shall have the right of self-organization and the 
right to form, join, or assist any employee organization for the purpose of 
bargaining collectively through representatives of their own choosing on 
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questions of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and to 
engage in lawful, concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.    
 
Massachusetts—Court Cases 
 
 In Lyons v. School Committee of Dedham (2003), two teachers were laid off of 
work but claimed “tenure” to the superintendent of schools.  The superintendent declined 
to recognize the teachers’ tenure and the teachers filed grievance.  The case went to 
arbitration where the arbitrator determined in favor of the school district and denied the 
teachers “tenure” status.  The case went to trial court and the arbitration decision was 
vacated based on public policy.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, the 
case was remanded to the original arbitrators to determine an appropriate remedy.  The 
judge stated that “our review of an arbitrator’s award is limited in scope” and that the 
only grounds for vacating an award applies when “the arbitrators exceed their powers or 
render an award requiring a person to commit an act or engage in conduct prohibited by 
state or federal law” (School Committee of Dedham, 2003).  The Court determined that 
“tenure” status should be no grounds to vacate an arbitration award.   
Michigan—Statutes 
 
 Collective bargaining legislation was first enacted by Public Act 336 of 1947, 
known as the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA).  The act grants public 
employees the right to organize and negotiate with public employers.  In 1994, Public Act 
112 amended PERA to provide penalties against public school teachers that strike and to 
restrict issues that can be “bargained” by the public school teacher.   
§ 423.202.  A public employee shall not strike and a public school employer shall 
not institute a lockout.   
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§ 423.209.  It shall be lawful for public employees to organize together or to form, 
join or assist in labor organizations, to engage in lawful concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective negotiations or bargaining or other mutual aid and 
protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their public employers 
through representatives of their own free choice.     
 
Michigan—Court Cases 
 
 In St. Clair Intermediate School District and Academy for Plastics Manufacturing 
Technology v. St. Clair County Education Association (2001), a school nurse attempted 
on numerous occasions to have her position included as a position that the union 
bargained for in contract negotiations.  The school district refused.  The union brought 
charges against the school district stating that they violated PERA, by threatening to 
terminate the school nurse based on her complaints.  On appeal to the Court of Appeals 
of Michigan, the Court determined that school district did violate PERA.   
There was competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record to 
support the conclusions of the hearing referee that the conduct violated PERA 
because it was an attempt to coerce the school nurse while she was engaged in the 
exercise of her rights guaranteed by PERA (St. Clair, 2001).   
 
Nebraska—Statutes 
 
 The State Employees Collective Bargaining Act recognizes the right of state 
employees in bargaining units, represented by an exclusive collective bargaining agent to 
negotiate with employers on matters of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.  Mediators are used to assist with negotiations, and the Special Master’s 
ruling is binding, with appeal possible by either party to the Commission of Industrial 
Relations.   
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§ 81-1370.  The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the public policy 
of this state and the purpose of the State Employees Collective Bargaining Act to 
promote harmonious, peaceful, and cooperative relationships between state 
government and its employees and to protect the public by assuring effective and 
orderly operations of government.  Such policy is best effectuated by (1) 
recognizing the right of state employees to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining and (2) requiring state employees to negotiate with and enter into 
written agreements on matters of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment. 
 
Nebraska Court Cases 
 
 In Crete Education Association v. Saline County School District (2002), school 
teachers alleged that the school district had committed prohibited practices in violation of 
Nebraska Statute, by directly dealing with a bargaining unit member regarding a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and paying the bargaining unit member a signing bonus.  
The teacher received an increased salary above the designated annual salary under the 
collective bargaining agreement, assigned by the school district.  The Commission of 
Industrial Relations (CIR) found the school district in violation of Nebraska Statute and 
ordered the district to cease and desist from deviating from the negotiated agreement in 
payment of salaries and benefits, cease and desist from paying the new teacher in 
deviation from the negotiated agreement, and cease and desist from bypassing the 
bargaining unit and dealing directly with its represented employees.  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska, the Court affirmed and supported the decision of the 
Commission and the lower court.   
The CIR’s order was affirmed insofar as it (1) found that the district engaged in 
prohibited labor practices; (2) ordered the district to cease and desist from 
deviating from the negotiated agreement in payment of salaries and benefits; (3) 
ordered the district to cease and desist from paying the teacher in deviation from 
the negotiated agreement; (4) ordered the district to cease and desist from 
bypassing the bargaining unit and dealing directly with its represented employees 
regarding wages, terms, and conditions of employment; and (5) ordered the 
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district to cease and desist from paying teachers signing bonuses which is not 
included in the negotiated agreement.  The CIR’s order was reversed insofar as it 
(1) found that the district engaged in prohibited labor practices in communicating 
and (2) ordered the district to post notices regarding its violation of the negotiated 
agreement (Saline County, 2002).        
 
Region III – Strikes Permitted 
 
Alaska—Statutes 
 
 Alaska Statute § 23.40.070 affirms the right of public employees to organize for 
the purpose of collective bargaining.  The law requires public employers to negotiate with 
and enter into agreements with employee organizations for the purpose of determining 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment  
§ 23.40.070.  The legislature finds that joint decision-making is the modern way 
of administering government.  If public employees have been granted the right to 
share in the decision-making process affecting wages and working conditions, 
they have become more responsive and better able to exchange ideas and 
information on operations with their administrators.   
 
§ 23.40.070.  The policies are to be effectuated by (1) recognizing the right of 
public employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining; (2) 
requiring public employers to negotiate with and enter into written agreements 
with employee organizations; and (3) maintaining merit-system principles among 
public employees. 
 
 Alaska Statutes classify public employees in three classes which affect the 
bargaining unit’s authority to strike.   
§ 23.40.200 (a).  Public employees are employed to perform services in one of 
three classes:  (1) those services which may not be given up for even the shortest 
period of time; (2) those services which my be interrupted for a limited period but 
not for an indefinite period of time; and (3) those services in which work 
stoppages may be sustained without serious effects on the public. 
 
§ 23.40.200 (d) The employees in the third class may engage in a strike if a 
majority of the employees in a collective bargaining unit vote by secret ballot to 
do so.  The parties shall submit to advisory arbitration before the employees may 
engage in a strike.   
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Employees in the second class may also engage in strikes and the strike may not  
be enjoined unless it can be shown that it has begun to “threaten the health, safety, or 
welfare of the public.”   
 
Alaska—Court Cases 
 
 In Alaska Public Employees Association v. State of Alaska (1992), at issue was 
whether the state’s classification plan for state jobs and its assignment of salary ranges to 
that plan are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under Alaska’s Public 
Employment Relations Act (PERA).  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alaska, the 
Court stated that  
the unions contend that the assignment of jobs to classes falls within the scope of 
the state’s personnel policies affecting the working conditions of the employees.  
The state, argues that job classification falls within the scope of the general 
policies describing the function and purposes of a public employer.  We agree 
with the state (State of Alaska, 1992). 
 
The Court concluded that the salary range assignment also cannot be a  
“mandatory subject” of collective bargaining under the state’s present system. 
In PERA, the legislature expressly reinforces the importance of the merit principle 
and refrains from stating that implementation of the merit principle may ever be 
mandatorily contingent upon the approval of its employees or outside arbitrators 
(State of Alaska).   
 
The lower court’s decision affirming the State Labor Relations Agency Order was  
affirmed.      
California—Statutes 
 
 There are five major statutory sections dealing with collective bargaining for 
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public employees in California.  They are the State Employer-Employee Relations Act 
(Government Code §§ 3512 – 3524), the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Government Code 
§§ 3500 – 3511), the Educational Employment Relations Act (Government Code §§ 3540 
– 3549.3), the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Government Code 
§§ 3560 – 3599), and the Excluded Employees Bill of Rights Act (Government Code §§ 
3525 – 3539.5).   
 The State Employer-Employee Relations Act, known as SEERA or the Dills Act 
provides for collective bargaining for rank-and-file employees employed by the State of 
California.  The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, known as the MMBA provides for collective 
bargaining for rank-and-file employees employed by municipalities and counties.  The 
Educational Employment Relations Act, known as the EERA provides for collective 
bargaining for employees in the public school system.   
 The right to strike is not specifically provided for or prohibited by any of these 
Acts.  The right to strike and prohibitions against striking has been addressed through the 
California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the California courts.   
 PERB ruled, under EERA, that pre-impasse strikes are presumptively illegal if the 
conduct violates the duty to bargain or the duty to participate in the impasse procedures 
in good faith.  PERB further ruled that post-impasse strikes under EERA are not unlawful 
where they do not result in the total breakdown of basic education for students and 
negotiations were free from coercive tactics that hold education hostage (Compton USD, 
1987). 
§ 3540.  It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the improvement of personnel 
management and employer-employee relations within the public school systems 
by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public school employees 
to join organizations, to be represented by the organizations, to select one of the 
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organizations as the exclusive representative, and to afford employees a voice in 
the formulation of educational policy.   
 
§ 3543 (a).  Public school employees shall have the right to form, join, and 
participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for 
the purpose of all matters of employer-employee relations.     
 
California—Court Cases 
 
 In County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Co. Employees 
Association (1985), the trial court, in a tort action, awarded a county sanitation district 
damages and prejudgment interest against a county employees’ union in connection with 
the union’s involvement in a labor strike against the district.  The trial court found the 
strike to be unlawful and in violation of the public policy of the state.   
 On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision, holding that the common law prohibition against public sector strikes 
should not be recognized, that strikes  
by public sector employees as such are neither illegal nor tortuous under 
California common law, and that it is not unlawful for public employees to 
engage in a concerted work stoppage for the purpose of improving their wages or 
conditions of employment, unless it has been determined that the work stoppage 
poses an imminent threat to public health or safety (Los Angeles, 1985).   
 
The Court’s decision was compelled not only by “common law principles but also 
by the California Constitution.”  The Court refuted the traditional justifications for a ban 
on all pubic employee strikes and recommended a modern approach to be prepared for 
the national and international influences on labor laws.   
Other states and countries have developed a wide range of policies for dealing 
with public employee strikes, and the arena is clearly one in which 
experimentation should be encouraged.  We should not attempt to prejudge the 
constitutionality of any particular legislative response.  If we were to adopt the 
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district’s position, that there exists an absolute common law ban on public 
employee strikes in the context of the present statutory scheme, substantial 
questions of constitutional dimension would arise (Los Angeles, 1985). 
 
 
Hawaii—Statutes 
 
In the State of Hawaii, public employees have the right to organize for the 
purpose of collective bargaining, as provided by the Hawaii Revised Statutes, Chapter 89.  
§§ 89-11 to 89-12 describes which bargaining units are entitled to strike and which are 
subject to an arbitration process in lieu of striking. 
§ 89-1 (a).  The legislature finds that joint decision-making is the modern way of 
administering government.   
 
§ 89-1 (b).  The legislature declares that it is the public policy of the State to 
promote harmonious and cooperative relations between government and its 
employees.  These policies are best effectuated by (1) recognizing the right of 
public employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining; (2) 
requiring public employers to negotiate with and enter into written agreements 
with exclusive representatives on matter of wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment; and (3) creating a labor relations board to administer these 
provisions.   
 
§ 89-12 (b).  It shall be lawful for an employee, who is not prohibited from 
striking under subsection § 89-12 (a) and who is in the appropriate bargaining unit 
involved in an impasse, to participate in a strike under the following conditions:  
(1) the requirements of § 89-11 relating to the resolution of disputes have been 
complied with in good faith; (2) the proceedings for the prevention of any 
prohibited practices have been exhausted; (3) the collective bargaining agreement 
and any extension of the agreement has expired; and (4) the exclusive 
representative has given a ten-day notice of intent to strike, together with a 
statement of its position on all remaining issues in the dispute, to the employer 
and the board. 
 
    
Hawaii—Court Cases 
 
 In Lewis W. Poe v. Hawaii Labor Relations Board (2004), an employee filed five 
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prohibited practice complaints with the Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB), based on 
the collective bargaining agreement, without the assistance of the union, and pursued 
these complaints through step three of the grievance procedure.  The HLRB dismissed 
each of the employee’s complaints concluding that the employee needed to exhaust his 
available remedies prior to bringing a prohibited practice complaint against the employer, 
alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.  The HLRB further stated that 
the employee needed to establish that the union “breached its duty of fair representation” 
in failing to pursue his grievance to arbitration.  Absent this claim, the Board dismissed 
the employees complaint.   
 The case was appealed to the circuit court, alleging that the HLRB had erred and 
the court affirmed all of the HLRB’s dismissals.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii, the Court concluded that the employee “lacked standing to pursue his claim 
because he failed to demonstrate that his union breached the duty to fair representation” 
(Hawaii Labor, 2004).  The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.       
 
Illinois—Statutes 
 
5 ILCS 315/1 § 2.  It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to grant public 
employees full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
 
5 ILCS 315/6 § 6.  Employees of the State have the right of self-organization, and 
may form, join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing.   
  
5 ILCS 315/17 § 17.  Nothing in this Act shall make it unlawful or make it an 
unfair labor practice for public employees, other than security employees, peace 
officers, fire fighters, and paramedics, to strike except as otherwise provided by 
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this Act.   
  
Illinois—Court Cases 
 
 In Buchna v. Illinois State Board of Education (2003), a teacher was terminated 
from employment, for failing to successfully remediate under Article 24A of the School 
Code.  The teacher’s case was reviewed by a hearing officer appointed by the Illinois 
State Board of Education, and the hearing officer affirmed the school district’s decision 
to terminate the teacher.  On appeal to the county circuit court, the decision was again 
affirmed.  The teacher appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, claiming 
that  
(1) the hearing officer applied an incorrect legal standard; (2) the evidence does 
not support the hearing officer’s decision; and (3) the circuit court’s order is 
against the manifest weight of the evidence (Illinois State, 2003). 
 
On appeal, the Court concluded that the teacher was not properly evaluated and 
thus had been improperly terminated.  The school district placed weight in its argument 
on the fact that its teacher rating system resulted from collective bargaining.  However, 
the Court stated that  
The mere fact of mandatory bargaining does not authorize parties to contravene 
any statute, in the process.  The school district’s departure from statute was 
unauthorized (Illinois State, 2003).  
 
The teacher’s termination decision was reversed.    
 
Montana—Statutes 
 
§ 39-31-101.  In order to promote public business by removing certain recognized 
sources of strife and unrest, it is the policy of the state of Montana to encourage 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment 
of all disputes between public employees and their employers. 
 144
 § 39-32-110.  It shall be unlawful for any employee of a health care facility to 
participate in a strike if there is another strike in effect at another health care 
facility within a radius of 150 miles.  Employees of a health care facility must 
give 30 days written notice of any strike and must specify in the notice the day the 
strike is to begin.  
    
Montana—Court Cases 
 
 In Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap (2003), a teacher was hired by the 
local school district during the same time that the teachers were considering forming a 
union.  The union was not formed and the teacher was hired with a contract which 
included a liquidated damages clause in case of breach of contract.  The teacher claimed 
there was no contract but the school district took steps to collect the liquidated damages 
clause money when the teacher resigned.  The district court found that the school district 
had suffered damages to find a teacher replacement and awarded judgment in favor of the 
school.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, the Court stated that 
the liquidated damages provision was not unconscionable because the 20% 
amount of salary forfeiture was within the teacher’s reasonable expectations being 
familiar with the employment needs of the school and the damages the school 
would suffer upon breach of contract (Klyap, 2003).   
 
 The Court held that the lower court had correctly determined that the damages 
clause between the teacher and the school was enforceable and the court’s decision was 
affirmed.   
Ohio—Statutes 
 
§ 4117.03.  Public employees have the right to (1) form, join, assist, or participate 
in, or refrain from forming, joining, assisting, or participating in any employee 
organization of their own choosing; (2) engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining; (3) representation by an employee organization; 
and (4) bargain collectively with their public employers to determine wages, 
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hours, terms and other conditions of employment.   
 
§ 4117.23.  In the case of a strike that is not authorized in accordance with this 
chapter, the public employer may notify the state employment relations board and 
request the board to determine whether the strike is authorized under Chapter 
4117 of the Revised Code.   
 
Ohio—Court Cases 
 
 In Whitsel v. Southeast Local School District (1973), the local school district 
terminated a teacher’s continuing contract following a school demonstration of 350 
students.  During a public hearing with the Board of Education, the teacher’s termination 
was supported, for his behavior during the student demonstration and for his previous 
criticism of the Board and his personal beliefs, attitudes, and religious views.  On appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Court held that the teacher 
had been terminated not for his views and beliefs but for his insubordination.  The court 
stated that it “could not substitute its judgment for that of the School Board so long as the 
Board did not infringe on any of the teacher’s constitutionally protected rights” (Whitsel, 
1973).   
 
Oregon—Statutes 
 
§ 243.662.  Public employees have the right to form, join and participate in the 
activities of labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of 
representation and collective bargaining with their public employer on matters 
concerning employment relations. 
 
§243.726. (1) Participation in a strike shall be unlawful for any public employee 
who is not included in an appropriate bargaining unit for which an exclusive 
representative has been certified by the Employment Relations Board or 
recognized by the employer; or is included in an appropriate bargaining unit that 
provides for resolution of a labor dispute to final and binding arbitration. (2) It 
shall be lawful for a public employee who is not prohibited from striking under 
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subsection (1) of this section and who in the appropriate bargaining unit involved 
in a labor dispute to participate in a strike over mandatory subjects of bargaining.   
  
Oregon—Court Cases 
 
 In Walter v. Scherzinger and Portland School District (2004), the union sought 
judicial review of the State’s Employment Relations Board (ERB) declaratory ruling that 
a proposal by the respondent, Portland Public School District (PPS) to contract out the 
district’s custodial services did not violate the Custodian’s Civil Service Law (CCSL), 
and therefore was not a prohibited subject for bargaining under the Public Employee 
Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA).  On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Oregon, the 
Court concluded that the CCSL did not preclude PPS’s private contracting proposal.   
Nothing in the CCSL’s text or pertinent context required PPS to hire persons 
providing custodial services as employees.  There was nothing in the CCSL that 
limited PPS’s ability to procure custodial services through contracts comporting 
with the public contracting laws. The CCSL merely provided that, in those 
circumstances in which PPS did, in fact, employ persons as probationary or 
permanent custodians or assistant custodians, the appointment, retention, 
promotion, or discharge of those employees must comply with the requirements 
of the CCSL (Walter, 2004). 
 
 The Court concluded that  PPS’s proposal did not violate PECBA and the ERB’s  
legal conclusions were affirmed.      
Pennsylvania—Statutes 
 
§ 1101.101. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
declares that it is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this 
act to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public 
employers and their employees.  The General Assembly has determined that the 
overall policy may best be accomplished by (1) granting to public employees, the 
right to organize and choose freely their representatives; (2) requiring public 
employers to negotiate and bargain with employee organizations representing 
public employees and to enter into written agreements; and (3) establishing 
procedures to provide for the protection of the rights of the public employee, the 
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public employer and the public at large.   
 
§ 1101.1002. Strikes by public employees during the pendency of collective 
bargaining procedures set forth in Article VIII are prohibited.  In the event of a 
strike during this period the public employer shall initiate an action for the same 
relief and utilizing the same procedures required for prohibited strikes.   
 
Pennsylvania—Court Cases 
 
 In Central Dauphin Education Association v. Central Dauphin School District 
(2001), the school district appealed from a preliminary injunction granted by the Court of 
Common Please of Dauphin County which required the district to provide work to 
teachers pursuant to an expired collective bargaining agreement.  In addition, the union 
made a motion to dismiss the appeal since the parties have ratified a new collective 
bargaining agreement.   
 The union commenced a lawful strike and the school district responded by 
imposing new terms and conditions of employment including new wages and health care 
coverage.  The teachers planned to return to work so as not to violate state law. 
If a strike by employees or a lockout by an employer will prevent the school 
entity from providing the period of instruction required, 180 days, by the last day 
of the school year, the parties shall submit to mandated final best-offer arbitration 
(Central Dauphin, 2001).   
 
 The Court of Common Pleas found that it was readily apparent that injunctive 
relief was necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be 
compensated for by damages.  The school district unilaterally implemented terms and 
conditions of employment at a time when the union was conducting a limited lawful 
strike.  These changes preceded the utilization of the arbitration procedures outlined by 
statute.   
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 On appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the Court held that the 
school district’s actions “clearly altered the status quo and disrupted labor peace” 
(Central Dauphin).  The Court found it reasonable for the Common Please Court to 
conclude that the school district’s implementation of terms when the union was to return 
to work and prior to completion of required bargaining resulted in “irreparable harm to 
the union and justified issuing a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo” 
(Central Dauphin).  The Court affirmed the Common Please Court’s issuance of the 
preliminary injunction and the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.    
  
Vermont—Statutes 
 
§ 903. (a) Employees shall have the right to self-organization; to form, join or 
assist employee organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choice, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining.  (b) No state employee may strike or recognize a picket line 
of an employee or labor organization while in the performance of his official 
duties.   
 
Vermont—Court Cases 
 
 In Chittenden South Education Association v. Hinesburg School District (1986), 
teachers and the school district reached impasse over contract negotiations.  After final 
mediation and fact finding efforts, the teachers went on a thirteen day strike.  The school 
district replaced all employees with permanent replacements.   The union immediately 
filed unfair labor practices against the school district alleging that the school district had 
refused to bargain in good faith and improperly hired permanent replacements.  On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Vermont, the Court affirmed the administrative decision 
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of the Vermont Labor Relations Board (VLRB), holding that the school district converted 
the walkout into an unfair labor practice by unilaterally deleting binding grievance 
arbitration.  The VLRB had ordered the school district to add those provisions to the 
contract offer and to reinstate all striking teachers.  The Court held these decisions well 
within the VLRB’s discretion.   
 
Wisconsin—Statutes 
 
§ 111.80 (4). It is the policy of this state, in order to preserve and promote the 
interests of the public, the employee and the employer alike, to encourage the 
practices and procedures of collective bargaining in state government subject to 
the requirements of the pubic service and related laws.   
 
§ 111.89. Upon establishing that a strike is in progress, the employer may either 
seek an injunction or file an unfair labor practice charge with the commission.  
The occurrence of a strike and the participation therein by an employee do not 
affect the rights of the employer, in law or in equity, to deal with the strike.   
  
Wisconsin—Court Cases 
 
 In Dodgeland Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (2002), the school district maintained that “teacher preparation time” was 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining but a permissive one.  The union held that this was 
a mandatory subject of bargaining because it primarily related to wages, hours, and 
conditions of employment.  The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) 
held that “teacher preparation time” was permissive, in support of the district’s view.  On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the Court affirmed WERC’s decisions on all 
issues.  Teacher prep time was considered permissive and not a fringe benefit.   
Affording that decision due weight deference, we found that WERC’s 
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interpretation of fringe benefits was reasonable and furthers the purpose of the 
Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act, because it was based on the 
ordinary and accepted meaning, and was consistent with previous case law 
(Dodgeland, 2002). 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 This dissertation investigated the jurisprudence and statutory language concerning 
public employee labor law and the collective bargaining laws and strike laws for teachers 
and other municipal, state and local government employees.  The purpose of this 
dissertation was to research the current state statutes and to review the case law for public 
employee labor law in the United States.  In addition, the purpose of this dissertation was 
to offer recommendations based on the current state of the law as represented in the 
research to assist public employees, school administrators, government supervisors, 
legislators and other government individuals in positions of authority in formulating 
policies that will be in the best interests of both the government and its employees and the 
public that it serves.   
 This chapter summarizes the findings of chapters two and three and includes a 
summary of public employee labor law by state in the United States.  Included are 
conclusions and recommendations for school officials and other public employee 
managers and legislators regarding the issues of collective bargaining and striking in the 
public sector.   
Summary of Literature Review 
 
 The courts have permitted collective bargaining in the public sector, with state 
and federal laws determining the extent of this right for public employees.  The right to 
strike by public employees has also been considered and established by state and federal 
law and state and federal case law.  The collective bargaining process in the United States 
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has evolved over the last 200 years, designed to resolve disputes between two parties, the 
employer and the employee.  The relative strength to bargain of each party depends 
significantly on the state and federal laws and the case law as written.  This balance of 
negotiating power has changed dramatically over the course of the last 200 years.   
 The public sector has 50 different state laws and several federal laws shaping the 
extent of collective bargaining for public employees.  Public employee labor unions and 
public employers are limited in their range of actions during collective bargaining by 
laws written at the local, state, and federal level in the United States.   
 The public employee arena is affected by a changing political and economic 
process.  The political process and collective bargaining are well intertwined in the public 
sector.  The doctrines of government sovereignty and government employee privilege 
have been addressed by the courts.  Collective bargaining has been denied when the 
essentiality of government services is hindered.  However, the public has adapted in 
recent years to postal strikes, teacher strikes, and other disruptions of public service as 
public service labor bargaining has become more accepted by the general public.  
 The history of the laws of public sector collective bargaining and the right to 
strike go back to the Philadelphia Cordwainers’ Case (Commonwealth v. Pullis, 1806).  
In order to understand the state of public employee labor law in the United States, it is 
necessary to provide a detailed review of the history of all labor law, public and private.  
In Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), the English common law set the precedent, stating 
that “jumping wages” by force of a strike or other concerted action was illegal and open 
to fine and possible imprisonment.  The decision in Pullis effectively made unions illegal.   
 In Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842), a similar situation as in Pullis arose and the 
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defendants were charged with “conspiracy” but the courts ruled that such “societies” and 
associations were legal as long as the actions taken by the unions were not criminal in 
nature.  Hunt set a precedent outside the scope of common law for years to come by 
allowing the concerted activities of labor unions.  However any activity that was deemed 
harmful to the employer could result in financial liability on the part of the union.  The 
courts were now responsible to find a judicial balance between the competing economic 
interests of the workers and the employers.  The courts were also expected to consider the 
overall benefit or detriment to the public.   
 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 provided statutory language that “unlawful 
conspiracies” would be brought to the courts.  The Act was passed to promote 
competition and to break up large monopolies but did not benefit the unions.  In two 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled directly in relation to the application of the Sherman 
Act.  In Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) and Lawlor v. Loewe (1915), under § 7 of the Sherman 
Act, the Court ruled against union activity for preventing free trade and commerce and 
permitted an award for damages.   
 The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 was passed to give relief to labor unions and to 
support the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act.  The Clayton Antitrust Act stated that 
unions were not “illegal combinations” or conspiracies in restraint of trade.   
 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 provided boundaries for injunctions not to be 
given without proper hearing and finding of fact.  The National Labor Relations Act of 
1935 created a national administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to manage labor and management relations in the United States.  The NLRB 
provided that  
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining (NLRA, 1935).   
 
 The NLRB became the “expert agency” in regulating labor disputes.  Labor 
organizations were permitted to protest unfair working conditions and to act in their 
workers’ best interests.  Management was required to bargain in good faith. 
 The NLRB was designed to develop a body of case law that would oversee the 
relationship between labor and management.  In one of the first cases, NLRB v. Jones and 
Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937), the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the constitutional 
theory that Congress was to regulate labor relations.  The NLRB was authorized by the 
Act to prevent employers from taking discriminatory and coercive action against 
employees and their union and to preclude employers from interfering with the 
employees’ right to self-organization.  The NLRB was further empowered and supported 
by the authority of the Circuit Court of Appeals.  The courts demonstrated their support 
of the NLRB by backing the findings of the NLRB and not undermining the agency by 
changing its decisions at will.   
 In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company (1960), the courts 
further showed their support of the NLRB by holding that it was not for the courts to 
weigh the merits of a grievance or the equities of an employee’s claim.  The Labor 
Management Relations Act clearly stated that the claim made by a party, employee or 
employer, was to be considered on its face and governed by the contract, and the court 
had no business interfering with this process.  The courts upheld this general view of the 
Board’s authority to ensure a uniform federal interpretation of the law.   
 In the early days of the NLRA, Congress passed several laws in order to better 
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working conditions in the United States.  The Social Security Act, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act were passed in an effort to improve the overall 
conditions in the workplace.  The Taft-Hartley Act was written in an effort to balance the 
ground rules between employers and employees.  In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act made 
all strikes by government employees illegal.   
 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) was passed by 
Congress to prevent unfair labor practices by employers.  The LMRDA helped to reduce 
corruption and racketeering in unions and included a “bill of rights” for union members.  
The LMRDA and the Taft-Hartley Act further supported the NLRA and provided 
guidelines for employers and employees to follow in collective bargaining.   
 As the legal activities of the unions and the employers became more defined, the 
issue of picketing came up in several cases.  In Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), the 
petitioner was charged and convicted for picketing.  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that it was not justified to proscribe the “freedom of discussion” and reversed 
the decision.  In other cases following Thornhill, the U.S. Supreme Court further defined 
the boycott and clarified that the First Amendment did not protect violence. 
Violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment.  The presence of activity 
protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may 
give rise to damages liability and on the persons who may be held accountable for 
those damages (Claiborne, 1982).    
 
 The Court was not willing to protect behavior that was violent and illegal, but the 
Court did not see speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism as a basis for legal 
damages award.  The NLRA was written to promote collective bargaining where parties 
would have the widest latitude in bargaining tactics, pressure, and economic weaponry.  
The NLRB was not designed to over-regulate the bargaining process.   
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  Employers challenged the actions taken by unions and their members.  In NLRB 
v. Insurance Agents (1960), the employer complained that the “slowdown” was an unfair 
labor practice under § 8 (b) (3) the NLRA which stated that  
§ 8 (b) (3).  It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its 
agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the 
representative of his employees. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the NLRB and stated that the 
Board was not set up to be an arbiter of the kinds of economic weapons being used by 
both sides.  The behavior of the unions continued to be reviewed by the courts.  Some 
actions were considered protected and other actions were called unprotected or 
prohibited.  § 7 of the NLRA guaranteed that  
§ 7.  Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.   
 
 In addition § 13 of the NLRA clearly protected the right to strike. 
§ 13.  The right to strike is preserved.  Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as 
either to interfere with or impede or diminish the right to strike.  
 
In response to the concerted activities of the unions, the employers responded  
with the lockout.  In American Ship Building Company v. National Labor Relations 
Board (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the company lockout did not violate § 8 
(a)(1) or (a)(3) of the NLRA when, after a bargaining impasse was reached, the employer 
created a lockout situation by temporarily shutting down his plant for the sole purpose of 
bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position.   
 The courts considered the requirements of “good faith bargaining” and continued 
to review the balance of economic and strategic bargaining power between unions and 
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employers.  The courts upheld the obligation of both sides to bargain to impasse on 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.  The courts provided that for items to be considered 
mandatory, they had to bear a direct and significant relationship to the terms and 
conditions of employment.   
 The unions and employers made great efforts to come to terms with the issues of 
what was legal and what was not legal in terms of labor negotiations.  The unions wanted 
to keep the option to strike in order to hold their ground economically and strategically to 
ensure a fair contract.  The employers complained about loss of business and customers 
and requested from the courts the right to hold lockouts and to hire permanent 
replacements.   
 The courts supported arbitration as a means to resolve labor conflict.  Arbitration 
was preferred over the strike, lockout, or other methods of “economic warfare.”  The 
NLRB facilitated the arbitration process by using its own jurisdiction and by not reversing 
the arbitrators’ awards when the arbitration process was fair and the unfair labor practice 
issue had been addressed by the arbitrator.   
 A very important part of the evolution of labor relations in the United States is the 
development and implementation of Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights 
laws.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 influenced the way employers and employees accomplished their 
work every day.   
 Labor relations in the public sector have been shaped by the history and precedent 
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set in the private sector, however, the public sector is set apart from the private sector 
with many notable differences, economically, strategically, and politically.  The Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 adopted many of the provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act, 
providing a pattern of labor relations for the public sector to be similar to the private 
sector.   
 Public sector collective bargaining caused a great deal of controversy.  One of the 
major arguments against the applicability of private sector labor law to the public sector 
was that the economics was very different.  The private sector in the United States was 
based on a market economy that did not apply to the public sector.  The public sector 
included an important political process that affected the relationship between employer 
and employee that simply did not exist in the private sector.  The public interest was held 
against the needs of the government employees to strike.   
 In most cases, federal employees were not permitted to bargain on the topic of 
compensation.  Federal workers were also prohibited from striking.  State employees 
were not required to treat employees any differently, unless delineated by state law.  
Collective bargaining at all public employment levels was discouraged on the basis of the 
privilege doctrine, stating that government employment benefits were privileges and not 
rights.  Government services were characterized as “essential” and many bargaining 
rights were denied to public employees, but in more recent years, citizens have come to 
accept many civil service strikes: postal workers, air traffic controllers, teachers, and 
other local level workers.   
 President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 established the union in public sector 
employment.  President Nixon’s Executive Order 11491 tried to improve the negotiation 
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process in the public sector.  President Clinton’s Executive Order 12871 established the 
National Partnership Council to advise the President and propose specific reforms in the 
law for employee relations in the government.  The executive order required each 
government agency to establish “labor-management partnerships” programs.   
 Public sector labor relations at the state level exist without a comprehensive 
common legal framework.  State and local labor relations are determined through a 
complex map of common law doctrines, judicial decrees, executive orders, statutes, and 
ordinances.  The labor relations situation for public employees has been extremely 
diverse in each city, county and state in the United States.   
 State and local government employees, unlike their federal counterparts, have 
often resorted to strikes as a way to impose their needs on their respective government 
employers.   
 First Amendment rights allowed a government worker to join a union without fear 
of being discharged.  However the rights of the government employee were balanced by 
the interests of the state and local governments’ requirement to provide pubic services.   
 Employers continued to resist the possibility of legalizing public employee strikes 
because of the sovereign nature of government and the fundamental necessity of 
government services.  State and local governments resorted to three basic procedures to 
press the process of finality: mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.   
 Public policies varied greatly among the states and some public policies had a 
greater impact on reducing strike frequency for public employees.  Arbitration in its 
various forms: interest arbitration, final offer arbitration, and binding arbitration 
attempted to stem the tide of striking public employees.  The trend in public sector 
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bargaining has been toward mutual responsibility for wages, hours, and working 
conditions, but the conflict between sovereignty and accountability and bilateral authority 
has been strongly debated and continues to exist in a state of fluctuation.  The movement 
of work involvement and labor-management cooperation continues to grow more 
prevalent in the work environment.   
 
Summary of State Statutes 
 
 The review of state statutes and case law provided a clear geographic pattern to 
the status of public employee labor law.  The Southern states through the Southwestern 
and into the Western states (Region I) predominantly have No State Collective 
Bargaining Laws.  The Northeastern through the Midwestern and parts of the Western 
states (Region II) have Collective Bargaining Laws.  Florida and Tennessee were the 
exceptions in the South.  In the Northeastern, Midwestern and Western states (Region 
III), ten states Permitted Strikes, plus Alaska and Hawaii, to make a total of twelve states 
to permit public employees to strike.   
 Unions and employee associations represented about 40 percent of State and local 
government workers in the late 1990s.  This number has continued a steady rise in the 
last five years.  The rights of public sector employees to organize and bargain collectively 
vary from state to state.  There are important differences in governments’ willingness to 
permit strikes and disruptions of public services (Cimini, 1998).   
 Unionization in State and local government did not grow significantly until the 
1960s and 1970s after President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988.  States adopted 
a variety of laws for managing collective bargaining in the public sector.  Laws varied 
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from comprehensive laws, covering all classes of public employees, to laws in some 
states which only dealt with specific groups of employees such as police, firefighters, and 
teachers.  The status of collective bargaining also changed from state to state, from 
mandatory to permissive, with some states providing “meet and confer” options.     
 State legislatures have generally prohibited strikes by State and local government 
employees up until the 1960s.  In the 1990s and more recently, 12 States have either 
statutorily or through common law and additional legal acts provided for the right to 
strike to public sector employees.   
 Alaska state law affirms the right of public employees to strike unless it 
“threatens the health, safety, or welfare of the public.”  California prohibits only pre-
impasse strikes and otherwise does not specifically provide or prohibit public employee 
strike activity.  Hawaii has statutorily recommended “joint-decision making” and 
provides public employees the right to strike and also has an arbitration process in lieu of 
striking.  Montana prohibits strikes by health care facility members under certain 
conditions.  There are no additional limitations on other public employees when striking.  
Ohio prohibits strikes by public safety personnel.  Strike action by other public sector 
employees is permitted if impasse has not been resolved.  Oregon prohibits strikes by 
police, firefighters and health workers.  All other public employees have the right to 
strike after following mediation and fact-finding procedures.  Pennsylvania does not 
permit strikes by prison and mental health personnel.  Strikes by other public employees 
are allowed after following mediation and fact-finding procedures.  Vermont prohibits 
State employees from striking.  Municipal employees in the “performance of official 
duties” may also not strike.  All other public employees can strike after following fact-
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finding procedures and arbitration.  Wisconsin prohibits State employees from striking.  
Municipal employees are permitted to strike after mediation-arbitration procedures have 
failed.   
 In Region I, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia have no collective bargaining laws.  In 
these states, labor law activities are sanctioned by court decisions, attorney general 
opinions, local ordinances and executive orders.   
 In Board of Education of the Scottsdale High School District v. Scottsdale 
Education Association (1972), the Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that the 
decision of either party in entering into a collective bargaining agreement remains 
optional and to compel or coerce either side to bargain against its better judgment is 
improper. 
 In Arkansas, workers are encouraged to work with supervisors to determine their 
own working conditions by using the process of “meet and confer” or any other method 
of agreed on negotiation.   
 In North Carolina, public employees are prohibited from bargaining.  In Texas, 
public employees are prohibited from bargaining, and in Virginia the laws do not 
recognize public employees’ rights to collectively bargain.   
 In Region II, states have collective bargaining laws that vary from comprehensive 
to permissive.  Connecticut has laws that define and protect the statutory rights of public 
sector employees to “form, join or assist labor organizations.”  Connecticut law prohibits 
strikes but provides for impasse resolution through binding arbitration.  Florida public 
employees are permitted to collectively bargain but not to strike.  Mediation is an option 
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previous to impasse resolution.  Beyond impasse, there is no statement that compels 
either party to agree or is required to make concessions and the agreement is not binding.  
Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Michigan provide for 
public employee collective bargaining as written in the representative state statute but 
restrict public employees from striking.  In Nebraska, public employee collective 
bargaining is supported by statute and mediators are used to assist with negotiations and 
the Special Master’s ruling is binding.        
Conclusions 
 
1.  The overall working conditions in the organized sector of the United States 
economy are determined by collective bargaining on a daily basis and not solely by 
legislation.  There are three main pieces of legislation that have helped govern industrial 
relations:  The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), The Railway Labor Act of 
1926 (RLA), and The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(LMRDA).  
2.  The behavior of unions was reviewed by the courts and some actions were 
considered protected and others were unprotected or prohibited.  Actions which were 
prohibited could be cause for the NLRB to obtain a cease-and-desist order through an 
administrative process or from the circuit court of appeals.   
3.  § 7 of the NLRA provided that employees “shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to 
engage in concerted activities.”  The Supreme Court held that walkouts were generally 
protected activity.   
4.  The U.S. Supreme Court examined the dynamics and specifics of the strike.  § 
 164
13 of the NLRA stated that nothing in the NLRA was written to interfere with the right to 
strike.  However, the right to strike met some limitations.  Taft-Hartley prohibited strikes 
during emergencies affecting national security and health.   
5.  In response to the strike, the employers utilized the lockout.  In American Ship 
Building Company v. National Labor Relations Board (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the employer had not violated the NLRA when he shut down the plant and laid 
off his workers for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure in support of his 
bargaining position.  
6.  Equality issues are addressed in collective bargaining, but the main support for 
ensuring that equal employment opportunities are available in the workplace is through 
the following federal civil rights laws:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 
Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and The Civil Rights Act of 
1991  
7.  The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) placed into statutory form many 
of the provisions that already existed in executive orders.  Title VII of the CSRA adopted 
many of the concepts in the Taft-Hartley Act, creating an environment of labor relations 
in the federal government which was similar to the private sector.   
8.  Public employment in the United States has been legally classified as a 
“privilege” and not a “right.”  Federal workers were prohibited from striking.  Executive 
Order 10988 (1962) defined three types of unions: formal, informal, and exclusive.  
Many topics that were commonly bargained for in the private sector were excluded form 
negotiations in the federal government.   
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9.  There is no comprehensive common legal framework for state and local 
government employees.  State and local labor relations were defined by common-law 
doctrines, judicial decrees, executive orders, statutes, and ordinances.  The large majority 
of jurisdictions prohibited public employees from striking, however state and local 
government employees have resorted to strikes numerous times in the last 30 years.   
10.  There are three main classifications of public bargaining laws: (a) states with 
no specific provisions for collective bargaining or where bargaining is illegal; (b) states 
where labor organizations have the right to present their views but falls short of the 
“duty-to-bargain”, states which have a duty-to-bargain but no compulsory arbitration 
mechanism, states which have duty-to-bargain and provide compulsory arbitration; and 
(c) states that permit strikes.   
11.  The at-will doctrine of employment, absent a contract, allows any employer 
or employee to end the working relationship at their own will, at any time, for almost any 
reason, including no reason at all.  The courts have developed three broad categories of 
exceptions to the employer’s right to terminate employees at will: public policy, breach 
of implied contract, and implied covenant of good faith.   
 
Recommendations 
 
1.  A balance must be found between the interest of public employees as citizens 
and the interest of the state as an employer delivering on public services.  Public sector 
collective bargaining has come into conflict at the state level with civil service 
regulations.  Unions continue to work in this area of disagreement between civil service 
codes and the collective bargaining statutes and agreements to expand the scope of public 
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sector bargaining.  Local governments should not enter in to collective bargaining 
agreements with employee organizations without state passed legislation authorization.     
2.  The sovereign nature of government and the fundamental necessity of 
government services, except in the case of emergency services such as police, fire, and 
medical, should not preclude the public employee from participating in concerted 
activities, including the strike.  State and local governments have resorted to three basic 
procedures to press the finality of negotiations: mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.  
Binding arbitration attempts to prevent strikes through legally imposed penalties for 
failure to reach agreement.   
3.  The mechanism for resolving disputes is one of the most important issues 
facing the public sector.  Local, state, and federal government agencies should utilize the 
wide range of available impasse resolution methods.  Governments without adequate 
laws for resolving impasse, either in statute, agreement, or case law, should experiment 
with alternative methods of dispute resolution.   
4.  Public sector labor relations, limited because the right to strike does not exist 
in most states, through legislation, court decisions, or attorney-general opinions, should 
implement alternative methods to dispute resolution to include: arbitration, conciliation, 
facilitation, fact-finding, negotiation and mediation.   
5.  Public sector employees have implemented “meet and confer” methods with 
employers where the responsibility of key decisions regarding wages, hours, and working 
conditions are shared and discussed openly among employers and employees.  The 
conflict between sovereignty and accountability and bilateral authority has continued to 
be a topic of discussion and disagreement.  Employers and employees should continue to 
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make attempts to reach agreements in the best interests of the employees, the public, and 
the government agency.    
6. Public sector employees’ rights vary greatly from state to state.  Three main 
Regions exist, divided by the absence of state collective bargaining and strike legislation, 
the presence of state legislation, and the right of public employees to strike.  States rights 
should be preserved but the disparity in public employees’ rights in the United States, 
from state to state, should be addressed by the federal government in conjunction with the 
representative legislatures of each state and governors.  A standard level of public 
employees’ rights, to include the right to bargain and the right to strike, should be 
provided by federal law, at a minimum, permitting each state to support the law through 
further legislation, which would better define the law, to specifically address the local 
needs and to provide a higher standard, without removing any rights of the employer or 
the employee. 
7.  Healthcare has emerged as the most contentious bargaining issue.  Health 
insurance in the United States is tied to employment.  In unionized employment, 
healthcare is “bargainable.”  Employers are not legally bound by state or federal law to 
provide a standard of health coverage.  As costs continue to rise, employers have 
attempted to reduce coverage and pass a larger portion of the costs to the employees, by 
using the bargaining table as the forum for negotiation.  Federal and state legislation 
should be written to provide a standard level of care for all employees.  The collective 
bargaining of employee and employee family healthcare should not be permitted, and the 
practice of pushing the cost ever more to the employee should be prohibited.        
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Honorable ________________, Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
------------------------------ 
------------------------------ 
 
January 1, 2004 
 
 
 
As a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, Florida, I am 
conducting research for a dissertation concerning Public Employee Labor Law in the 
United States.  My research includes case law and state and federal statutes. 
 
I am writing to you to request your assistance.  I would like to confirm the law from your 
state for both case law and statute.   
 
• At this time, does your state have an active law written that directly addresses 
both/either collective bargaining and/or striking for public employees? 
 
I am interested in the statutory language as written in your state.  I am also researching 
the most significant case law of the past ten years, from approximately 1990 to today.   
 
• When were the statutes written?  Have they been challenged in court? 
 
I appreciate your help in addressing the above listed questions.  I hope to have a positive 
impact on this very important and current topic – public employee labor law.   
 
Please return all information in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope.  I can be 
reached by telephone at (321) 779-2000, ext. 213, at Satellite High School in Brevard 
County, Florida and via email at bulao@brevard.k12.fl.us.   
 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.   
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Oleh A. Bula  
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Secretary of Education 
------------------------------ 
------------------------------ 
 
January 1, 2004 
 
 
 
As a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, Florida, I am 
conducting research for a dissertation concerning Public Employee Labor Law in the 
United States.  My research includes case law and state and federal statutes.   
 
I am writing to you to request your assistance.  I would like to confirm the law from your 
state for both case law and statute.   
 
• At this time, does your state have an active law written that directly addresses 
both/either collective bargaining and/or striking for public employees? 
 
I am interested in the statutory language as written in your state.  I am also researching 
the most significant case law of the past ten years, from approximately 1990 to today.   
 
• When were the statutes written?  Have they been challenged in court? 
 
In addition, if you have information concerning administrative rules that are mandated by 
school boards at the local level, please include this data as well. 
 
I appreciate your help in addressing the above listed questions.  I hope to have a positive 
impact on this very important and current topic – public employee labor law.   
 
Please return all information in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope.  I can be 
reached by telephone at (321) 779-2000, ext. 213, at Satellite High School in Brevard 
County, Florida and via email at bulao@brevard.k12.fl.us.   
 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.   
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Oleh A. Bula  
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APPENDIX D: 
TABLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES 
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The Alaska Public Employment Relations Act, Alaska Statutes Title 23, Ch. 40, §§  
23.40.070 et seq.  
The California State Employer-Employee Relations Act, Government Code §§ 3512 –  
3524.   
The California Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, Government Code §§ 3500 – 3511. 
The California Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code §§ 3540 –  
3549.3. 
The California Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, Government Code  
§§ 3560 – 3599.   
The California Excluded Employees Bill of Rights Act, Government Code §§ 3525 – 
3539.5.   
The Connecticut Teachers’ Negotiations Act, Connecticut General Statutes, §§ 10-153 (a)  
et seq. 
The Delaware Public School Employment Relations Act, Ch. 40, §§ 4001 – 4019.   
The Florida Public Employees Act, Florida Statutes, Chapter 447, Labor Organizations  
and Public Employees, §§ 447.201 and 447.203. 
The Georgia Firefighters Mediation Act.  O.C.G.A. § 25-5-1. 
The Hawaii Public Employee Bargaining Rights, Hawaii Rev. Stats., Ch. 89, § 89-1 et  
seq.    
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 315/1 – 315/7. 
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1 – 5/20.   
The Indiana Certified Educational Employee Bargaining Statute, Indiana Code §§ 20- 
7.5-1-1 to 20-7.5-1-14. 
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The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, Iowa Code, §§ 20.1 – 20.26.   
The Kentucky Revised Statutes, Firefighters’ Bargaining Rights, K.R.S. Ch. 345, §§  
345.010 et seq.   
The Kentucky Revised Statutes, Police Bargaining Rights, K.R.S. Ch. 78, §§ 78.400 et  
seq.    
The Maine Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Title  
26, §§ 961-974. 
The Maine State Employee Labor Relations Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Title 26, §§ 979- 
979-Q.   
The Maryland State Employees Collective Bargaining Law, Md. Code Ann., § 3-101 et  
seq.   
The Maryland State Noncertified Public School Employees Bargaining Law, Md. Code  
Ann., §§ 6-501 – 6-510.  
The Maryland State Teachers Bargaining Law, Md. Code Ann., §§ 6-401 – 6-411 
The Massachusetts Public Employee Bargaining Rights, Mass. Ann. Laws, Ch. 150E, §§  
1 – 15.    
The Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 423.201 –  
423.216.  
The Montana Collective Bargaining Law for Public Employees, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39- 
31-101 to 39-31-409.   
The Municipal Employee Relations Act, Connecticut General Statutes, §§ 7-467 et seq. 
The Nebraska State Employees Collective Bargaining Act, Nebraska Const. Article 13,  
Ch. 81, § 81-1369 et seq.   
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The North Carolina General Statutes, Public Employee Labor Law.  N.C.G.S. Ch. 95,  
Art. 12, § 95-98.  
The Ohio Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4117.01- 
4117.23. 
The Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, O.R.S. § 243.650 et seq. 
The Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 43, §§ 1101.101 –  
1101.2301.  
The State Employee Relations Act, Connecticut General Statutes, §§ 5-270 et seq.     
The Texas Government Code, Collective Bargaining, Ch. 617, § 617.002 (a).   
The Vermont State Employees Labor Relations Act, Vt. Stat. Ann., Title 3, Ch. 27, §§ 901- 
1006. 
The Vermont Labor Relations for Teaches Act, Vt. Stat. Ann., Title 16, Ch. 57, §§ 1981 –  
2010. 
The Code of Virginia, Labor and Employment, Title 40.1, § 57.2.   
The Wisconsin State Employees’ Bargaining Rights, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.80 – 111.97.  
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APPENDIX E: 
TABLE OF FEDERAL STATUTES AND ORDERS 
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (LEXIS 2004).   
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 126 (LEXIS 2004). 
 
The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 2000 (e) (2) (LEXIS 2004).   
 
The Civil Service Reform Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160, 7101 - 7201 (LEXIS 1978). 
 
The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 17, 26 (1970), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (LEXIS 1979). 
 
The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (LEXIS 2004).   
 
The Erdman Act, c. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898). 
 
Executive Order 10988, 27 Fed. Register 551 (1962). 
 
Executive Order 11491, 34 Fed. Register 17605 (1969). 
 
Executive Order 12871, 58 Fed. Register 52 (1993). 
 
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (LEXIS 2003). 
 
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (LEXIS 2003).  
 
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (LEXIS 2003). 
 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (LEXIS 2003). 
.  
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (LEXIS 2003). 
 
The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (LEXIS 2004). 
 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 1 et seq. (LEXIS 1976). 
 
The Social Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (LEXIS 2003). 
 
The Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (LEXIS 2003). 
 
The United States Constitution, Article I, § 8. 
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